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Abstract
This thesis analyses the euro zone sovereign crisis from a macroeconomic
perspective with a focus on the interaction between sovereign risk, financial
markets and the real economy at the euro area currency union-wide level. The
first part consists of an empirical study on the euro zone asset markets. It
computes and analyses the dynamic comovements of stock and sovereign bonds
for the core and the periphery of the euro zone focusing on the geographical and
asset dimension of the markets. This comprehensive approach allows shading
new light on European financial markets with respect to studies that focus at
only one dimension. Results suggest that further economic integration would be
desirable but that, at the moment, Europe is a tale of two regions. The second
part of the thesis consists of two chapters dealing with the modeling of the euro
zone financial markets and the study of the international transmission of shocks.
Chapter 3 focuses on the international transmission of soverei...
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Chapter 1
Sovereign debt crisis and
financial markets
1.1 Introduction
A sovereign debt crisis is generally linked to the perceived inability of a
country to pay its public debt. A country’s public debt is considered sustain-
able when government budget constraints can be met without disrupting
the country’s monetary and fiscal policies. This implies that the amount
of public debt should not exceed the present value of all future primary
surpluses. Government’s borrowings usually exceed the capacity to repay
when a country reaches critical high debt levels and suffers from low economic
growth.
The euro zone sovereign crisis was prompted by the financial crisis
started in 2007 that lead to a reassessment among investors of asset prices,
growth prospects and sustainability of large external deficits in the euro area.
That was particularly the case for periphery countries that displayed high
macroeconomic imbalances. In these countries, the reassessment determined
a private credit outflow, tightening of credit and troubles on the national
banking systems. Governments were forced to step in and to increase their
budgets. For those countries that were already experiencing high levels of
debt that created additional concerns about their sustainability. Countries
like Greece, Ireland and Portugal first, Spain and Italy then, started to
report increasing levels of public debt and rising bond yields in government
securities. As a consequence these countries were facing rising bond yields
spreads vis-a`-vis the rest of the union intensifying the internal imbalances.
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At the same time, the periphery sovereign’s troubles translated into new
banking sector problems at the euro area level as the credit tightening linked
to sovereign default risk perceptions impeded the well functioning of the
common monetary policy.
Much of the existing literature on sovereign debt crisis focused on their
national dimension. However, there is an important difference between
countries that control their own monetary policy and those that instead
belong to a currency union. The firsts can always count on their central
banks behaving as lender of last resort in case of troubles on their sovereigns.
The governments of these countries can always force the central bank to
buy the government securities and avoid default, the main problem being
a possible increase in inflation.1 In a currency union instead, governments
loose their ability of issuing debt over which they have full control. In the
euro zone, the European Central Bank for instance is prevented by its statute
from acquiring debt securities issued by member countries. Missing a lender
of last resort financial markets become very powerful as liquidity problems
can force these countries’ sovereigns into default.
The present thesis aims to study the euro zone sovereign crisis from a
macroeconomic perspective with a focus on the interaction between sovereign
risk, financial markets and the real economy at the euro area currency union-
wide level.
A vast body of research recently focused on the periphery country dimen-
sion of the sovereign debt crisis. On the one hand the literature looked in
depth at sovereign bond yields spreads and contagion. Credit risk, liquidity
risk and risk aversion proved to be the three main sources of risk determin-
ing the behaviour of sovereign yields with respect to the benchmark bond,
normally the one of Germany. On the macroeconomic dimension, debt levels
and current account imbalances were found to be the main drivers of the
yields together with general risk aversion and financial uncertainty.
On the other hand,2 the literature on sovereign risk and banking focused
on the transmission of the sovereign’s turmoil to banks and ultimately to the
real economy. Empirical studies conducted at the national level, in periphery
countries, highlighted two channels of transmission: the bank capital and
1However if this privilege is used to maintain a budget deficit that leads to demand that
is excessive with respect to the economy’s productive capacity for too long, the resulting
increase in prices would have disastrous economic and social consequences.
2Additionally a vast part of the literature focuses on fiscal policy and sovereign debt
crisis. In this thesis we completely abstain from its study.
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collateral channel. These studies reported an increase in lending rates driven
by the higher sovereign interest rates. The theoretical literature explored
extensively the role of bank’s balance sheet showing that the greater is the
default risk, the weaker are the bank’s balance sheets. The key idea is that
sovereign default risk raises the funding costs of the private sector because
of the increase in the costs of financial intermediation. However, in the euro
zone, the banking sectors of the different countries are tightly linked via the
interbank markets and are characterised by high cross-border exposure to
sovereign debt. In this environment the increased costs of intermediation
and the reduction in credit not only affect the periphery countries but their
effect transmits also to the core region.
The contribution of this dissertation is to go beyond the periphery dimen-
sion of the euro area sovereign debt crisis and to provide a comprehensive
study of the determinants of the behaviour of euro area asset markets and
of the union-wide banking sector’s transmission role.
From an empirical point of view, the contribution of this thesis is the
use of a comprehensive approach to study in depth the relation between
sovereign bonds and equity markets in the euro area. This comprehensive
approach allows to discover patterns between assets and countries that would
be otherwise neglected. For instance relative imbalances between the core
and the periphery of the euro zone and balance of payments dynamics played
a major role for the behaviour of these markets, not only for bonds, as
highlighted in the previous literature, but also for stocks. Moreover, this
thesis attests the driving role of macroeconomic variables before and during
the sovereign debt crisis for the behaviour of asset markets, as opposed to
the debated view in the literature of a change in investor’s perceptions on
the economic situation.
From a theoretical point of view, the contribution of this thesis is to
develop a two-country DSGE framework, as opposed to closed-economy
models as those used in the literature on sovereign debt, wherein to explain
the role of the banking sector in the transmission of the sovereign risk within
the union. One of the main results suggests that the banking sector and, in
particular the banking structure, is the key for the transmission of sovereign
default risk within the euro area. The study of the different degrees of
banking integration further suggests that a well integrated banking sector
reduces the negative consequences of sovereign default at the euro area level.
Another finding shows that financial intermediaries are also determinant
for the transmission of other sources of shock within the union and, ultimately,
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for the behaviour of asset markets. Without credit constraints, asymmetric
shocks in the union imply asymmetric impacts on the core and periphery
asset markets. The existence of credit constraints at the international
bank level prompts more synchronization in asset markets’ responses and
a more homogeneous sharing of the effects of shocks between countries.
This consequently affects the behaviour of asset markets at the euro area
union-wide level. The ignorance of such relation was a relevant missing bloc
in the open economy financial macroeconomics DSGE literature.
1.2 Overview
This dissertation consists of three chapters, all of them are self-contained
works that are presented following the chronological order of development
during the period of the Ph.D of the author.
The first part of the thesis consists of an empirical study on the euro
zone asset markets. Chapter 2 is a joint work with Wessel Vermeulen that
studies the macroeconomic determinants of the behaviour of euro zone
asset’s markets. It computes and analyses the dynamic comovements of
stock and bonds for the core and the periphery of the euro zone focusing on
the geographical and asset dimension of the markets. This comprehensive
approach allows to shade new light on European financial markets with
respect to studies that focus at only one dimension. The cross-country
panel regressions highlight the importance of macroeconomic variables and
of the heterogeneity in fundamentals between the core and the periphery
of the union but not a primary role for investor’s change in perceptions
on the economic situation. The regressions confirmed the importance of
variables like relative inflation, stock market uncertainty, economic growth
differentials and policy rate and additionally, they find a significant impact
for balance of payments-related variables. Results suggest that further
economic integration would be desirable but that, at the moment, Europe is
a tale of two regions.
The second part of this dissertation consists of two chapters dealing
with the modelling of the euro zone financial markets and the study of the
international transmission of shocks. Chapter 3 is a joint work with Olivier
Pierrard. It focuses on the international transmission of sovereign debt
default and looks at the spillover from the periphery to the core. The shock
is mainly transmitted to the other region via financial intermediaries and
in particular via the bank balance sheet channel and the collateral channel.
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The study of different degrees of banking integration suggests the desirability
of more banking integration for the euro area welfare. The policy analysis,
on the one hand reinforces the recent debate on the need of counter-cyclical
requirements in order to reduce output volatility; on the other hand, it shows
that extending the Taylor rule to target sovereign spreads does not really
allow to reduce output and inflation volatility. In general, for any policy,
the welfare costs of stabilising the economy are much lower under a well
integrated banking sector.
Chapter 4 develops a new theoretical framework useful to study the
behaviour of euro zone financial markets. It expands the model of Chapter
3 by introducing international equity markets. This framework allows to
explore, for the first time in the literature, the relation between financial
intermediaries and asset markets for the euro zone. Results point to the key
role of this interaction as a driver of the time varying stock-bond correlation.
Thank to this general equilibrium model, by looking at the correlation on
the equity and sovereign bond markets, it is possible to detect the sources of
shocks that hit the euro area. For instance, a technology shock determines
a negative correlation on the stock-bond market; a financial expectation
shock a positive one and a sovereign risk shock an heterogeneous behaviour
of periphery and core stock-bond markets as highlighted in Chapter 2.

Chapter 2
Macro-economic
determinants of European
stock and government bond
correlations: A tale of two
regions1
2.1 Introduction
In the first decade following the introduction of the Euro, Euro-zone financial
markets showed an increasing degree of integration and of economic and
financial convergence.2 This showed up both in the equity and sovereign
bond markets. With respect to the latter, it appeared that differences in
current accounts, balance of payments, debt ratios and growth rates were
1This chapter is based on Perego and Vermeulen (2013).
2See for instance Kim et al. (2006), discussed further below. Just before the crisis
broke, the European Commission celebrated the 10 year anniversary of the euro with
the publication of a booklet that documents the “macroeconomic stability” and “financial
integration” that resulted from the monetary union. Joaqu´ın Almunia, Commissioner
for Economic and Monetary Affairs, wrote: “[F]or the world, the euro is a major new
pillar in the international monetary system and a pole of stability for the global economy.”
(European Commission, 2008, p. iii).
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not captured by the markets.3 However, after the revelation of the Greek
financial mis-report and the beginning of the sovereign debt crisis at the
end of 2009, the differences in fundamentals showed up in bond spreads
as fears of southern countries’ defaults mounted. One well-known piece
of evidence at this point was the flight-to-quality from southern countries’
bonds towards their “risk-free” northern counterparts. Instead the equity
markets did not suffer such a strong flight-to-quality between countries but
suffered from higher volatility. Starting from those two observations, this
work studies the dynamic correlations of the bond, stock and bond-stock
markets of the Euro-zone and tries to test their relations with the evolution
of the macroeconomic determinants before and during the recent crisis.
Understanding the time varying behaviour of the stock and bond correla-
tions and which factors affect their development is of primary importance for
investors as well as for policy makers. Asset allocations and risk management
directly rely on the correlation between a portfolio’s assets, where negative
correlations across regions and assets offer opportunities for diversification
and for the hedging of risks. Moreover, a well-functioning financial market
is crucial for the wider economy. Since stocks and government bonds ac-
count for a dominant share in all traded financial assets as well as in banks’
balance sheets, the determinants of such comovements become of interest
for regulatory and monetary authorities as well. In particular, macroeco-
nomic determinants of stock and bond returns correlations, such as inflation,
economic growth and balance of payment indicators can provide useful in-
formation for monetary policy on the status of financial markets and the
expectations of investors. In addition, it is essential to understand the role
of macroeconomic determinants, which include fiscal variables, in order to
implement optimal policies at the national level and their coordination in
the Euro-zone. Since the spreading of the financial turmoil and the sovereign
debt crisis in the Euro-zone, European countries started showing divergent
macro-financial behaviour, which triggered concerns about the preservation
of the single currency.
While the previous literature has focused on the stock, bond and stock-
bond market categories separately, assessing the role of macroeconomic
determinants at the national level (see Section 2.2), this work studies the
three categories in the Euro-zone in a new way by analysing all the relations
3Besides economic indicators, there are institutional (e.g. government setup, health
and elderly insurance) and sociological (e.g. participation rate, demography) differences
that are highlighted now but were of little concern before.
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simultaneously. This general approach to financial markets enables us to
highlight patterns between assets and countries that would otherwise remain
hidden and ignored, thereby giving important insights on the European
financial integration. Therefore, we will pay attention to the differences
within the Euro-zone. Specifically, for the estimations we do not consider
the European Monetary Union (EMU) as one economic unit but -with the
benefit of hindsight- we divide our sample of Euro-zone countries in two
groups (north and south) and proceed in two steps.
First, for each country pair and asset combination we compute the time-
varying dynamic conditional correlations (DCC) using the Engle (2002)
methodology, which has proved a useful methodology to reflect relations
among markets. By grouping together the correlation pairs at the asset-
region level we study six categories of correlations: cross-asset for both
regions, cross-region for both assets and cross asset-region correlations (i.e.
north-bond south-stock and north-stock south-bond).
In the second step we conduct a panel study to find the macroeconomic
determinants of the six pairwise correlations. Theory predicts differentiated
impacts of macroeconomic fundamentals based on cash flow determinants,
risk determinants and the interaction of the two.4 We will analyse to what
extent the impact of such determinants have changed since the European
debt crisis. This method allows us to look at all country-asset relations
simultaneously and show how macroeconomic factors affected these relations
differently.
We find that the division between north and south helps to visualise
the divergence in the Euro-zone for the cross-asset correlation and subse-
quently helps to explain the underlying determinants of such divergence.
The disintegration of the bond market over time is clearly leading to the
heterogeneous effects on the other asset markets. Additionally, our regression
results show that the correlations are mostly driven by two factors: the
relative uncertainty between countries and balance of payments dynamics,
represented by the current account and government debt. We find that the
balance of payments dynamics are not only important for the difference
in the pricing of bonds between countries, but even for the stock markets.
However, current account dynamics appear of secondary importance once
we control for other economic fundamentals and unobserved fixed effects.
Moreover, we find no evidence that the results are driven primarily by a
4E.g. Campbell and Ammer (1993), Ilmanen (2003) and Li (2002), discussed further
below.
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change in investors’ perceptions on the economic situation, but that the
variation in economic fundamentals can explain most of the development
of markets’ comovements. For instance, we find that relative imbalances
between the northern and southern European countries have a major impact
on the correlations, not only in the sovereign bond market, but also in the
stock market.
We interpret these results as a potential risk for the Euro-zone, but not
as indicators of irreversible developments. The results confirm that there is
heterogeneity among the Euro-zone members with respect to their economic
fundamentals, which is in turn reflected in the financial markets. However,
the way these determinants interact with the correlation in financial markets
indicates that further economic integration and growth would work positively
on financial integration although, for the moment, our results indicate that
the Euro-zone is a divided union.
To our knowledge this is the first work that looks at the time-varying
correlations of bond, stock and bond-stock markets jointly and at their
determinants, directing attention to the different patterns for the northern
and southern countries of the Euro-zone. In this way we extend the existing
literature by combining the rising sovereign bond market literature with the
well-documented stock-bond factor pricing and international stock market
convergence literature for the Euro-zone, and we shed new light on their
interaction.
The remainder of the chapter is set out as follows: Section 2.2 reviews the
literature, Section 2.3 estimates the asset market correlation and documents
the DCC results, Section 2.4 presents the panel regressions and Section 4.6
concludes.
2.2 Related Literature
We will work with dynamic conditional correlations as a measure of market
relations. Such correlations can be interpreted as a measure of interdepen-
dence and integration, but a careful discussion on that is beyond the scope
of this chapter. Nevertheless, the general observation is that markets with
very similar fundamentals both in terms of supply and demand dynamics
will be positively correlated. While there is a wide literature on assessing
the international (as well as European) correlations of equity and bond
markets as distinct entities, the literature on the cross-asset correlations
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has gained momentum only recently.5,6 The literature in this field moved
in two directions: one investigating comovement in the cross-asset market
and attesting the asymmetric nature of stock and bond market conditional
variances and a second strand trying to introduce economic variables in
order to determine the factors driving the bond-stock market correlation.
Strictly belonging to the first category and employing a DCC model,
we have the studies of Scruggs and Glabadanidis (2003) and de Goeij and
Marquering (2004) on the stock-bond correlation in the US. Both studies find
a time-varying relation in conditional covariances. Scruggs and Glabadani-
dis (2003) find that bonds respond symmetrically to bond shocks and are
“unaffected” by stock returns’ shocks while stock variance responds asymmet-
rically to both stock and bond returns’ shocks. De Goeij and Marquering
(2004) highlight the asymmetric leverage effect in the conditional covariances:
stock-bond covariances tend to be relatively low after bad news in the stock
market and good news in the bond market.
Cappiello et al. (2006) add to the previous papers both in terms of
methodology -by introducing an asymmetric dynamic conditional correlation
model- and sample selection as they include European, Australasian as well
as North American markets using data from 1987 to 2002. Regarding the
Euro-zone they found an almost perfect correlation among bond yields after
the introduction of the monetary union as well as an increased correlation
of the stock returns in the Euro-zone. Regarding the degree of correlation of
the stock-bond market, they attest a stable and positive long-term relation
before and after the introduction of the single currency.7 Nevertheless, they
found evidence of a “flight-to-quality” effect, defined as a move of capital
from equities to safer assets in times of financial turmoil.
With respect to the second direction of research, on the determinants
of comovements, the work of Kim et al. (2006) is the closest to our ap-
proach, studying the integration across the bond and stock markets within
the Euro-zone as well as Japan and the US. Their attention is focused
on the introduction of EMU and its effect on the within-market financial
integration as well as the interdependence between financial markets. They
5A good survey for works dealing with the European stock market integration but
using different methodologies can be found in the literature review of Kim et al. (2005).
For a review on the sovereign bond integration see Laopodis (2008, 2010).
6Throughout the chapter we refer to sovereign bonds simply as bonds. In no part of
this chapter do we consider the corporate bond market.
7The correlation of the EMU bond returns and the American and Australasian stock
returns moved from slightly positive to slightly negative with the breaking point in 1999.
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find that real economic integration and the absence of currency risk leads
to financial integration, e.g. intra-bond and intra-stock markets integration.
However, monetary policy convergence may have created uncertainty about
the economic future of the European monetary union thereby stimulating
a segmentation, e.g. a small but negative correlation between stock and
bond markets. Their time horizon spans from March 1994 to September
2003. We employ data on the Euro period (2000-2012) on a selection of
Euro-zone bond and stock markets. Our results confirm the segmentation of
these markets until the fall of 2008. We show that by differentiating among
European regions and by taking into account cross-asset relations, a different
pattern of correlations in European markets appears since the start of the
European debt crisis.
Kim et al. (2006) also look for the determinants of stock-bond correlations
within countries given macroeconomic variables that are linked to open
economies such as exchange rate volatility. Nevertheless, they find only
marginal effects for the monetary variables. We extend their analysis by
taking into account more macroeconomic variables that are potentially
capturing the different price factors. Secondly, we test the determinants in a
panel of across countries-assets correlations as opposed to within-country
correlations.
Andersson et al. (2008) conduct a similar estimation for the within
country stock-bond correlations regressed on national economic variables
such as inflation, GDP growth and stock market uncertainty. They find
that macroeconomic variables can only explain a small part of the variation
in correlations.. Finally, Li (2002) develops a theoretical foundation to
support his estimation of dynamic stock-bond correlations regressed on
uncertainty and inflation factors. In one of his tests he uses a dynamic
conditional correlation model on a panel of G7 countries taken as individual
cross-section observations.
Concerning intra-bond market analysis two studies we relate to are
Barrios et al. (2009) and Caggiano and Greco (2012). These studies test the
bond spread of each country relative to the German Bund with certain risk
factors such as the market perceived risk of defaults and liquidity risk as well
as macro financial variables. Caggiano and Greco (2012) in addition test
for a change in the determinants between periods and find several financial
variables to become more important during the crisis.
Concerning the international stock-market integration there have been
many studies. Kim et al. (2005) apply the same strategy as for their later
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article between bonds and stocks. Using real economic and financial variables
they try to explain dynamic correlations and find that the financial variables
are the best explanatory factors in their within-country setup. Bracker et al.
(1999), while using a different measure for countries influence on each other,
use a similar cross-country setup as we do where all countries in the data
set are compared to each other with relative and difference variables such as
relative exports and imports and the difference of inflation and real interest
rates.
While the previous empirical studies attempt to find the determinants
of comovements of assets limiting themselves to one of the three categories,
bond-stock, bond-bond and stock-stock, we argue that it is essential to
analyse all the categories of correlations in the Euro-zone simultaneously.
Our work also builds on the prediction in the theoretical literature of
well-known asset pricing models as well as on new literature that attempts to
incorporate the behaviour of these assets into general equilibrium models.8
The idea is to use the most appropriate environment to assess all (general
equilibrium) effects of specific policies (in particular monetary policy) and
variables on the comovements of the returns. Moreover, this work builds on
two-country general equilibrium models for the Euro-zone that highlight the
(negative) role of imbalances within the Euro-area for the real economy and
the subsequent need for coordination.9 Unfortunately most of the models
developed so far either focused on the closed economy dimension of the
correlation between stocks and bonds -disregarding the impact of sovereign
risk on it- or studied the role of imbalances and sovereign risk on the real
economy but not on the bond-stock correlation specifically.
2.3 Estimating Comovements
In this section we introduce the data and present the results of the estimation
of the dynamic conditional correlations that will be used for the panel
regressions in Section 2.4. In order to study the properties of the Euro-
zone equity and government bond returns we use a multivariate dynamic
conditional correlation model by Engle (2002). These dynamic correlations
are specified and estimated in two steps: first an univariate estimation is
computed for all series; secondly, while using the standardised residuals from
8See Campbell et al. (2013) for review.
9See among others Roeger and in ’t Veld (2013), Brzoza-Brzezina et al. (2013), Badarau
et al. (2013) and Fagan and Gaspar (2009).
14 CHAPTER 2. EUROPEAN STOCK AND BOND CORRELATIONS
the first stage, a multivariate estimation results in the dynamic conditional
correlations. Statistical properties of the data and details on the estimation
of the DCC model are presented in the appendix 2.A and 2.B.
2.3.1 Data
Our empirical analysis is conducted on a sample of 11 European countries,
which have belonged to the Euro-zone since the beginning of the common
currency area and thus have been in the same institutional-monetary frame-
work during the entire time span of 2000-2013.10 We will group the countries
into northern countries–Germany, France, Belgium, Finland, Austria and
the Netherlands–and southern countries–Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and
Spain.11
The data used for this study are indices for stocks and bonds taken from
Datastream. For equity we employed the MSCI price indices while for bonds
the 10 years benchmark DS government indices. Daily data is collected on
the sample period spanning from 3 January 2000 until 30 October 2013. We
have then a total of 3608 observations per series.
As usual stock returns are more volatile than bonds, positively skewed
and with a relatively high degree of kurtosis.12 Between regions the stock
returns do not indicate differences between the two regions. In contrast, bond
10Among the founding members Luxembourg is excluded and Greece, which joined the
Euro-zone in 2001, is included in the sample. Luxembourg is the smallest economy among
the founding members and used to be in a monetary union with Belgium before, while
the availability of data is more limited. Greece is a major subject in the European debt
crisis and joined the Euro relatively soon so that it has a comparable environment with
the other countries in the sample.
11We do not provide a formal test for our allocation of countries to regions. Note that
the ‘southern’ countries were often bundled together in the popular media in the acronym
PIIGS, which is perhaps more appropriate since Ireland is geographically not located
in the south of Europe. The descriptive statistics of the bond markets provide a basis
for the division of regions. A recent IMF study uses a similar division (Jaumotte and
Sodsriwiboon, 2010), while they group Ireland in the north for its positive current account
balance. In our division, countries that belong to the ’south’ have all been “net debtors”
under the threat of bail out as in Chen et al. (2013). One can find similar divisions in
the literature on financial markets during the European debt crisis (e.g. Schmitz and von
Hagen, 2011; Grammatikos and Vermeulen, 2012) The problem is not so much in bundling
the north, but rather in bundling the south. The economic situations that exist in each of
them are not the same and treating them as such may obscure this fact. Nevertheless,
since we aim to find general patterns between regions and we will control for each country’s
situation the problem is mitigated.
12See for details the appendix 2.A.
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returns indicate severe differences in the standard deviation and skewness
between northern and southern bonds. Indications of such a differentiated
market for European bonds was absent from previous studies (e.g. Cappiello
et al., 2006) and it is a signal of a strong change in performance behaviour
since the spreading of the (sovereign bond) crisis.
2.3.2 Dynamic Conditional Correlation Estimation
We estimate a k × k DCC Multivariate Garch model, with k = 22.13 We
specify and estimate the model in two steps following the methodology
described by Engle (2002). For the univariate regression we use a Garch
specification common to all the series. However, some series need some
additional pre-processing steps in order to take care of the different volatility
regimes that characterise the euro area stock and bond market.14 For the
multivariate regression we estimate the k × k correlation matrix of all the
possible pairwise correlations. By doing so we force the parameters of
the DCC to be common between all the pairwise correlations.15 Finally,
although the DCC is estimated on daily data we average the results at
quarterly frequency in order to continue the study at a frequency compatible
with macroeconomic variables.
2.3.3 Dynamic Conditional Correlation Results
We will graphically present the results divided in different categories, consid-
ering the country-asset subgroups at the aggregate level. Data are grouped
at the country-asset level as follows: North-stock (Ns), North-bond (Nb),
South-stock (Ss), South-bond (Sb). The main six categories we study are
the within region cross-asset markets (Ns-Nb, 6× 5 correlations, and Ss-Sb,
5 × 4 correlations), the cross-country markets (Ns-Ss, 6 × 5 correlations,
and Nb-Sb, 6× 5 correlations) and the cross-region cross-asset correlations
13This is the dimension of the full correlation matrix composed by the 11 countries for
the two assets.
14All these procedures as well as further details on the data are presented in the
appendix 2.B.
15Note that for the panel regressions we do not use all the resulting correlations, notably
we exclude the asset correlations within the same country. As an alternative, we estimated
pair-wise dynamic correlations, allowing for different DCC-parameters for each correlation,
and use these for the panel regressions. Appendix 2.D indicates that there is no qualitative
difference in the regression results relative to our benchmark.
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(Ns-Sb, 6× 5 correlations and Nb-Ss, 6× 5 correlations).16 For the purpose
of presentation, we aggregate the resulting 20 or 30 pairwise correlations
for each category using a weighted average, where the weights are given by
the stock market capitalisation for stock returns and the government gross
liabilities for the bond returns. For both assets we used the reference value
of the year 2002 to avoid having the weighting measures correlating with the
return series.17 For each category we plot this weighted mean and a band
representing the minimum and maximum in Figure 2.3.1.18
These dynamic correlations show an interesting picture of market move-
ments of stock and bond returns between the two regions. There is one
obvious case: the inter-bond market. In panel (1) a process towards per-
fect correlation of the European government bond market is visible since
the launch of the Euro. This is in line with the findings of previous and
longer-sample studies attesting to a drastic increase in the correlation of
the Euro-bond markets since the introduction of the common currency. It
shows that around the first half of the decade government bonds all over the
Euro-zone were considered to be equally risky and almost perfect substitutes,
although small differences in the levels of the yields remained. Previous
studies are in support of the idea that the introduction of the common
currency lead to increased correlation both in the bond and stock market.19
Since the beginning of 2008 this pattern in the bond market reversed
dramatically as it became apparent that southern economies were major
affected by the financial crisis and were at risk of default. Credit agencies
downgraded and investors revalued Southern bonds in line with the underly-
ing risk. The correlation between northern and southern bonds started to
decrease, becoming negative in the last two years. The drop in correlation
from approximately one to zero or negative values, shows clearly the period
in which the southern bond market behaviour detached from the northern
one. This is in line with the widening of the Euro-zone sovereign bond yield
16We do not consider the within asset-within region categories Nb-Nb, Ns-Ns, Sb-Sb
and Ss-Ss. Additionally, we exclude correlations between stocks and bonds for the same
country, which is why the number of correlations series for Ns-Nb and Ss-Sb is 6× (6− 1)
and 5× (5− 1) respectively.
17Stock market capitalisation was obtained from Standard & Poor’s Global Stock
Markets Factbook and gross government liabilities figures come from the OECD.
18Plots on the daily frequency are presented in appendix 2.B.2.
19Among others Cappiello et al. (2006) considers the period between the 1950’s and
2003. Kim et al. (2006) show a similar striking increase in correlation in the European
bond market studying the period 1994–2003.
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Figure 2.3.1: Quarterly Weighted Dynamic Conditional Correlations
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each category (panel) except for South-stock South-bond where there are 20 pairs.
The weights are constant over time and based on stock market capitalisation and
gross government liabilities figures for 2002. Shaded areas denote the minimum
and the maximum for every category at each point in time.
spreads (Deutsche Bank, 2009; ECB, 2008, 2009), and consistent with the
view of de Grauwe and Ji (2012) on the mis-pricing of sovereign risk within
the Euro-zone.
We interpret the correlations plots as evidence for a similar reaction
across assets and across regions. For this reason we look at the correlations
between stock and bond returns across the two regions. Looking at panels (3)
and (5) of Figure 2.3.1 jointly we can observe the change in the within-region
cross-asset correlations. Up until mid-2008 the pattern is similar in the two
pictures showing a business cycle-like behaviour remaining in the negative
part of the correlation distribution. This is in line with Kim et al. (2006)
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and their findings of a negative correlation between bond and stock within
the Euro-zone.
From mid-2008 onwards there is a divergence in the pattern of the
southern and northern stock-bond markets. In contrast to previous studies,
once we control for geographical blocs we find evidence of an increase in
correlation in the southern stock-bond market. It indeed seems that markets
based on geography started to react differently to common information as if
there were not two categories of assets but more. While in the north the
correlation remains negative, the southern countries’ correlations increase
ending up to be positive. The increase in correlation between southern bonds
and stocks can be explained by a joint selling of these assets against a third
(safe) one.
The same pattern is visible in the comparison of panels (2) and (6) where
the two bond markets are compared to the other region’s stock market. It
seems that the divergence between the patterns is due to the change in
the performance of the southern bond market as shown in panel (1). This
cross-area cross-asset comparison shows how after 2008 there was a change in
the conditional correlation not only in the southern area stock-bond market
but also at the cross regional level. What used to be considered a safe asset
(southern bond) started to co-move with the northern stock; a generally
perceived more risky market. In other words the safe asset in the ‘risky’ area
became more correlated with the risky asset in the ‘safe’ area. Similarly,
although the bands appear to have narrowed shortly around 2008, there is
not much indication that the relations changed structurally.
The inter-regional stock market in panel (4) does not show any of the
dramatic changes that are observed in the other panels. The stock market
was, and remains, highly correlated as given in the graph. There were some
minor drops during the crisis but not significantly lower values than in other
periods.
The next step is to study the drivers or determinants of these correlation
dynamics.
2.4 Estimating Determinants
2.4.1 Estimation Technique
We present regression results to understand the behaviour over time of the
six correlation categories. There is one major difference in the way we set
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up our regressions compared to the literature discussed before. Studies on
bond-stock correlations often have one regression per cross-section, using
SURE, or separate OLS or time-series regressions. One of the implications
of such strategy is that each estimated coefficient is allowed to differ across
the cross-section, which may be an appropriate assumption, and failing to
recognise such heterogeneity when it is true would lead to potential biases
(Baltagi, 2008).
Our choice of fixed coefficients for the cross-section is supported by the
selection of countries. Arguably each country must be treated on its own
merits but the same fundamentals should apply in the broader context of
the European economy. Since we control for pair- and time-fixed effects we
control for most of pairwise and time varying unobserved effects that could
be correlated with the regressors. Secondly, a separate estimation for each
cross-section demands more from the time-dimension of the data. This would
require us, like in other studies, to use much more data, and in particular
data from before the monetary union which is a very different European
context indeed. Using a higher frequency is not preferable, because many of
the economic variables are available at no higher frequency than quarterly.
For the same reason, we average the DCC series of the previous section over
each quarter in order to match the other data.
Studies on the determinants of correlations of the same asset between
countries often use one benchmark country. We present cross-country panel
regressions where each cross-section is a pair of two countries for a given set
of assets. This setup allows us to have a fairly robust inference of what might
be the fundamental economic determinants that drive the correlations over
time as opposed to obtaining country specific elasticities. Nevertheless, the
dynamic correlations are strongly correlated over the pairs, in the same way as
stock and bond returns show a strong correlation at the cross-section (at least
at the regional level) and so do the pairwise dynamic correlations. However,
the pairwise macroeconomic fundamentals may be widely different. It is
this heterogeneity that we exploit in order to find the main determinants of
the correlations series. Therefore, the combination of the panel construction
using pairwise analysis and the inclusion of time- and pair-fixed effects
allows us to analyse the role of economic fundamentals very precisely and
independently of outside shocks. For instance, the fixed effects will control for
such shocks as news on the state of the world economy and EMU integration
and policy discussions at the EU level.
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The regression models may be summarised as follows,
ρ˜i,j,t,p = γpρ˜i,j,t−1,p + β′pxi,j,t−1,p +α
′
ij,t,p + εi,j,t,p, (2.4.1)
for i, j = 1, . . . , 20/30 and i 6= j; t = 2000q2, . . . , 2013q3;
p = {Nb v Sb, Ns v Ss, Nb v. Ns, Sb v. Ss, Nb v. Ss, Ns v. Sb} ;
where ρ˜i,j,t,p =
1
2
log
(
1 + ρi,j,t,p
1− ρi,j,t,p
)
.
The dependent variable, ρ˜i,j,t,p, is the Fischer transformed correlation for
each country pair, i, j, for each quarter, t, and each category, p. The original
correlation series are bounded between minus one and one, but the Fisher-
transformed series are unbounded.20 The model includes a lag dependent
variable to capture the dynamic transition of the lagged independent variables,
xi,j,t−1,p.21 The set of independent variables is discussed below. We use
lagged versions of all the independent variables in order to ensure that the
coefficients are not affected by reverse causality.22 The consequence is that
regressors might also pick up part of the expectations of the past quarter
that are formed by realisations of the past data, which are subsequently used
for decisions in the asset markets.
The parameter α′ij,t,p represents the fixed effects included for each re-
gression. All regressions include cross-section fixed effects, meaning a time
constant dummy for each country pair. It is possible to use a different set
of cross-section dummies, namely country specific fixed effect, resulting in
two sets of country dummies. However, the pair-fixed effect captures more
variation and principally controls for relative pair relations such as distance,
historical, financial and trade links and financial integration between any two
20A Panel unit-root test, taking into account cross-dependence, using methods developed
in Pesaran (2004, 2007) indicates no evidence for a unit root in any of the correlation
series, see appendix 2.C.
21Lagged dependent variables are subject to Nickel-bias, since the lag-dependent variable
is by construction correlated with the error term. However, the bias decreases with the
time span, and in our case the average time span of 50 periods would imply a very limited
bias. More critically, unbiased estimators that have been developed depend on cross-section
asymptotics and small time-span and hence are not particularly fit for the dataset at hand
where the time span is much larger than the cross-section (Baltagi, 2008, p. 148).
22The correlations are averaged over the quarter, whereas market participants may
have daily updated information on these statistics. Information on these correlations early
in the quarter may affect macroeconomic variables later in the same quarter. For instance,
a decrease in the correlation early within a quarter, may trigger portfolio rearrangements
which in turn affects stock-market volatility and possibly government responses.
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countries that a double set of country dummies does not necessarily control.
In the second specification we also include a cross-section fixed set of time
dummies for which we use the combination of quarter- and year-dummies.
Each equation p is separately estimated over a panel of 20 or 30 country
pairs over about 54 quarters.23 Since we only look at cross-country effects
we do not include in any of the results those observations that come from
the same country.24
A constant set of independent variables, xij,t−1,p, is used in each regression
and obtained from Datastream at a quarterly frequency. For this reason the
dependent variable -which was calculated at the daily frequency- is averaged
over each quarter window. The independent variables are as follows,
xij,t−1,p = [dInfli,j,t−1 rV oli,j,t−1 dDebti,j,t−1 dCai,j,t−1 dGi,j,t−1 Ratet−1]′ .
The variables are meant to capture the current market situation and general
macroeconomic conditions. The difference of inflation rates between two
countries, dInfl, is used often in the literature to capture the fact that
bonds are more sensitive to inflation than stocks. Uncertainty is measured
through the ratio of the respective stock market volatilities, rV ol. We use
the realised stock variance series from the initial return series as a measure
of this uncertainty. The government budgetary health is measured by its
relative debt position, dDebt, the absolute difference of the countries’ debt-
to-GDP figures. In the same way, the current account measures a country’s
net external asset position, dCa, capturing the sustainability of the public
and private development. Differential in economic growth, dG, is another
important factor in explaining the difference in stock and bond performance
as well as correlations of bonds and stocks between countries.25 Since all the
countries in our sample are in the Euro-zone there is no nominal exchange
rate risk and all countries face the same benchmark rate captured in Rate,
which is the policy rate of the ECB.
23Data of independent variables is missing for some of the more recent periods for some
countries. Therefore the dataset is not perfectly balanced. Only the category “South stock
v. South bond” has a cross-section of 20, all the others have 30.
24For instance, for the “North Stock v. North Bond” case we exclude the within
country correlation. They could be easily included but all the independent variables that
are represented as ratio or difference would be without variation and hence not explain
anything.
25We use GDP growth, rather than GDP/capita growth, assuming that not only
productivity growth matters for financial performance but also the size of the market,
which may be affected by population movement including labour migration.
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The selection of the variables is partly based on general economic theory
and empirical findings in the literature. With the discussion of the results,
section 2.4.2 will briefly review the literature for each category, recalling
what was found before and what can be expected from theory. Previous
studies, such as those mentioned above, occasionally let their selection of
regressors be guided by theory. For instance, for models concerning bonds
versus stocks, there are clear predictions on the signs of cash-flow/growth
variables (negative as stocks tend to benefit more from economic growth
than bonds), inflation indicators and monetary policy (positive, as such
factors affect the discount factor of both securities in the same way).26
Other studies may present a search for variables that give empirical results.
In general, basic macroeconomic variables are expected to play a role on
the correlations of the general country-asset indices at the frequency and
time-span we use. Such channels, namely those related to real economics,
monetary measures and risk, therefore appear with the set of variables above.
However, not all variables in each regression would be expected to have
necessarily a significant explanatory power. Other variables were tried as
well, such as the relative government budget deficit, the unemployment rate,
forecasting variables (e.g. expected inflation) and different measures of the
same variables (difference instead of ratios and vice versa). The ones we
present give intuitive and consistent results.
We keep the set of variables fixed between the regressions for two rea-
sons. Firstly, the set of variables are sufficiently general that they can be
expected to play a role for each correlation, especially since we are looking
at relatively tight economic union at the medium- to long-term horizon. A
more short-term outlook would require a much greater emphasis on liquidity
and credit related indicators. Secondly, we find that variables that are not
generally predicted to play a role in fact do, and the other way around. For
expected results, including additional variables made little difference. For
completeness, we keep the set of variables fixed for all the regressions.
The combination of the pair fixed effects and time dummies will make
the (adj.-)R2 of any regression high, but it is not immediately clear what
fraction of the explained variance can be attributed to the other regressors.
Therefore, a partial-R2 is reported for each regression. This partial-R2 is
defined as the share of the explained variance that is orthogonal to the
unobserved fixed effects.27
26See further Section 2.4.2
27The partial-R2 is calculated in two steps. First regress the ρ˜i,j,p,t on the unobserved
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Is there a structural break?
As discussed in the introduction, new awareness on the true state of Eurozone
economies may have resulted in a fundamental change in the perception
among investors. This may in turn explain the dramatic fall in the correla-
tions of the bond markets as shown in Figure 2.3.1. In contrast, the panel
setup of the estimation aims to explain the comovements of assets based
on fundamental economic indicators. The question that remains is to what
extent is there still a change in how countries’ situations were perceived after
controlling for the actual situation?
In order to test whether the fundamental variables explain the larger
part of the story we can proceed in two ways. One is to include additional
variables that may proxy for such expectations. Some studies have used
implied volatility measures, volatility indices and other variables that may
be correlated with investors’ perceptions and therefore could function as
approximations to investors’ expectations. The limitations of such variables
are their sparse availability for the cross-section we study and such variables
may be very well correlated with fundamentals, in particular those we may
have omitted.
A second method is to include a dummy for the crisis period, like the
studies that included a dummy for the period where the EMU started
(Cappiello et al., 2006). We allow this dummy to be interacted with each
of the explanatory variables so we can capture the extent to which these
variables changed their role in investors’ behaviour. One could similarly split
the sample in two sub-samples and estimate the regressions separately but
the drawback of this procedure is that all parameters have to be estimated
with half the observations. With the dummy procedure this loss is mitigated.
The estimation equation becomes,
ρ˜i,j,t,p = γpρ˜i,j,t−1,p + β′pxi,j,t−1,p + δ
′
pdt × xi,j,t−1,p +α′ij,t,p + εi,j,t,p,
dt =
{
1 t ≥ 2008q1
0 otherwise
. (2.4.2)
where δ′p are the coefficients on the independent variables interacted with
the dummy variable, dt, and everything else defined as before.
fixed effects (using the same sample as the full regression). Then regress the residuals of
this regression on the unobserved fixed effects and the other regressors. The R2 of the last
regression is the partial-R2.
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The date of the structural break is based on the dynamic correlations
series, such as those plotted in Figure 2.3.1. The break coincides with the
start of financial crisis. It can be argued that the financial crisis was followed
by a European debt crisis which may be dated to start around the first
quarter of 2010. Although this may be true, it is interesting to see that the
decrease in correlations in the European bond market started much earlier
than 2010, although a negative spike in early 2010 is certainly visible in the
plot. Secondly, we performed a test, based on the lm-statistic, to obtain
the optimal date for the cross-section dummies, presented in appendix 2.G
. This test suggests different dates for each category, where most dates
are between 2008 and early 2010. Regressions with a dummy equal to 1
for t ≥ 2010q1, presented in appendix 2.G, does not indicate substantial
qualitative differences relative to our benchmark results.
If a coefficient in δ′p is significant, then it indicates primarily that the
role played by the respective variable has changed from one period to the
next. Such a change can be explained in two ways: on the one hand it could
represent a re-interpretation by investors of economic fundamentals; on the
other hand, we could also observe a significant coefficient for a variable
if there is a non-linear effect of the fundamental variable on the dynamic
correlation as opposed to the linear form we model here.28 More importantly,
if there is no significant coefficient on the interaction dummy, then neither
is the case.
2.4.2 Panel Data Results
We present the results divided by asset market category. For each category,
we first briefly review the relevant literature and then present the results.
28For instance, debt can be at a stable difference for two countries. Small changes in
this difference over time may covary slightly with the correlation of the two markets of
such countries. During the crisis, one of the countries could face more fiscal problems
than another, for example by having to bail out a larger bank, which adds to the deficit
and enters the debt ratio. Subsequently, investors respond to these developments and
correlation of the markets, between those two countries, stops or reverses. This means
that during the crisis, a large effect on debt causes a large effect on the correlation, while
there was no similar change in the ratio in the non-crisis period. The estimator will likely
not distinguish between what is due to the oversized change in the fundamental and what
is due to the supposed change in perception of the relevance of the ratio to investors. In
conclusion, only if we assume that the size of the change in the ratios does not affect the
marginal effect on correlation can we assume that a significant coefficient on the interaction
variable indicates that the underlying ratios has regained (or lost) some relevance.
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Estimations, in every table, follow the same sequence of model specifications:
1) only pair fixed effect, 2) pair and time fixed effects, and 3) inclusion of
crisis indicators.29
Standard errors are computed by bootstrap to account for the use of
the estimated dependent variable and they are robust to heteroskedasticity,
serial correlation and cross-section correlation in the errors. Note that for
the explanatory variables, when concerning north and south, the southern
country is the numerator for ratios and the first variable in differences. In
case of within region estimation, the stock country is first.30
Bond market
The literature on the European bond market correlations is very modest
while there is a vast production on the assessment of government bond
spreads determinants. Spreads and correlation are indeed closely related as
an increase in spreads normally determines a decrease in correlation. Even
if the two variables are not the same measure, we refer to this literature as
the benchmark for our estimation and comparison. Previous studies focused
both on the effect of liquidity related factors on yields at high frequency
data and the effect of credit risk based on macroeconomic fundamentals at
lower frequency.
Codogno et al. (2003) study the determinants of EMU yield spreads on
the period 1999-2002. With a dataset at a monthly frequency they find
that differences in debt-to-GDP ratios have no significant effect on relative
asset swap spreads when considered separately, but become significant when
interacted with international risk variables. They find that international
risk factors dominate liquidity risk factors and suggest that interest rate risk
factors rather than debt-to-GDP affected yield differentials.
Barrios et al. (2009) study the period between 2003-2009. Their empirical
evidence highlights the importance of international factors, such as general
risk perception, but also to a smaller extent domestic factors, such as a
deteriorating financial outlook. More interestingly for the low-frequency case
29In appendices 2.D, 2.E and 2.F we present panel estimations based on different
underlying criteria of the DCC estimation, realised correlations and a joint system-
estimation of all the six regressions respectively. All the results presented below are echoed
in these alternative specifications.
30For instance, for the case if between regions and a variable x for each country belonging
to the S(outh) or the N(orth), rx = xS/xN , dx = xS − xN . In the case of within region
but between two assets s(tock) and b(ond), rx = xs/xb, dx = xs − xb.
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are the statistically significant coefficients of macroeconomic fundamentals
on the spread. Among others, fiscal conditions and the current account
have a strong impact on government bond yield spreads. In particular fiscal
balance and current account surpluses decrease the spread, while debt tends
to increase it even if not in a linear way.31 Using data from debt at-issuance,
Schuknecht et al. (2010) find that yields increase with debt ratio and budget
deficits, and that these factors also played a role before the crisis.
More recently de Grauwe and Ji (2012) highlight the role of changes in
perception of default risk in the Euro-zone. They focus their analysis on two
macroeconomic variables: debt-to-GDP and current account. They find a
significant and non-linear effect of debt on the spreads while they do not find
any significant effect of the current account. Moreover, they find evidence of
a structural break around the year 2008 with respect to debt-to-GDP and
its non-linear effect.
For the choice of our variables we mainly focus on credit risk in order to
determine the impact of macroeconomic variables (as opposed to liquidity).
Debt sustainability depends firstly on expected budget surpluses or deficits
which is in turn determined by future economic activity and the interest rate.
Secondly, the current account is a good indicator for measuring the overall
asset position of the economy. The inflation differential could be expected
to play a role when there are widely diverging regional prices.
Table 2.4.1 presents the results with respect to the bond market correla-
tion. Starting with the first column the correlation between bond markets
seems to be determined by all the regressors. In particular a deterioration
in the current account for a southern relative to a northern country de-
creases the correlation in line with the documented results on bond yield
spreads, while an increase in southern inflation and GDP growth increases
the correlation in the bond market.32
If European countries in the Euro-zone converge, the south must have,
on average, a higher GDP per capita growth rate than the north. Such
31As Barrios et al. (2009) explain, countries with historically high debt levels might
benefit from liquid bond markets, but suffered because of the reaction of financial markets
if debt rose above a certain unsustainable threshold.
32By construction, the variable on current account, dCA is the difference between the
southern and northern current account and it is almost always negative since the southern
countries, except for Ireland, have generally a bigger current account deficit compared to
the north over the time sample. Hence a positive sign in front of the coefficient should
be read as a decrease of the correlation due to a worsening in the current account of the
south with respect to the north.
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Table 2.4.1: Bond market panel regressions
Dependent variable: Dynamic Correlation
(1) (2) (3)
1-way FE 2-way FE Crisis
Lag Dependent 0.8831∗∗∗ 0.5990∗∗∗ 0.6187∗∗∗
(0.0123) (0.0396) (0.0378)
dInfl 0.0426∗∗∗ 0.0205 −0.0242
(0.0114) (0.0195) (0.0209)
rVol −0.1934∗∗∗ −0.0812∗∗ −0.0479
(0.0574) (0.0336) (0.0550)
dDebt −0.6380∗∗∗ −0.3238∗∗∗ −0.3064∗∗
(0.1431) (0.1091) (0.1220)
dCa 1.2989∗∗∗ 0.2308 0.3757
(0.2148) (0.1963) (0.3106)
dG 0.0239∗∗ 0.0078 0.0275∗
(0.0109) (0.0075) (0.0142)
Rate 0.1179∗∗∗ −0.2044∗∗∗ 0.0445
(0.0178) (0.0246) (0.0483)
d × dInfl 0.0778∗∗∗
(0.0296)
d × rVol −0.0809
(0.0690)
d × dDebt 0.0392
(0.0547)
d × dCa −0.4886
(0.3532)
d × dG −0.0371∗∗
(0.0182)
d × Rate −0.4793∗∗∗
(0.0630)
d −0.9268∗∗∗
(0.2805)
Observations 1512 1512 1512
Number of pairs 30 30 30
Adjusted R2 0.910 0.937 0.938
Partial R2 0.911 0.449 0.463
Time dummies yes yes
Bootstrap based standard errors (100 reps.) in parentheses. Pair fixed
effects always included. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
28 CHAPTER 2. EUROPEAN STOCK AND BOND CORRELATIONS
favourable economic performance should lead to a further integration of
the respective sovereign bond markets. Hence the positive sign of the GDP
coefficient, which captures both GDP per capita and population growth
rates, can be interpreted as the catching-up of the southern countries with
the north.
Moreover, we see that relative financial uncertainty, as measured by the
corresponding stock market volatility, decreases the correlation between the
northern and southern bonds. Finally and intuitively, differences in sovereign
debt between the regions decrease the correlations of bonds.
The other specifications show that only the debt and stock market
volatility remain the most significant explanatory variables for the bond
market correlations. Time fixed effects wipe out the effects of inflation,
current account and GDP growth. The coefficients of the other variables
are roughly halved while the standard errors remain roughly the same,
making these coefficients fall out of the usual significance criteria. Only
the coefficient on the policy rate changes in sign. Additionally, the fall of
the partial R2 between columns 1 and 2 indicate that the time-fixed effects
control substantially for unobserved effects that are correlated with the
regressors.33
If non-linear effects are present, as suggested by de Grauwe and Ji (2012)
and Caggiano and Greco (2012), then allowing for different coefficients
between the two periods for each variable could uncover non-linear or non-
constant marginal effects. Column (3) shows that for debt there is no
indication that there are such effects. Debt is still significant, while there
appears no significant change in its elasticity for the crisis period. The
coefficient in fact is positive, indicating the role of relative debt level might
have decreased.34 Although the coefficients on volatility appear individually
not significant, a joint test of the two coefficients indicates that volatility
remains an important determinant even when we control for the crisis dummy.
The interaction on ECB rate suggests that only since the crisis period
33The reason that in the first columns of the tables the partial-R2 is occasionally larger
than the adjusted R2 is due to the fact that we take the normal R2, rather than the
adjusted, for the partial-R2 calculation.
34In appendix 2.G, where the dummy starts in 2010, this coefficient is significant and
halves the net effect of debt during the crisis, indicating that indeed relative debt levels
have not become suddenly much stronger indicators.This finding can be explained by the
observation that at the same time when southern countries faced their economic challenges,
northern countries bailed out banks and gave guarantees to EU stability programs sharply
increasing their own debt levels as well.
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this variable helps to explain a convergence of correlations, because as the
policy rate was lowered the negative coefficient indicates a net positive effect
for the correlation. The coefficient on GDP is significantly positive for the
core equation while significantly negative for the crisis period, causing the
net effect to be close to zero. The crisis dummy itself indicates that the
mean of the correlations decreased and appears to capture the largest part
of the effect of the crisis. Notably, the role of debt is not changed in the
crisis.
To summarise we find that debt and uncertainty in the financial markets
are consistent explanatory variables for the comovement of the bond market
prices. GDP growth appears to be related to comovement but has reversed
effects in the two periods. Current account and inflation appear unrelated
to the comovements of bonds.
Stock market
The literature on the comovements of European stock markets focused
primarily on the determinants of integration after the introduction of the
EMU. The attention has been devoted to evaluating the impact of exchange
rates as the main driver of stock market comovements. In addition, various
variables have been proposed as alternative drivers, especially those related
to real economic convergence and monetary policy criteria. The idea is that
asset returns reflect the business cycle to a certain extent. Having more
synchronous business cycle means being more interdependent and prone to
common shocks. From here studies address how shocks can be transmitted
through economic variables, e.g. convergence in trade, dividend yields, GDP
growth, interest and inflation rates.
Fratzscher (2002) found that the reduction in exchange rate volatilities
and the convergence in GDP growth and monetary policy (correlation of
inflation) resulted in Euro-area equity market integration. Hardouvelis et al.
(2006) consider the process of EMU integration over the period 1992–1998
with a focus on currency risk. They find that both forward interest rate dif-
ferentials and inflation differentials are statistically significant determinants
of the degree of stock market integration in the Euro-zone. Interestingly, they
find that in 1994, a period they characterise as determined by pessimism in
Europe and a sharp increase in the global bond yields, the degree of integra-
tion reduced. Concerns about the ability of highly indebted governments to
control budget deficits led to a widening in the interest rate spreads among
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Table 2.4.2: Stock market panel regression
Dependent variable: Dynamic Correlation
(1) (2) (3)
1-way FE 2-way FE Crisis
Lag Dependent 0.5827∗∗∗ 0.4018∗∗∗ 0.3838∗∗∗
(0.0215) (0.0267) (0.0266)
dInfl −0.0381∗∗∗ 0.0008 −0.0156
(0.0076) (0.0087) (0.0120)
rVol −0.0608∗∗ −0.1355∗∗∗ −0.0922∗∗
(0.0275) (0.0247) (0.0368)
dDebt 0.3088∗∗∗ 0.1746∗ 0.1538
(0.0413) (0.0984) (0.1131)
dCa −0.8137∗∗∗ −0.3331∗∗ −0.7323∗∗∗
(0.1144) (0.1336) (0.2239)
dG −0.0004 0.0236∗∗∗ 0.0165
(0.0080) (0.0076) (0.0109)
Rate 0.0121∗ 0.0507∗ −0.0176
(0.0073) (0.0289) (0.0396)
d × dInfl 0.0283∗
(0.0152)
d × rVol −0.1263∗∗∗
(0.0341)
d × dDebt 0.0210
(0.0508)
d × dCa 0.6637∗∗∗
(0.1958)
d × dG 0.0075
(0.0154)
d × Rate 0.1399∗∗
(0.0549)
d −0.0894
(0.1982)
Observations 1512 1512 1512
Number of pairs 30 30 30
Adjusted R2 0.438 0.554 0.561
Partial R2 0.495 0.354 0.363
Time dummies yes yes
Bootstrap based standard errors (100 reps.) in parentheses. Pair fixed
effects always included. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
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European countries and a reduction in integration.
Kim et al. (2005) considered the period 1989–2003, before and after the
introduction of the common currency. They find that increasing stock market
comovements can be explained with the overall macroeconomic convergence
process associated with the introduction of the Euro rather than the specific
effects of the elimination of foreign exchange rate risk due to the currency
unification. Among others, GDP growth and stock market capitalisation to
GDP ratio were the main drivers of stock market convergence.
Table 2.4.2 presents our results for the stock market. When only pair fixed
effects are considered, the key determinants of the stock market correlation
seem to be differentials in inflation (in line with Hardouvelis et al., 2006),
relative uncertainty, differentials in debt and in the current account. When
we introduce time-fixed effects, relative volatility in the stock market becomes
a principal variable together with the current account and GDP growth.
The signs on relative debt, current account balance and growth are opposite
to what was found for the bond market. The higher the relative degree of
inflation and volatility in the stock market the lower the correlation between
the two areas. The bigger the current account imbalance the more southern
and northern stock markets are correlated. This seems a counter-intuitive
result at first. A possible explanation could be that government expenditures
in the south stimulated demand allowing for private sector convergence with
the north. This explanation is supported by the positive effect of relative
debt on this correlation.
Hence, while this government policy causes a major repricing of bonds,
it helps the development of the two areas, increasing the correlation in the
stock market. Also the GDP coefficient could be puzzling at first analysis,
since increased differential in GDP growth increases correlations. This result
can be interpreted in the same light as a catching-up effect of the southern
countries with the northern ones.
Looking at the differentiated coefficients for the crisis period, it appears
that the effect of current account falls majorly during the crisis, while the
other variables are not affected in the same way. In contrast, we find that
stock market volatility became a stronger determinant during the crisis.
The policy rate shows a significant positive coefficient for the second period,
which stands in contrast with the negative coefficients in the bond market
case. Using the same reasoning as before implies that the decreasing rates
in the crisis period decreased the comovements in the stock market.
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Bond-Stock correlation
Theoretical models, belonging to the bond-stock literature, point out that
factors that affect the payments of stocks and bonds differ. While both
stock and bond prices are the discounted sums of their future cash flows,
bonds earn a fixed nominal cash flow while stocks’ cash flows are an infinite
stream of uncertain dividends. Therefore, these models predict that changes
in factors that affect the discount rates are likely to increase the bond-stock
correlation while asymmetric shocks in other dimensions tend to decrease it
(Campbell and Ammer, 1993; Li, 2002; Ilmanen, 2003; Christiansen, 2010).
Empirical studies that use these predictions tested them for within-country
correlations only.35
There are two sets of determinants to take into account. The first
category includes real interest rate changes, monetary policy, and expected
inflation. The second category includes unexpected inflation, economic
growth and uncertainty measures such as stock market volatility. While
expected inflation is already priced in the discount factors of both assets,
unexpected inflation can hamper the asset that pays a predetermined amount.
Similarly, expectations of strong GDP growth can help stocks and hurt bonds.
On the contrary, in periods of high volatility in the equity market, stocks
perform badly while bonds are less affected. Furthermore, one can observe
flight-to-quality dynamics from the equity market into the sovereign bond
market. Hence the main drivers of periods of low correlation in bond-stock
returns have been suggested to be unexpected inflation and stock market
uncertainty.
Ilmanen (2003) suggests that stock-bond correlation is at its lowest when
equities are weak and volatility is high (i.e. flight-to-quality behaviour) but
also when inflation and growth are low. Li (2002) presents results based
on an asset pricing model that includes inflation expectations next to the
previously noted determinants. Kim et al. (2006) -focusing specifically on the
process of integration of European stocks and bonds between 1994 and 2003-
find that real economic integration and the absence of currency risk lead to
increased comovements. However, monetary policy convergence may have
created uncertainty about the economic future of the European Monetary
Union and consequently decreased comovements.
Andersson et al. (2008) study the US and Germany. For both markets
35Christiansen (2010) being the exception in also calculating correlations relative to
the US and an EU index.
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Table 2.4.3: Northern region Stock-Bond panel regression
Dependent variable: Dynamic Correlation
(1) (2) (3)
1-way FE 2-way FE Crisis
Lag Dependent 0.6614∗∗∗ 0.3731∗∗∗ 0.3563∗∗∗
(0.0100) (0.0292) (0.0250)
dInfl −0.0038 0.0003 0.0104
(0.0154) (0.0128) (0.0127)
rVol 0.0464∗∗∗ 0.0627∗∗∗ 0.0575∗∗∗
(0.0109) (0.0141) (0.0140)
dDebt −0.1088∗ −0.2243∗∗ −0.2782∗∗∗
(0.0574) (0.0985) (0.0969)
dCa −0.0642 −0.1414 0.0538
(0.1124) (0.1174) (0.1282)
dG −0.0011 0.0013 −0.0036
(0.0034) (0.0037) (0.0060)
Rate −0.0214∗∗∗ −0.1110∗∗∗ −0.2648∗∗∗
(0.0028) (0.0126) (0.0165)
d × dInfl −0.0121
(0.0150)
d × rVol −0.0707∗
(0.0378)
d × dDebt 0.1498∗∗∗
(0.0520)
d × dCa −0.2655
(0.1829)
d × dG −0.0020
(0.0080)
d × Rate 0.2937∗∗∗
(0.0202)
d −0.9425∗∗∗
(0.0631)
Observations 1560 1560 1560
Number of pairs 30 30 30
Adjusted R2 0.466 0.622 0.640
Partial R2 0.468 0.241 0.279
Time dummies yes yes
Bootstrap based standard errors (100 reps.) in parentheses. Pair fixed
effects always included. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
34 CHAPTER 2. EUROPEAN STOCK AND BOND CORRELATIONS
they find evidence of a negative effect of stock market volatility on the
stock-bond relation and a positive effect of expected inflation. They find that
GDP growth has a negative impact but is not always statistically significant.
Table 2.4.3 and 2.4.4 present, respectively, the stock-bond relation in
the northern and southern regions. As we are considering the within region
markets we should pay attention to the interpretation of the results. The
relative variables are now referring to differences within one region. For this
reason we exclude six pairs for the north and five for the south, namely those
that refer to correlations of stocks and bonds within the same country.
In the northern region the correlation between stock and bond markets
seems to be determined uniquely by the policy rate, debt and volatility. While
the policy rate is in line with the literature, the sign of relative volatility
is counter-intuitive. The sign on debt suggests that a relative increase in
debt would have a repercussion on the stock market of the corresponding
country since there is a divergence in the correlation between these two
country-assets. These results are constant among the different specifications
although the crisis appears to diminish most of the effects. The crisis dummy
itself indicates that the mean of the correlations decreased. Among the six
models that we present, this model is the one that has the greatest difficulties
in finding intuitive and significant determinants.
The southern correlation, Table 2.4.4, delivers better results. The bond-
stock correlation is expectedly decreased by the interest rate and GDP
growth and additionally by debt and stock market volatility when we control
for pair and time fixed effects. Relative changes in the debt positions as well
as stock market uncertainty in the southern countries leads to a flight-to-
quality within the same region. Heterogeneity in the level of debt-to-GDP
leads to a decrease in the stock-bond correlation in the region. The addition
of crisis indicators does not alter the main regression as the crisis dummy
does not have an impact on this correlation.
All the determinants for both the northern and southern regions are in
line with theoretical predictions and the findings of the previous literature.
The fact that the model behaves better for the within-region case of the
south compared to the north may be explained by the relative degree of
heterogeneity in the south relative to that among the northern countries.
As noted before, pooling southern countries together may obscure a relative
high degree of heterogeneity among them, while in pooling countries in the
north this is much less the case. However, we can also find an indication
for increased heterogeneity within the northern region. For instance the
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Table 2.4.4: Southern region Stock-Bond panel regression
Dependent variable: Dynamic Correlation
(1) (2) (3)
1-way FE 2-way FE Crisis
Lag Dependent 0.6828∗∗∗ 0.3571∗∗∗ 0.3577∗∗∗
(0.0226) (0.0340) (0.0329)
dInfl 0.0105 0.0062 0.0017
(0.0064) (0.0057) (0.0089)
rVol −0.0224 −0.0452∗∗ −0.0253
(0.0323) (0.0193) (0.0288)
dDebt −0.0838 −0.1337∗∗∗ −0.1286∗∗
(0.0637) (0.0517) (0.0522)
dCa 0.1775 0.1687 0.1845
(0.1704) (0.1281) (0.1553)
dG −0.0105∗∗ −0.0096∗∗∗ −0.0134∗∗∗
(0.0043) (0.0035) (0.0046)
Rate −0.0913∗∗∗ −0.1130∗∗∗ −0.2391∗∗∗
(0.0049) (0.0129) (0.0171)
d × dInfl 0.0088
(0.0130)
d × rVol −0.0353
(0.0400)
d × dDebt −0.0112
(0.0215)
d × dCa −0.0821
(0.1491)
d × dG 0.0094
(0.0126)
d × Rate 0.2490∗∗∗
(0.0249)
d −0.0981
(0.0714)
Observations 976 976 976
Number of pairs 20 20 20
Adjusted R2 0.700 0.797 0.803
Partial R2 0.702 0.215 0.242
Time dummies yes yes
Bootstrap based standard errors (100 reps.) in parentheses. Pair fixed
effects always included. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
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combined coefficients for debt in Table 2.4.3 column 3 (-0.2782+0.1498),
roughly equals the coefficient found for debt in Table 2.4.4 column 3 (-0.1286).
Table 2.4.5 presents the case of North bond-South stock (Nb-Ss). The
Nb-Ss estimation confirms the previous literature’s results with respect to
expected inflation, volatility, GDP growth and the policy interest rate. An
increase in the relative debt or a deterioration of the current account is
related to the reduction of correlation, confirming flight-to-quality dynamics.
Once we control for time and pair fixed effects the coefficients on fiscal
measure as well as on the current account lose significance. While controlling
for the crisis period, the current account becomes relevant in explaining
the correlation. Again the crisis-dummy indicates that there was a shift
downward of the mean of the correlation.
In the North-stock and South-bond case (Ns-Sb) (Table 2.4.6) an increase
in the relative volatility makes southern bonds co-move more closely with
northern stocks. The effect of the interest rate is in line with the prediction of
theoretical models. GDP growth increases the correlation while an increase
in debt in the south reduces it when we control for time fixed effects.
Controlling for the crisis shows that the marginal effect of the current
account seems to be completely driven by the crisis period with a negative
sign. A worsening in the current account of the south relative to the north
determines an increase in the correlation of Ns-Sb since 2008. If anything,
this result is the clearest indication thus far that a fundamental variable
is related differently before and during the crisis. The significance of the
interacted coefficient for inflation suggests that also this variable is mostly
driven by the crisis. The crisis dummy is also significantly negative for this
category.
A comparison of Table 2.4.5 with Table 2.4.6 shows how the same
macroeconomic variables had a differentiated impact on the two categories:
stock market uncertainty worked as a hedge in the first category while
increased the correlation for the second; the GDP growth differentials worked
in line with the literature for the first while suggested to increase the
correlation in the second. Moreover, in the North-stock South-bond category
it seems that the current account is an important driver of the divergence
between the two correlations, as it is only statistically significant since the
crisis.
We can conclude that, looking at all the categories considered, the results
suggest quite clearly the relevance of macroeconomic variables in explaining
a significant portion of the international financial market correlations in
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Table 2.4.5: North Bond-South Stock panel regression
Dependent variable: Dynamic Correlation
(1) (2) (3)
1-way FE 2-way FE Crisis
Lag Dependent 0.6628∗∗∗ 0.4169∗∗∗ 0.4017∗∗∗
(0.0181) (0.0414) (0.0387)
dInfl 0.0252∗∗∗ 0.0110∗∗ 0.0226∗∗∗
(0.0037) (0.0049) (0.0053)
rVol −0.0523∗∗∗ −0.0617∗∗∗ −0.1048∗∗∗
(0.0165) (0.0150) (0.0185)
dDebt −0.0811∗∗ 0.0500 0.0812
(0.0340) (0.0795) (0.0708)
dCa 0.2095∗∗ 0.2267 0.2871∗
(0.0860) (0.1510) (0.1709)
dG 0.0058 −0.0082∗∗ −0.0065
(0.0039) (0.0041) (0.0050)
Rate −0.0313∗∗∗ −0.1103∗∗∗ −0.2390∗∗∗
(0.0035) (0.0127) (0.0178)
d × dInfl −0.0162∗∗
(0.0080)
d × rVol 0.1185∗∗∗
(0.0315)
d × dDebt −0.0563
(0.0414)
d × dCa −0.0281
(0.1662)
d × dG −0.0049
(0.0098)
d × Rate 0.2567∗∗∗
(0.0187)
d −0.9640∗∗∗
(0.0796)
Observations 1512 1512 1512
Number of pairs 30 30 30
Adjusted R2 0.462 0.599 0.614
Partial R2 0.467 0.251 0.282
Time dummies yes yes
Bootstrap based standard errors (100 reps.) in parentheses. Pair fixed
effects always included. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
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Table 2.4.6: North Stock-South Bond panel regression
Dependent variable: Dynamic Correlation
(1) (2) (3)
1-way FE 2-way FE Crisis
Lag Dependent 0.6490∗∗∗ 0.3069∗∗∗ 0.2927∗∗∗
(0.0241) (0.0150) (0.0152)
dInfl 0.0020 −0.0098∗ 0.0053
(0.0047) (0.0052) (0.0062)
rVol 0.0995∗∗∗ 0.0628∗∗∗ 0.0330
(0.0234) (0.0192) (0.0266)
dDebt 0.1788∗∗∗ −0.2565∗∗∗ −0.2998∗∗∗
(0.0438) (0.0471) (0.0442)
dCa −0.1836 0.1511 0.1423
(0.1171) (0.1072) (0.1041)
dG 0.0165∗∗∗ 0.0096∗∗∗ 0.0042
(0.0044) (0.0037) (0.0043)
Rate −0.0866∗∗∗ −0.0883∗∗∗ −0.2812∗∗∗
(0.0025) (0.0128) (0.0202)
d × dInfl −0.0326∗∗∗
(0.0091)
d × rVol 0.0708∗
(0.0376)
d × dDebt 0.0977∗∗∗
(0.0283)
d × dCa 0.2846∗∗∗
(0.0795)
d × dG 0.0016
(0.0103)
d × Rate 0.3885∗∗∗
(0.0233)
d −0.3321∗∗∗
(0.1003)
Observations 1512 1512 1512
Number of pairs 30 30 30
Adjusted R2 0.701 0.805 0.820
Partial R2 0.703 0.185 0.249
Time dummies yes yes
Bootstrap based standard errors (100 reps.) in parentheses. Pair fixed
effects always included. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
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the Euro-zone. For instance, the outcome of the previous tables indicates
that current account and debt dynamics impact both on the private and
public sector, with an opposite sign, as well as on the different geographical
markets. The results indicate that an increase in the southern debt decreases
the correlation between the northern and southern bond markets (Table
2.4.1) while increasing the stock market correlation (Table 2.4.2). Moreover,
it decreases the correlation between northern stocks and southern bonds
(Table 2.4.6). These results suggest that a debt increase in the south did not
change the pattern of the correlation in a way that is counter to European
financial homogenisation, except in the bond market where we observe that
increase of debt level affects negatively the correlation between the two
regions. Furthermore, current account imbalances seem a primary factor for
the correlations during the crisis (Tables 2.4.2 and 2.4.6). A worsening of the
current account for the south vis-a`-vis the north increases the stock market
correlation while it decreases the North-bond South-stock correlation since
the crisis.
Stock market volatility decreases the correlation between northern and
southern stocks (Table 2.4.2) logically but also decreases correlation between
the bond markets in the two regions (Table 2.4.1) and appears to make
southern bonds move more like northern stocks (Table 2.4.6).
Hereby we have also shown the relevance of a more general and joint-
analysis of European financial markets. Instead of a strict focus on one
market, and looking for the roles of specific financial variables, we are able to
provide evidence of the determinants of standard macroeconomic variables
across the different markets.36 The risk of an analysis on a single market
is that it may deliver a partial view of the Euro-zone asset markets and in
particular of the impact that macroeconomic variables have on them.
Moreover, the hypothesis that there was a revaluation of macroeconomic
fundamentals or a non-linear effects in their developments that caused
the disintegration of markets between northern and southern Euro-zone
is not strongly supported by any of the tables. Admittedly, there is a
general downward shift in the correlations as given by the coefficient on
the crisis period dummy. However, there is no model where the dummy
36Using the joint-estimation results of appendix 2.F we can test the joint-significance
of individual regressors across the 6 equations. Using the estimation with bootstrapped
standard errors, the result indicates that the coefficients on inflation cannot be rejected of
being jointly equal to zero at 1% (p-value is 0.036), while all the other coefficients indicate
strong evidence again the corresponding null-hypothesis.
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variable indicates a significant and consistent change in the role played by
the macroeconomic variables. In contrast, many of the coefficients on the
interaction variables indicate that the net effect has decreased in an absolute
sense, while most of these coefficients are insignificant. The occasional
significant sign does not provide strong enough evidence to attribute this to
the change in the role played by the underlying variable. The only exception
to this conclusion is the policy rate, which is consistently significant across
the different markets. The robustness check in appendix 2.G, where the
crisis is specified as starting in the first quarter of 2010, does not change
these conclusions.
These results are partly in contrast to what has been reported in some
research (for instance Caggiano and Greco, 2012). This difference can to some
extent be explained by the setup of our estimations. We focused squarely on
medium and long-term developments using broad macroeconomic indicators
as opposed to specialised macro-financial indicators. Secondly, our pairwise
panel setup allows for the control of many unobserved effects. Moreover,
we did not allow for contemporaneous effects, but estimated the effect of
the independent variables with a one quarter lag in order to forgo the risk
of reverse causality. Therefore, the results we find in this chapter may be
interpreted as the equilibrium marginal effects of the regressors, rather than
indicators of news-shocks. Thirdly, since we use all pairwise combinations, as
opposed to using a single benchmark market (e.g. Germany or the US), we
can interpret our results as neutral to a particular benchmark and instead
as fundamental drivers within the Euro-zone.
2.5 Conclusion
Since the spreading of the financial turmoil and the sovereign debt crisis in
the Euro-zone, it has been clear that European countries ceased to behave
uniformly triggering concerns about the preservation of the single currency.
In order to understand what occurred in the financial markets we proposed
to analyse these markets in a multi-dimensional fashion. We did this by
looking simultaneously at all correlations for two regions and two asset
markets. The division of regions into North and South worked well to
visualise the divergence in the Euro-zone and subsequently explain the
underlying determinants of such divergence.
The comparison of the conditional correlations of the between-regions and
between-assets shows how, after 2008, there was a change in the dynamics
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not only in the southern area stock-bond market but also at the cross regional
level. What used to be considered a safe asset (southern bond) started to
co-move with the deemed risky Northern one. The safe asset in the “risky”
area became more correlated with the risky asset in the “safe” area as well
as with stocks in the south. In contrast, the dynamics on the stock market
did not show any fall in correlation apart from a short-term and relatively
minor drop between 2010 and 2011.
We presented cross-country panel regressions to find the determinants
of the international dynamic correlations. By using all possible pairs of
countries for each correlation category, and in particular the heterogeneity
in the macroeconomic fundamentals, we obtained a fairly robust inference
of what might be the fundamental economic determinants that drive the
correlations over time for our sample. The panel estimations of assets’ corre-
lations between countries also allowed to introduce variables that highlighted
differences between those countries.
We find as main determinants for the overall set of equations: rela-
tive stock market volatility, debt and current account, growth, inflation
differentials and monetary policy. Not all of these factors are important
for each regression however, and in particular inflation differentials proves
to be the weakest determinant out of all the equations. The results are
mostly consistent with the theory for individual markets when available.
Additionally, debt and current account have not been considered in the
literature for all of the correlations we study, such as for the international
stock market correlations. The inflation, volatility, policy rate and economic
growth variables have been tried in the literature with mixed results.
We find that the correlation between bond markets seems to be mostly
determined by differences in debt levels and stock market volatility, our
measure of financial uncertainty. The correlations of stocks and bonds
between regions behave as expected by theory of cash flow determinants on
the one hand, and by macroeconomic fundamentals that indicate relative
economic performance between countries on the other hand. So, while
inflation, stock market volatility, economic growth and policy rate have the
correct signs according to theory, we find an additional significant impact
for the current account in some of the specifications and for debt only
when considering the southern region. Finally, the correlation of the stock
markets between north and south are mostly affected by current account
and economic growth on top of stock market volatility, and to a lesser extent
by differences in debt levels.
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Although we looked at the original Euro-zone countries, the results do
have implications for new and future member states. For instance, our results
indicate a trade-off of using unfunded government spending for private sector
stimulants at the risk of bond-market disintegration. Similarly, economic
growth proves to be a major driver behind financial integration. Current
account dynamics, recently highlighted as fundamentally important within
Europe, prove to have its effects on financial markets as well. Future research
might look more specifically at an expanded set of countries including new
Euro-zone members and those European countries outside the Euro-zone in
order to evaluate the role of fundamentals as countries join the monetary
union or are otherwise strongly economically and politically dependent on
it. Future research could also expand on the regressors, and in particular
look more closely at financial variables and spill-over effects in this bilateral
setting.
Although many studies have doubted the robustness of the union, the
general perspective was that over time, the EU would develop as an ever
integrating set of markets. We find that there is a mixed picture. Our
results do not indicate that European financial integration is fundamentally
hampered by the macroeconomic differences. These differences do affect the
integration, but not in ways that would be irreversible, meaning that as
long as the economies strive to grow and do so on sound macroeconomic
foundations, then this will be reflected in their financial markets. At the
moment, when we allow for regional division, not only cross-asset correlations
within regions behave differently, but also the variation of cross-assets cross-
regions dynamics can be explained with macroeconomic factors such as the
relative uncertainty between countries and balance of payments dynamics.
We do not find such effects when we look at each region separately, which
shows that Europe indeed is still a tale of two regions.
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2.A Descriptive statistics daily returns
Table 2.A.1: Daily data descriptive statistics
Asset returns Mean St Dev Skewness Kurtosis ACF2
Stocks
Austria 0.00016 0.0158 0.0334 11.5143 0.0000
Belgium 0.00001 0.0141 −0.2269 12.2145 0.0000
France −0.00004 0.0149 0.1418 7.8487 0.0000
Finland −0.00007 0.0224 −0.0851 9.4977 0.0000
Germany 0.00009 0.0155 0.1438 7.6402 0.0000
Netherlands 0.00003 0.0144 0.0423 8.3565 0.0000
Greece −0.00041 0.0199 0.2914 7.6454 0.0000
Ireland −0.00015 0.0173 −0.2645 12.0679 0.0000
Italy −0.00008 0.0148 0.1093 8.4179 0.0000
Spain 0.00009 0.0158 0.3521 9.1959 0.0000
Portugal −0.00011 0.0119 0.0805 10.7024 0.0000
Bonds
Austria 0.00010 0.0033 −0.2272 5.4112 0.0000
Belgium 0.00010 0.0036 −0.1437 8.0121 0.0000
France 0.00010 0.0035 −0.0769 5.8869 0.0000
Finland 0.00009 0.0032 −0.0811 4.5306 0.0000
Germany 0.00010 0.0034 −0.0485 4.7261 0.0000
Netherlands 0.00010 0.0033 −0.1236 4.4186 0.0000
Greece −0.00005 0.0138 3.6221 154.6728 0.0000
Ireland 0.00007 0.0055 0.7672 36.3590 0.0000
Italy 0.00008 0.0044 1.0414 27.1074 0.0000
Spain 0.00008 0.0045 1.3057 23.6396 0.0000
Portugal 0.00006 0.0074 −0.0299 56.5008 0.0000
ACF2 is the Ljung-Box Q-test for squared residual autocorrelation (up
to 20 lags), p-values reported. For every series we consider daily returns
on the period 2000-2013 for a total of 3608 observations.
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2.B Dynamic Conditional Correlation Estimation
2.B.1 Methodology
This appendix explains in detail the DCC methodology used in the chap-
ter. We estimate a DCC Multivariate Garch model using the methodology
described by Engle (2002).
The univariate estimation, discussed below, results in standardised resid-
ual i,t = zi,t/σi,t, where zi,t represents the residuals for each country-asset
i = 1, . . . k series at each time period t = 1, . . . T , and σ2i,t its time varying
variance.
The standardised residuals, i,t = zi,t/σi,t, of the univariate study are
passed to the multivariate stage under the assumption that the returns from
the initial assets, rt, are conditionally multivariate normal with mean zero
and covariance matrix Ht, equation (2.B.1). This assumption is important
for the maximum likelihood estimation of the model.
The model reads:
rt|Ψt−1 ∼ N (0, Ht), (2.B.1)
Ht = DtRtDt, (2.B.2)
Dt = diag
{√
σ2i,t
}
, (2.B.3)
t = D
−1
t zt, (2.B.4)
Qt = (1− α− β) Q¯+ αt−1′t−1 + βQt−1, (2.B.5)
Q¯ ≈ Et(t−1′t−1), (2.B.6)
Rt = diag(Qt)
−1/2Qtdiag(Qt)−1/2. (2.B.7)
With k assets, Dt is the k × k diagonal matrix of the time varying
standard deviations, σi,t, from the univariate estimation with
√
σ2i,t on the
ith diagonal. The expression for σi,t could be a simple Garch model as well as
any other formulation. The choice of this process is discussed below. Given
a sample of T observations, t is the k × T series of standardised residuals.
Finally Rt is the time varying correlation matrix and Q¯ is approximately the
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Figure 2.B.1: Selected bond and stock returns
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unconditional covariance of the standardised residuals from the first stage
estimation.37
Equations (3) and (4) refer to the univariate stage of the estimation
while (5) to (7) to the multivariate one. In order to decide the best process
to employ in the univariate stage we look at the descriptive statistics (Table
2.A.1) of daily raw returns and at their time plots. Figure 2.B.1 shows a
representative sample of the countries’ returns, exhibiting the broad difference
among stocks and bonds on one hand, and north and south on the other.
The statistics in Table 2.A.1 suggest the necessity for a Garch model
that is able to detect the specific nature of the data. By observing the
behaviour of the returns for the bond series in Figure 2.B.1 it is clear that
there was a strong change in volatility since the beginning of the sovereign
37Aielli (2006) shows that the DCC as set out by Engle (2002) needs theoretical
corrections in the formulation but for empirical work there is no relevant difference in
using either method (Aielli, 2013).
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debt crisis from 2010 onwards. This increase was by far more visible in
southern countries than in northern ones. Looking at the stock returns we
can instead detect an initial period of high volatility referring to the dot.com
financial crisis and, after 2008 another period of high volatility linked to the
current financial crisis. This pattern is visible both in the northern stock
markets as well as in the southern ones.
The second stage of the estimation requires standard normal distributed
residuals.38 In order to achieve this and capture the short term volatility
some series need additional pre-processing steps. Namely, we proceed by: 1)
standardise the returns via a moving window of the unconditional variance
(equation [2.B.10] and [2.B.9]) and 2) we take care of changes of the overall
volatility by introducing a crisis dummy (equation [2.B.13]).
The decision to introduce either of these two features is based on the
correct identification of the univariate process and on the Ljung-Box Q-test
for the residuals.39 Table 2.B.1 indicates how we treated each series. An
AR(P)-Garch (1,1) is then fitted to all the series:
rt = µ+
P∑
p=0
αprt−p + zt, (2.B.8)
r˜t = rt/
√
ht, (2.B.9)
ht = (1− J) + J ∗ 1
S
S∑
s=1
r2t−s, (2.B.10)
zt = σtt, (2.B.11)
t ∼ N(0, 1), (2.B.12)
σ2t = ω + αz
2
t−1 + βσ
2
t−1 + δIt, (2.B.13)
where (2.B.13) is the Garch formulation of Bollerslev (1986), and expresses
the choice of the process for the univariate series and the elements of the
38If the normality assumption is violated, the Gaussian likelihood has a quasi-likelihood
interpretation (Engle and Sheppard, 2001)
39An Igarch specification would not be appropriate for our dataset. By splitting the
sample we did not find any evidence of a unit root process in the two subsamples showing
that fitting an Igarch on the full sample appears to be a spurious regression due to the
change in the volatility regime in the post crisis period. Results for the second stage
-obtained from an Egarch specification- gave qualitatively similar results for the DCC and
panel estimations.
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matrix Dt in (2.B.3). The coefficient β determines the degree of memory of
the process; α the impact of new information and ω/(1− α− β) determines
the unconditional volatility. Equation (2.B.10) shows how we computed
the moving window unconditional variance of length S, that is used to
standardise the returns before entering the Garch. When J = 0, the series
are not standardised by the slow moving variance.40 The last term in (2.B.13)
is the dummy for the crisis, with It = 1 for selected series from 2010 onwards.
The introduction of the dummy changes the unconditional variance of the
model helping to capture the drastic increase in volatility we see in the
returns.
The DCC is computed and estimated in two stages following Engle et al.
(2008).
Univariate estimation results
Table 2.B.1 reports the parameters’ estimates for all markets. Southern
bonds required mostly an autoregressive part and the adjustment via crisis
dummy. Some stocks and the Italian bond series required the moving
windows standardisation.
Once the single univariate series are estimated, and before passing the
standardised residuals to the multivariate stage we ensure that there is no
further autocorrelation in the standardised residuals and squared standard-
ised residuals. Table 2.B.2 presents the same descriptive statistics as Table
2.A.1 with respect to the standardised residuals’ series. Additionally, it
reports the Ljung-Box Q-test for squared residual autocorrelation (up to 20
lags), by which we do not reject the null hypothesis of lack of autocorrelation
at the 5% level, except for the Greek stocks, Italian and Belgium bonds.
40In this Section, we are interested in the short run behaviour of the series. Before
continuing with the DCC we filter the returns of the long memory dynamics allowing to be
fairly confident that what we find as macroeconomic determinants in the panel regressions
are not driven by these dynamics left from the univariate regressions.
52 CHAPTER 2. EUROPEAN STOCK AND BOND CORRELATIONS
Table 2.B.1: Garch parameters
Asset returns Model J δ α β
Stocks
Austria GARCH - - 0.0938∗∗∗ 0.8957∗∗∗
Belgium GARCH - - 0.1096∗∗∗ 0.8800∗∗∗
France GARCH - - 0.0900∗∗∗ 0.9017∗∗∗
Finland GARCH - - 0.0324∗∗∗ 0.9658∗∗∗
Germany GARCH yes - 0.0850∗∗∗ 0.8438∗∗∗
Netherlands GARCH - - 0.0934∗∗∗ 0.8961∗∗∗
Greece AR(1)GARCH - - 0.0882∗∗∗ 0.9115∗∗∗
Ireland GARCH - - 0.0937∗∗∗ 0.8960∗∗∗
Italy GARCH yes - 0.0869 0.8847∗∗∗
Spain GARCH yes - 0.1034 0.8709∗∗
Portugal AR(1)GARCH - - 0.0949∗∗∗ 0.8989∗∗∗
Bonds
Austria GARCH - - 0.0445∗∗∗ 0.9421∗∗∗
Belgium AR(1)GARCH - ∗∗yes∗∗ 0.0638∗∗∗ 0.9179∗∗∗
France GARCH - - 0.0493∗∗∗ 0.9360∗∗∗
Finland GARCH - - 0.0383∗∗ 0.9535∗∗∗
Germany GARCH - - 0.0360∗∗∗ 0.9559∗∗∗
Netherlands GARCH - - 0.0372∗∗∗ 0.9529∗∗
Greece AR(1)GARCH - yes 0.1335∗∗∗ 0.8602∗∗∗
Ireland AR(1)GARCH - yes 0.0881∗∗∗ 0.9039∗∗∗
Italy AR(2)GARCH yes - 0.0659∗∗∗ 0.8302∗∗∗
Spain AR(1)GARCH - yes 0.0620∗∗∗ 0.9265∗∗∗
Portugal AR(1)GARCH - ∗∗yes∗∗ 0.0941∗∗∗ 0.8913∗∗∗
Parameters of the first stage univariate estimation set out in the text.
Standard errors are based on the Hessian matrix. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
The coefficients for the crisis dummy, δ, vary between 15% and 5% significance.
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Table 2.B.2: Univariate residuals descriptive statistics
Asset returns Mean St Dev Skewness Kurtosis ACF2
Stocks
Austria 0.0308 0.999 −0.2285 4.2812 0.7628
Belgium 0.0144 0.999 −0.2894 4.8881 0.3938
France 0.0043 0.999 −0.1999 4.0151 0.0730
Finland 0.0082 0.999 −0.1863 6.9048 0.9424
Germany 0.0128 1.000 −0.2068 3.5210 0.0346
Netherlands 0.0045 1.000 −0.1752 3.7742 0.1241
Greece −0.0451 0.998 0.0939 4.6001 0.0450
Ireland 0.0032 0.999 −0.4205 6.4650 0.6806
Italy −0.0063 1.000 −0.3273 3.9543 0.0821
Spain 0.0106 0.999 −0.1754 3.9588 0.0621
Portugal −0.0508 0.999 −0.0839 4.9606 0.8851
Bonds
Austria 0.0363 0.999 −0.1470 4.1246 0.9240
Belgium −0.0042 1.000 −0.1372 4.0593 0.0430
France 0.0348 1.000 −0.0578 3.9308 0.4391
Finland 0.0316 1.000 −0.1148 3.8124 0.8385
Germany 0.0328 0.999 −0.1466 3.7724 0.8557
Netherlands 0.0356 1.000 −0.1394 3.7791 0.9335
Greece −0.0163 0.998 −0.3087 8.5171 0.8001
Ireland −0.0102 1.000 0.2291 9.1341 0.9785
Italy −0.0104 1.000 −0.2179 3.9710 0.0374
Spain −0.0051 1.000 0.1500 5.7135 0.0537
Portugal −0.0051 0.999 −0.3040 8.2831 0.8562
ACF2 is the Ljung-Box Q-test for squared residual
autocorrelation (up to 20 lags), p-values reported.
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2.B.2 Daily dynamic conditional correlation results
This appendix shows the weighted DCC results as estimated in the multi-
variate model before transforming the daily results into quarterly frequency.
Figure 2.B.2: Daily weighted Dynamic Conditional Correlations
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Weighted average dynamic correlation series based on 30 country-asset pairs for
each category (panel) except for South-stock South-bond where there are 20 pairs.
The weights are constant over time and based on stock market capitalisation and
gross government liabilities figures for 2002. Shaded areas denote the minimum
and the maximum for every category at each point in time.
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2.C Panel Unit Root Test
This appendix gives the result of the cross-dependence and panel unit root
tests following Pesaran (2004, 2007) and described in Baltagi (2008) on the
quarterly correlations. The cross-sectional dependence describes whether a
panel unit root test should take into account cross-section dependence. The
test results show that it should. The panel unit root test can be conducted
in three fashions, normal, including cross-section fixed effects and including
cross-section and time fixed effects. One should also include lags, where the
lag-length can be defined by an information criteria. The AIC indicates a
lag-length of one is sufficient. The H0 is unit-root. Since the H0 is always
rejected, none of the tests indicate that the series follow a unit root.
Table 2.C.1: Panel unit root test
Panel unit root cross-section
1 2 3 dependence
critical values
1% −2.00 −2.60 −3.15 2.65
5% −1.72 −2.34 −2.88 1.96
10% −1.58 −2.21 −2.74 1.67
Nb v. Ns −6.45 −4.78 −4.77 20.13
Nb v. Sb −10.62 −11.78 −11.77 70.68
Nb v. Ss −6.69 −5.49 −5.49 103.26
Sb v. Ss −6.68 −7.43 −7.43 13.28
Ns v. Sb −7.78 −8.77 −8.77 109.64
Ns v. Ss −7.00 −4.20 −4.20 76.35
Cross-section augmented DF, CADF, (H0: series have a unit-root)
tests and Cross-sectional dependence, CD, (H0: no cross dependence)
following Pesaran (2004, 2007) described in Baltagi (2008). Critical
values are given, CD is normally distributed under H0. For the Panel
unit root, model 2 includes cross-section (cs) fixed effects, model 3 time
and cs fixed effect. Lag-length is 1. All based on quarterly figures of the
GARCH-DCC results.
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2.D Bilateral estimated DCC
This appendix presents the panel estimation results for the six categories in
the case of pair and time fixed effects. These regressions are conducted on
bivariate, separately estimated, DCC models as opposed to a joint estimation
where all correlations series share the same parameters. The bivariate
estimation has the advantage to be more flexible as allows to estimate
pairwise specific parameters. However, panel results prove to be robust
to the DCC model’s choice showing qualitatively similar macroeconomic
determinants’ dynamics.
Table 2.D.1: Bilaterally calculated correlations
Dependent variable: DCC Correlation (Bilateral)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Nb v. Sb Ns v. Ss Nb v. Ns Sb v. Ss Nb v. Ss Ns v. Sb
Lag dep. 0.5258∗∗∗ 0.4199∗∗∗ 0.3158∗∗∗ 0.5274∗∗∗ 0.4202∗∗∗ 0.4493∗∗∗
(0.0459) (0.0415) (0.0295) (0.0484) (0.0432) (0.0213)
dInfl 0.0113 0.0059 0.0005 0.0027 0.0063∗ −0.0106∗∗∗
(0.0251) (0.0070) (0.0088) (0.0039) (0.0034) (0.0037)
rVol −0.0945∗∗ −0.1119∗∗∗ 0.0420∗∗∗ −0.0412∗∗∗ −0.0350∗∗∗ 0.0473∗∗∗
(0.0424) (0.0200) (0.0102) (0.0130) (0.0109) (0.0153)
dDebt −0.5364∗∗∗ 0.1147 −0.1665∗∗ −0.1229∗∗∗ 0.0532 −0.1906∗∗∗
(0.1535) (0.0820) (0.0756) (0.0359) (0.0511) (0.0422)
dCa 0.3069 −0.2787∗∗∗ −0.1079 0.1932∗ 0.1283 0.0652
(0.2342) (0.1008) (0.0871) (0.0993) (0.0980) (0.0832)
dG 0.0122 0.0177∗∗∗ 0.0003 −0.0070∗∗∗ −0.0063∗∗ 0.0073∗∗∗
(0.0096) (0.0056) (0.0028) (0.0025) (0.0027) (0.0027)
rate −0.1801∗∗∗ 0.0316 −0.0788∗∗∗ −0.0756∗∗∗ −0.0698∗∗∗ −0.0606∗∗∗
(0.0267) (0.0223) (0.0090) (0.0092) (0.0097) (0.0086)
Observations 1512 1512 1560 976 1512 1512
Num. of pairs 30 30 30 20 30 30
Adjusted R2 0.923 0.574 0.571 0.844 0.560 0.850
Partial R2 0.354 0.282 0.188 0.383 0.236 0.313
Dependent variables are bilaterally calculated DCC correlations, quarterly averaged.
Bootstrap based standard errors (100 reps.) in parentheses ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗ p < 0.1. Time dummies always included
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2.E Realised Correlations
One disadvantage of the use of dynamic correlations such as the DCC is
that the series are estimated as opposed to observed data. This feature
is addressed in the panel estimation by the use of bootstrapped standard
errors that will take into account the additional estimation variance resulting
from the first stage estimation. Alternatively one can avoid the first stage
estimation by using the realised correlations. We compute quarterly realised
correlation based on the returns’ series and use the resulting correlations
as the dependent variables in the panel estimations. The results for the
two-way fixed effects are presented in Table 2.E.1.
All the results we present in the main text are echoed for all coefficients
in this setup. The main noticeable difference is the much smaller role for
the lagged dependent variable, which can be explained by the lack of time-
smoothing as is present in the DCC series. Consequently, also both R2
measures are noticeably smaller across the different equations.
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Table 2.E.1: Realised Correlations with two-way fixed effects
Dependent variable: Realised Correlation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Nb v. Sb Ns v. Ss Nb v. Ns Sb v. Ss Nb v. Ss Ns v. Sb
Lag dep. 0.3170∗∗∗ 0.0382∗ 0.0530 −0.0144 0.1105∗∗ −0.0749∗∗∗
(0.0440) (0.0225) (0.0341) (0.0323) (0.0499) (0.0173)
dInfl 0.0085 −0.0002 0.0054 0.0060 0.0154∗ −0.0070
(0.0367) (0.0140) (0.0188) (0.0105) (0.0089) (0.0082)
rVol −0.1128 −0.2285∗∗∗ 0.0911∗∗∗ −0.0753∗∗∗ −0.0941∗∗∗ 0.1016∗∗∗
(0.0720) (0.0447) (0.0215) (0.0288) (0.0268) (0.0257)
dDebt −0.9525∗∗∗ 0.2694∗ −0.3304∗∗ −0.2395∗∗∗ 0.0929 −0.3661∗∗∗
(0.2640) (0.1551) (0.1645) (0.0842) (0.1234) (0.0779)
dCa 0.8895∗∗ −0.5550∗∗∗ −0.1603 0.3947∗ 0.4305 0.1522
(0.4524) (0.1908) (0.1906) (0.2030) (0.2628) (0.1672)
dG 0.0902∗∗∗ 0.0317∗∗∗ 0.0089 −0.0128∗∗∗ −0.0158∗∗∗ 0.0133∗∗∗
(0.0181) (0.0094) (0.0060) (0.0046) (0.0061) (0.0050)
Rate −0.1977∗∗∗ 0.1048∗∗∗ −0.1072∗∗∗ −0.1312∗∗∗ −0.0749∗∗∗ −0.1231∗∗∗
(0.0486) (0.0317) (0.0162) (0.0204) (0.0155) (0.0174)
Observations 1512 1512 1560 976 1512 1512
Num. of pairs 30 30 30 20 30 30
Adjusted R2 0.873 0.358 0.435 0.690 0.405 0.717
Partial R2 0.145 0.070 0.051 0.041 0.043 0.050
Dependent variable are realised correlations, calculated from daily returns at quarterly
windows.Bootstrap based standard errors (100 reps.) in parentheses. *** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Time dummies always included.
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2.F Joint-estimations
Since we argue that the interaction among the six categories is relevant and
should be analysed simultaneously, one could argue that the joint estimation
of six categories simultaneously would be appropriate. Instead of equation-
by-equation estimation, one can make a system of six equations and estimate
this directly.
Here we present results that compare the estimation presented in the
text (for the two-way fixed effect models) (panel a) with a joint estimations
of the six equations using GMM (panel b). In order to reduce the number
of parameters of the system all series were firstly made orthogonal from the
pair and time fixed effects, thereafter the system was estimated. The results
of the joint estimation present both normal and bootstrap based standard
errors. The general results of the individual equation estimations remain,
although some individual coefficients differ in their level of significance or
even sign. The most structural difference between the two methods is seen for
the common EU rate, which may be attributed to the lack of cross-sectional
heterogeneity.
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Table 2.F.1: Joint estimation of the 2-way fixed effects model (panel a)
Dependent variable: Dynamic correlations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Nb v. Sb Ns v. Ss Nb v. Ns Sb v. Ss Nb v. Ss Ns v. Sb
a) Independent regressions
Lag dep. 0.5990∗∗∗ 0.4018∗∗∗ 0.3731∗∗∗ 0.3571∗∗∗ 0.4169∗∗∗ 0.3069∗∗∗
(0.0396) (0.0267) (0.0292) (0.0340) (0.0414) (0.0150)
dInfl −0.0205 −0.0008 0.0003 0.0062 0.0110∗∗ −0.0098∗
(0.0195) (0.0087) (0.0128) (0.0057) (0.0049) (0.0052)
rVol −0.0812∗∗∗ −0.1355∗∗∗ −0.0627∗∗∗ 0.0452∗∗∗ −0.0617∗∗∗ 0.0628∗∗∗
(0.0336) (0.0247) (0.0141) (0.0193) (0.0150) (0.0192)
dDebt −0.3238∗∗∗ 0.1746∗ −0.2243∗∗ −0.1337∗∗∗ 0.0500 −0.2565∗∗∗
(0.1091) (0.0984) (0.0985) (0.0517) (0.0795) (0.0471)
dCa 0.2308 −0.3331∗∗∗ −0.1414 0.1687 0.2267 0.1511
(0.1963) (0.1336) (0.1174) (0.1281) (0.1510) (0.1072)
dG 0.0078 0.0236∗∗∗ 0.0013 0.0096∗∗∗ −0.0082∗∗ 0.0096∗∗∗
(0.0075) (0.0076) (0.0037) (0.0035) (0.0041) (0.0037)
Rate −0.2044∗∗∗ 0.0507∗ −0.1110∗∗∗ −0.1130∗∗∗ −0.1103∗∗∗ −0.0883∗∗∗
(0.0246) (0.0289) (0.0126) (0.0129) (0.0127) (0.0128)
Panel a, estimates with pair and time fixed effects as presented in text. *** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Pair fixed effects and time dummies always included. In order to
reduce the number of parameters for the system estimation all series were firstly made
orthogonal from the pair and time fixed effects.
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Table 2.F.2: Joint estimation of the 2-way fixed effects model (panel b)
Dependent variable: Dynamic correlations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Nb v. Sb Ns v. Ss Nb v. Ns Sb v. Ss Nb v. Ss Ns v. Sb
b) GMM System regressions
Lag dep. 0.5544 0.4333 0.3405 0.4212 0.4558 0.2998
(0.0194)∗∗∗ (0.0167)∗∗∗ (0.0169)∗∗∗ (0.0187)∗∗∗ (0.0163)∗∗∗ (0.0180)∗∗∗
(0.0361)∗∗∗ (0.0346)∗∗∗ (0.0209)∗∗∗ (0.0528)∗∗∗ (0.0335)∗∗∗ (0.0433)∗∗∗
dInfl 0.0046 −0.0097 0.0100 0.0074 0.0096 −0.0030
(0.0135) (0.0069) (0.0093) (0.0047) (0.0048)∗∗ (0.0050)
(0.0156) (0.0096) (0.0135) (0.0056) (0.0062) (0.0051)
rVol −0.0470 −0.1320 0.0615 −0.0514 −0.0388 0.0685
(0.0269)∗ (0.0118)∗∗∗ (0.0073)∗∗∗ (0.0104)∗∗∗ (0.0093)∗∗∗ (0.0101)∗∗∗
(0.0353) (0.0177)∗∗∗ (0.0145)∗∗∗ (0.0172)∗∗∗ (0.0163)∗∗∗ (0.0161)∗∗∗
dDebt −0.2001 0.2455 −0.1996 −0.1266 0.0827 −0.1627
(0.0650)∗∗∗ (0.0374)∗∗∗ (0.0494)∗∗∗ (0.0259)∗∗∗ (0.0296)∗∗∗ (0.0282)∗∗∗
(0.0874)∗∗ (0.0583)∗∗∗ (0.0899)∗∗ (0.0317)∗∗∗ (0.0525) (0.0440)∗∗∗
dCa 0.4504 −0.3565 −0.1082 0.0335 0.1346 0.1491
(0.1591)∗∗∗ (0.0883)∗∗∗ (0.0811) (0.0735) (0.0663)∗∗ (0.0623)∗∗∗
(0.2305)∗ (0.1556)∗∗ (0.1426) (0.1356) (0.0881) (0.1404)
dG 0.0038 0.0115 0.0018 −0.0093 −0.0069 0.0005
(0.0071) (0.0039)∗∗∗ (0.0042) (0.0026)∗∗∗ (0.0027)∗∗∗ (0.0029)
(0.0109) (0.0089) (0.0051) (0.0024)∗∗∗ (0.0051) (0.0032)
Rate −0.0655 −0.0268 0.0038 0.0244 0.0331 0.0259
(0.0412) (0.0132)∗∗ (0.0097) (0.0105)∗∗∗ (0.0093)∗∗∗ (0.0114)∗∗
(0.0518) (0.0136)∗∗ (0.0115) (0.0166) (0.0071)∗∗∗ (0.0197)
Panel b, GMM estimation of 6 equations jointly. Standard errors in paranthesis,
upper standard GMM, lower bootstrap based (100 reps.). *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05,
* p < 0.1. Pair fixed effects and time dummies always included. In order to reduce the
number of parameters for the system estimation all series were firstly made orthogonal
from the pair and time fixed effects.
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2.G Alternative Crisis Period Indicator
We present statistics for varying structural break dates, ranging from 2007q1
to 2010q4 in Table 2.G.1.
Table 2.G.1: LM-statistic over varying structural break dates
break
point
Nb v. Sb Ns v. Ss Nb v. Ns Sb v. Ss Nb v. Ss Ns v. Sb
2007q1 865.45 993.85 1421.32 933.33 1231.20 785.59
2007q2 874.01 1013.71 1421.40 937.50 1253.20 790.73
2007q3 867.34 1020.55 1422.00 943.65 1255.49∗ 791.67
2007q4 883.71 1009.34 1420.60 942.94 1244.57 790.14
2008q1 861.01 1008.98 1420.48 940.08 1244.87 789.54
2008q2 883.02 1044.61∗∗ 1420.95 964.01∗ 1258.89∗∗ 796.94∗∗
2008q3 867.11 1028.12 1420.71 945.99 1251.76 792.85
2008q4 868.52 1010.69 1424.03∗∗ 940.76 1244.27 789.76
2009q1 865.85 1011.18 1419.39 940.70 1239.25 789.57
2009q2 872.31 1011.50 1420.23 940.95 1239.23 789.67
2009q3 889.06 1003.67 1419.66 935.40 1248.23 788.21
2009q4 899.29∗ 1005.62 1419.64 935.50 1247.81 788.26
2010q1 886.91 1004.77 1419.75 936.39 1247.47 787.89
2010q2 884.89 1005.91 1419.87 936.00 1247.47 788.42
2010q3 898.43 1017.88 1422.04∗ 957.71 1250.76 796.14∗
2010q4 920.97∗∗ 1042.72∗ 1420.64 977.12∗∗ 1242.27 788.65
LM statistics, (n ∗ R2), of the estimation with varying structural break dates. **
indicates highest value, * 2nd highest.
Following the discussion in the text in section 2.4.1 we present results
with an alternative starting date of the crisis dummy indicator, namely
starting at 2010q1. This date would approach closer to what is considered
the start of the European debt crisis but foregoes the signalling effect of the
broader financial crisis that was underway for some time at that point.
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Table 2.G.2: Alternative crisis-dummy, starting 2010q1
Dependent variable: Dynamic Correlation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Nb v. Sb Ns v. Ss Nb v. Ns Sb v. Ss Nb v. Ss Ns v. Sb
Lag dep. 0.6018∗∗∗ 0.3558∗∗∗ 0.3584∗∗∗ 0.3482∗∗∗ 0.4101∗∗∗ 0.2952∗∗∗
(0.0395) (0.0317) (0.0238) (0.0322) (0.0353) (0.0150)
dInfl 0.0264 0.0131 −0.0008 0.0054 0.0211∗∗∗ 0.0018
(0.0209) (0.0117) (0.0127) (0.0064) (0.0046) (0.0052)
rVol −0.1058∗∗ −0.1040∗∗∗ 0.0534∗∗∗ −0.0290 −0.0729∗∗∗ 0.0570∗∗
(0.0438) (0.0314) (0.0122) (0.0221) (0.0140) (0.0232)
dDebt −0.3690∗∗∗ 0.1357 −0.2436∗∗ −0.1435∗∗ 0.0648 −0.2799∗∗∗
(0.1165) (0.1119) (0.0950) (0.0631) (0.0705) (0.0452)
dCa 0.2922 −0.5806∗∗∗ −0.0101 0.2001∗ 0.1412 0.1616
(0.2417) (0.1852) (0.1020) (0.1172) (0.1262) (0.0985)
dG 0.0256∗∗∗ 0.0177∗∗ 0.0027 −0.0103∗∗∗ −0.0071∗∗∗ −0.0020
(0.0098) (0.0075) (0.0049) (0.0033) (0.0026) (0.0038)
Rate −0.2376∗∗∗ 0.0013 −0.1457∗∗∗ −0.1402∗∗∗ −0.1365∗∗∗ −0.1414∗∗∗
(0.0256) (0.0302) (0.0099) (0.0094) (0.0111) (0.0135)
d × dInfl −0.0297∗ −0.0540∗∗∗ 0.0128 0.0031 −0.0352∗∗ −0.0477∗∗∗
(0.0168) (0.0180) (0.0313) (0.0137) (0.0148) (0.0092)
d × rVol 0.0848 −0.0806∗∗ −0.0687 −0.0791 0.1375∗∗∗ 0.1353∗∗∗
(0.0606) (0.0336) (0.0722) (0.0525) (0.0483) (0.0406)
d × dDebt 0.1860∗∗∗ 0.0818 0.2341∗∗∗ 0.0411 −0.1520∗ 0.0085
(0.0563) (0.0718) (0.0744) (0.0614) (0.0832) (0.0405)
d × dCa 0.3603 0.7085∗∗ −0.2199 −0.0036 0.0845 −0.0340
(0.3497) (0.2852) (0.2260) (0.2687) (0.2969) (0.1360)
d × dG −0.1024∗∗∗ −0.0087 −0.0175 −0.0015 −0.0081 0.0460∗∗∗
(0.0182) (0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0124) (0.0098) (0.0156)
d × Rate 0.6500∗∗∗ 0.9373∗∗∗ 0.4548∗∗∗ 0.4805∗∗∗ 0.4549∗∗∗ 0.8607∗∗∗
(0.1125) (0.0955) (0.1018) (0.1229) (0.1097) (0.1200)
d −1.2131∗∗∗ −0.7786∗∗∗ −0.4556∗∗∗ 0.1372 −0.5701∗∗∗ −0.2969∗∗∗
(0.1522) (0.1337) (0.1214) (0.1117) (0.1106) (0.0926)
Observations 1512 1512 1512 1512 976 1560
Num. of pairs 30 30 30 30 20 30
Adjusted R2 0.938 0.579 0.822 0.612 0.801 0.637
Partial R2 0.455 0.303 0.256 0.274 0.231 0.273
Bootstrap Standard errors (100 reps.) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
pair and time fixed effects. Crisis period from 2010q1, everything else as specified in
main text.

Chapter 3
Sovereign debt default and
banking in a currency union1
3.1 Introduction
The global financial crisis starting in 2007 prompted a reassessment of asset
prices and growth prospects in the euro area (EA hereafter). As a result, in
late 2009, countries like Ireland and Spain began to report – much – larger
than expected fiscal deficits and rising spreads on sovereign debt. Some
downgrades later, most periphery countries – also called GIIPS for Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain – were in deep troubles, with surges in
sovereign bond yields and fears of default. At the same time, countries
perceived as safe – we call them core countries – saw their sovereign yields
reducing to a historical low, as shown on the left-hand-side of Figure 3.1.1.
The sovereign crisis also led to credit restrictions to the private sector
in the whole euro area. The right-hand-side of Figure 3.1.1 shows that
between 2010 and 2012, interest rates on loans to non-financial corporations
(NFC) increased by more than 100 basis points in the periphery and by
approximately 60 basis points in the core.2 We therefore observe spillovers
1This chapter is based on Perego and Pierrard (2014).
2In the core, the average increase in the loan rate from 2010Q1 to 2011Q4 was of 60
bps with a minimum increase of 46 bps for France and a maximum of 76 bps for Finland.
The region is therefore rather homogeneous. In the periphery the average was of 132 bps
but hiding a high degree of heterogeneity. Countries like Greece and Portugal faced an
increase respectively of 194 bps and 216 bps whereas countries like Spain and Ireland of
approximately 80 bps and Italy of 91 bps.
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from default risk on periphery sovereign debt (or default realization in the
case of Greece) to the private credit and to the core countries.
Recently, several empirical papers focus on the role the banking system
played in the transmission of sovereign risks. On the one hand, Brutti and
Saure´ (2012) using a VAR model show that strong interdependence between
banks and cross-border exposures to sovereign debt explain up to two-thirds
of the transmission of the euro debt crisis. Also, De Bruyckere et al. (2012)
underline two important banking channels of transmission: the capital
channel as sovereign default weakens the asset side of the bank’s balance
sheet and the collateral channel as sovereign bonds are often used as collateral
on the interbank market in order to obtain funds needed to provide credit to
the private sector. On the other hand, some papers suggest that the banking
sector is less integrated than it used to be. For instance, the ECB (2012) or
Abascal et al. (2013) acknowledge a deepening of financial integration until
2007 mainly through the important role of the single currency, but also show
that this integration receded between 2008 and 2011.3
In this chapter, we build a dynamic general equilibrium model to better
understand the role of banking in general and the role of the banking structure
in particular, in the transmission of a – sovereign – shock. We show that
the model reproduces quite well historical observations when we introduce
some degree of banking fragmentation. However, we observe that a better
integrated banking sector would have reduced the negative consequences of
default at the aggregate EA level. It would also limit the welfare cost of
stabilizing policies. Our contribution to the literature is twofold. First, we
enlarge the literature on sovereign default by studying default in a currency
union. There exist several models with explicit default modelling. In partial
equilibrium setups, Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and Arellano (2008) model
default as an optimal choice of the government. Instead, in Bi and Leeper
(2010) and Juessen et al. (2011), default results from a binding fiscal limit
impeding the government to raise enough funds to repay the debt. Another
strand of the literature on sovereign default, to which our work contributes,
focuses on the interaction between sovereign risk and the financial sector. In a
partial equilibrium setup Gennaioli et al. (2010) and Bolton and Jeanne (2011)
3Appendix 3.A provides data from various sources to give a snapshot of financial
integration at different dates. We indeed observe that until 2008, the EA banking sector
became highly integrated. Public and private debt obligations of the troubled countries of
the euro zone were largely held by creditors in other parts of the euro zone and, moreover,
banks were also closely connected through cross-border interbank market. From 2009
onwards, banking data however show a gradual fragmentation as well as a ‘flight-to-quality’.
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study the interaction between sovereign default risk and the banking system.
Both studies explore the role of bank’s balance sheet and show that the greater
is the default risk, the weaker are the bank’s balance sheets. This determines
international contagion and reduction in investment. Using a closed-economy
new-Keynesian model, Mallucci (2013) also shows how the cyclicality of
bank’s balance sheets magnifies the impact of sovereign debt crisis on the real
economy. Corsetti et al. (2013) analyse the impact of strained government
finances on macroeconomic stability and the transmission of fiscal policy. The
key idea is that sovereign risk raises the funding costs of the private sector
because of the increase in the costs of financial intermediation. van der Kwaak
and van Wijnbergen (2013) analyse the interaction between bank rescues,
financial fragility and sovereign debt default. All these papers study the
internal, i.e. closed-economy, transmission of sovereign debt default although
data suggest important international spillovers. Guerrieri et al. (2012) study
this international propagation but using a real business cycle model, that
is without any nominal dimension and therefore without monetary policy.
It is worth noting some of the above-mentioned papers look at default risk
whereas others look at default realization, which makes their results difficult
to compare. Our model considers a currency union with a common monetary
policy and introduces both default risk and default realization. As we will
see later, a common monetary policy in case of asymmetric shocks may
have important consequences, and ‘realization’ spillovers may differ from
the ‘risk’ ones. Second, we contribute to the literature on financial frictions
and banking in a currency union. Most papers with banking (frictions) use
closed-economy new-Keynesian models, as for instance Gerali et al. (2010)
or Gertler and Karadi (2011). Enders et al. (2011), Guerrieri et al. (2012)
or Kollmann (2013) combine banking and the international dimension but
without monetary policy, be it common or not. This chapter is one of the
few attempts to introduce banking frictions in a currency union.
More precisely, we build a 2-country new-Keynesian model of a currency
union, that is with a common monetary policy. Trade between countries
follows Gali and Monacelli (2008). Regarding the banking sector representa-
tion, we follow Enders et al. (2011) and Kollmann (2013) by introducing a
perfectly competitive banking sector playing at the EA wide level, paying
a cost whenever capital is lower than requirements (bank capital channel).
In our setup, sovereign bonds are not only bank assets but also a collateral
securing bank borrowings (bank collateral channel). The banking sector
may move from integration to fragmentation. Under fragmentation, a geo-
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graphical diversification of assets entails costs for the bank. Default arises
endogenously as in Corsetti et al. (2013), when actual debt-to-GDP becomes
too close to a feasible – or sustainable – maximum level. The bank trans-
mits this default to the real economy mainly through the bank capital and
collateral channels. As already explained, we make the distinction between
a default risk and a default realization. We calibrate the model on EA data.
First, we find that using an integrated bank approach, realization has
a deeper impact on output than risk, mainly through the bank capital
and the bank collateral channels (lower excess capital and lower eligible
collateral with realization). Second, the integrated bank assumption allows
to share almost perfectly between regions the periphery sovereign troubles
whereas fragmentation prevents the full sharing of the periphery turmoil.
The situation in the periphery deteriorates further which benefits to the core
region because of a too loose – for the core – monetary policy. The aggregate
situation at the EA wide level is worse with fragmentation, because of an
unadapted common monetary policy. This result is in line with the findings
of Bignon et al. (2013) showing that a currency union is only desirable under
banking integration.4 Third, our model reproduces the best empirical data
when we introduce only some degree of fragmentation. Fourth, from a policy
point of view, we see that counter-cyclical capital requirements targeting
output growth reduces seriously the volatility of output without implying a
too high welfare cost. Extending the Taylor rule to include sovereign spreads
does not really allow to reduce output volatility. In general, whatever the
policy, the welfare costs of stabilizing the economy are much lower under a
well integrated banking sector.
Section 3.2 details the model. Section 3.3 explains the calibration. Sec-
tion 3.4 presents the dynamic simulations. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Model
We develop a two-country model for the euro area. We call the first coun-
try/region as core and we denote it by c hereafter. We call the second
country/region as periphery and we denote it by p hereafter. We introduce
nominal rigidities, monetary policy and an endogenous probability of default
on the government debt. Households in each region j ∈ {c, p} work for the
firms, consume and invest in deposits at the bank and in domestic sovereign
4Their modelling approach is however different. They build a 2-country model a` la
Rocheteau and Wright (2005) with money and banks.
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Figure 3.1.1: Evolutions of selected interest rates
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Notes. Evolution of 10 years sovereign bond yields and of 1 to 5 years maturity
loans to non financial corporations (NFC) for core and periphery countries.
Core countries include: Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, Finland whereas
periphery countries are: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. The
aggregated series has been created by weighting each country by their GDP.
The vertical dotted lines signal the beginning of the sovereign debt crisis
(2010Q1) and its acknowledged end (2011Q4).
Data sources: Datastream and the ECB Statistical Data Warehouse.
bonds. The production side of the economy is composed of final and inter-
mediate firms and entrepreneurs. The entrepreneurs transform consumption
goods into capital goods. In order to do so they borrow from the bank
in the form of one-period loans and invest in firm’s capital. Intermediate
firms are monopolists that produce differentiated goods. In each country
final firms combine these goods into a final one. There exists a single bank
playing at the EA wide level receiving deposits from households, investing
in international sovereign markets and providing loans to entrepreneurs.
Although there exists a single bank playing at the EA wide level we allow
for different levels of geographical integration/fragmentation between its
assets/liabilities. Government expenditures are financed via lump-sum taxes
from the households and public debt. Moreover the government might de-
fault on its debt if the economy gets too close to its fiscal limit. We assume
symmetric countries in the sense that parameters are country invariant. The
only departure from symmetry is that the core country has a lower debt
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level than the periphery country.5
3.2.1 Households
In each country j ∈ {c, p}, the representative household may consume Cjt
(international) final goods, invest Djt in one-period (international) bank
deposits or bjt in one-period, domestic, sovereign debt. The – predetermined
– gross nominal returns on deposits and sovereign bonds are respectively
Rd,jt−1 and R
b,j
t−1. 
j
t ≥ 0 captures the share of outstanding sovereign debt
lost by households because of – partial – sovereign default.6 The household
also supplies hjt hours to firms and receives wages w
j
t . It moreover owns the
firms located in j and therefore receives their profits Υjt , as well as a lump-
sum income Hh,jt from the government. Finally, the household must pay
taxes T jt and quadratic portfolio adjustment costs on deposits and sovereign
debt, represented respectively by the parameters φd > 0 and φb > 0 in
equation (3.2.1). These costs make the household’s portfolio choices less
sensitive to interest rate differentials.7 It is worth noting that we segment
both the sovereign debt market and the labour market at the household’s
level, i.e. the household in j may only hold debt from government j and
work in country j. The household’s budget constraint is:
Cjt +D
j
t + b
j
t + T
j
t +
φd
2
(Djt −Djt−1)2 +
φb
2
(bjt − b¯j)2
= wjth
j
t +
Rd,jt−1
Πjt
Djt−1 +
Rb,jt−1 − jt
Πjt
bjt−1 + Υ
j
t +H
h,j
t , (3.2.1)
where Πjt is final goods inflation and, throughout the chapter, z¯ represents
the steady state of any variable zt. The household’s expected lifetime utility
at date s is:
maxEs
∞∑
t=s
βt−s
(
lnCjt + ψd lnD
j
t −
ψn
2
(
hjt
)2)
. (3.2.2)
5As a result, public consumption at the steady state is lower in the periphery country
because the cost of debt is higher. We could have alternatively assumed that taxes at the
steady state are higher in the periphery country.
6Equations in the model express default realization. However, we will also consider
default risk and we explain later how to modify the equations accordingly.
7See for instance Guerrieri et al. (2012) for similar costs. We could instead use
alternative approaches as e.g. habit in consumption.
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As in Enders et al. (2011), we assume that deposits provide utility to the
household and we take a logarithmic utility. We also take a logarithmic
instantaneous utility of consumption and a quadratic disutility of hours.
0 < β < 1 is the subjective discount factor and ψd, ψn > 0 are parameters.
The household maximizes (3.2.2) with respect to (3.2.1). It gives three first
order conditions:
(Cjt )
−1 (1 + φ′d,t) = ψd
Djt
+ Et β (C
j
t+1)
−1
(
Rd,jt
Πjt+1
+ φ′d,t+1
)
, (3.2.3)
(Cjt )
−1
(
1 + φb(b
j
t − b¯j)
)
= Et β (C
j
t+1)
−1 R
b,j
t − jt+1
Πjt+1
, (3.2.4)
wjt
Cjt
= ψnh
j
t , (3.2.5)
where φ′d,t = φd(D
j
t −Djt−1). Euler equations (3.2.3) and (3.2.4) state that
at equilibrium, marginal costs are equal to expected marginal income from
respectively deposits and sovereign bonds. Equation (3.2.5) shows that the
wage is equal to the marginal disutility of hours.
3.2.2 Entrepreneurs
In each country j ∈ {c, p}, entrepreneurs borrow from the (international)
bank in the form of one-period loans Ljt . They may consume C
e,j
t or invest
Ijt in domestic firms. In turn, investment increases firms’ capital stock K
j
t
according to:
Kjt = (1− δ)Kjt−1 + Ijt , (3.2.6)
where 0 < δ < 1 is the capital depreciation rate. Capital provides a net
real return rjt and entrepreneurs pay a gross nominal interest rate R
l,j
t−1 on
loans, as well as an adjustment cost on investment, as in Enders et al. (2011),
represented by the parameter φi > 0. The entrepreneurs’ budget constraint
is:
Ce,jt + I
j
t +
Rl,jt−1
Πjt
Ljt−1 +
φi
2
(Ijt − I¯j)2 = Ljt + rjtKjt−1 . (3.2.7)
The entrepreneurs expected lifetime utility at date s is:
maxEs
∞∑
t=s
βt−s
(
Ce,jt
)1−σe − 1
1− σe , (3.2.8)
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where σe > 0 reflects the curvature of the instantaneous utility of consump-
tion. By simplicity, we take a discount factor similar to the one of the
household. We also assume segmented capital markets. The entrepreneurs
maximize (3.2.8) with respect to (3.2.6) and (3.2.7). It gives two first order
conditions:
(Ce,jt )
−σe = Et β (C
e,j
t+1)
−σe R
l,j
t
Πjt+1
, (3.2.9)
(Ce,jt )
−σe(1+φ′i,t) = Et β (C
e,j
t+1)
−σe
(
rjt+1 + (1− δ)(1 + φ′i,t+1)
)
, (3.2.10)
where φ′i,t = φi(I
j
t − I¯j). Equation (3.2.9) says that at equilibrium, the
marginal income from loans is equal to the expected marginal cost, whereas
equation (3.2.10) states that the marginal cost of investment is equal to its
expected marginal income.
3.2.3 Firms
In each country j ∈ {c, p}, we have a uniform distribution between [0, 1] of
intermediate monopolistic firms, indexed by nj . We also define −j ∈ {c, p}
as the complement of j.8 By simplicity, we ignore time subscripts whenever
we have static equations. Let djj(nj) be the intermediate goods produced in
country j by the intermediate firm nj and sold in country j. Similarly, let
d−jj (nj) be the intermediate goods produced in country j by the intermediate
firm nj and sold in country −j.
Final firms’ demand
In each country j ∈ {c, p}, there is a final firm combining intermediate goods
from the j and −j countries in order to produce a final good Aj according
to a CES technology:
Aj =
(
Ajj
1− α
)(1−α) (
Aj−j
α
)α
, (3.2.11)
8That is j ∩ −j = ∅ and j ∪ −j = {c, p}.
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where
Ajj =
(ˆ 1
0
[
djj(nj)
] 1
1+θ
dnj
)1+θ
,
Aj−j =
(ˆ 1
0
[
dj−j(n−j)
] 1
1+θ
dn−j
)1+θ
.
0 < 1− α < 1 is the domestic bias, or equivalently α is an index of openness.
(1 + θ)/θ > 1 represents the elasticity of substitution between intermediate
goods produced within any given country. The final firm’s profit is:
P jAj −
ˆ 1
0
pj(nj) d
j
j(nj) dnj −
ˆ 1
0
p−j(n−j) d
j
−j(n−j) dn−j , (3.2.12)
where P j is the final goods price index in country j and pj(nj) is the
intermediate goods nj price index in country j. It is worth noting that
equation (3.2.12) takes into account that the two countries are part of a
monetary union (nominal exchange rate equal one) and includes the law of one
price, that is a given intermediate goods must have the same price in the two
countries. For each country, let us define the ratio between the intermediate
goods price index and the final goods price index φj(nj) = p
j(nj)/P
j . We
also define the real exchange rate of country j vis a` vis country −j as
Q−jj = P
−j/P j . Obviously, Qj−j = 1/Q
−j
j and Q
j
j = 1. The final firm
maximizes (3.2.12) with respect to (3.2.11). Using the above-mentioned
definitions, it gives the two first order conditions:
djj(nj)
Aj
=
(
φj(nj)
(1− α)
)− 1+θ
θ
(
Ajj
Aj
)− 1
θ
, (3.2.13)
dj−j(n−j)
Aj
=
(
φ−j(n−j) Q
−j
j
α
)− 1+θ
θ
(
Aj−j
Aj
)− 1
θ
. (3.2.14)
Intermediate firms
An intermediate firm located in country j and indexed by nj uses capital
Kjt−1(nj) and hours h
j
t (nj) to produce an intermediate good according to
the Cobb-Douglas production function. Final firms in the two countries
consume this intermediate production:
Y j(nj) ≡ djj(nj) + d−jj (nj) =
(
Kjt (nj)
)µ (
hjt (nj)
)1−µ
, (3.2.15)
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where 0 < µ < 1 is the elasticity of output to capital. The intermediate firm
receives a – real – intermediate price φjt (nj) but has to pay an interest rate
rjt on capital and a hourly wage w
j
t . Moreover, since intermediate firms are
monopolistic, they set the price but with an adjustment cost a` la Rotemberg
(1982) represented by the parameter κ > 0. The current real profit of an
intermediate firm nj is:
Υjt (nj) = φ
j
t (nj)
(
djj,t(nj) + d
−j
j,t (nj)
)
− rjtKjt−1(nj)− wjthjt (nj)
− κ
2
(
φjt (nj)Π
j
t
φjt−1(nj)
− Π¯j
)2 (
Ajj,t +A
−j
j,t
)
, (3.2.16)
where Πjt = P
j
t /P
j
t−1. The households hold the intermediate firms and they
therefore maximize:
maxEs
∞∑
t=s
βt−s
Cjt
Cjt+1
Υjt (nj). (3.2.17)
with respect to the production equation (3.2.15) and the two demand equa-
tions (3.2.13) and (3.2.14). It gives three first order conditions:
hjt (nj)
Kjt−1(nj)
=
(1− µ) rjt
µ wjt
, (3.2.18)
mcjt (nj) =
(
rjt
µ
)µ(
wjt
1− µ
)1−µ
, (3.2.19)
φjt (nj) + θκ
λjt (nj)
djj,t(nj) + d
−j
j,t (nj)
= (1 + θ) mcjt (nj) (3.2.20)
+Etβ
Cjt
Cjt+1
θκ
λjt+1(nj)
djj,t(nj) + d
−j
j,t (nj)
,
(3.2.21)
where λjt (nj) =
(
φjt (nj)Π
j
t
φjt−1(nj)
− Π¯j
)
φjt (nj)Π
j
t
φjt−1(nj)
(
Ajj,t +A
−j
j,t
)
.
Equation (3.2.18) shows that the labour-capital ratio is proportional to
the capital-labour cost ratio. Equation (3.2.19) defines the marginal cost.
Moreover, these two equations imply that the labour-capital ratio and the
marginal cost are identical across all intermediates firms located in a given
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country. Equation (3.2.20) is the new-Keynesian Phillips curve and states
that intermediate goods price is a markup over the marginal cost. If prices
are perfectly flexible (κ = 0), the markup is 1 + θ and constant over time.
With price rigidities (κ > 0) the markup becomes variable over time.
Aggregation
In equilibrium, all intermediate firms within a country j ∈ {c, p} are identical
and we may drop the index nj in all above equations. We also have d
j
j,t = A
j
j,t
and d−jj,t = A
−j
j,t . The aggregation of equations (3.2.16), (3.2.18), (3.2.19)
and (3.2.20) is straightforward. Moreover, equations (3.2.13), (3.2.14) and
(3.2.15) respectively become:
φjt A
j
j,t = (1− α) Ajt , (3.2.22)
Q−jj,t φ
−j
t A
j
−j,t = α A
j
t , (3.2.23)
Y jt = A
j
j,t +A
−j
j,t =
(
Kjt
)µ (
hjt
)1−µ
.
Using equation (3.2.11), we can simplify further these equations into:
1 = φjt φ
−j
t ,
Q−jj,t =
(
φjt
) 2α−1
α
,
φjt Y
j
t = (1− α) Ajt + α Q−jj,tA−jt = φjt
(
Kjt
)µ (
hjt
)1−µ
.(3.2.24)
Finally, taking the ratio of the real exchange rate at times t and t− 1 gives:
Q−jj,t
Q−jj,t−1
=
Π−jt
Πjt
. (3.2.25)
Summing equation (3.2.24) on j gives
∑
j φ
j
t Q
j
c,t Y
j
t =
∑
j Q
j
c,t A
j
t , meaning
that production is equal to demand in the whole currency area. Equa-
tion (3.2.25) shows that a higher inflation in the periphery country than in
the core country leads to an increase in the real exchange rate of the core
country, equivalent to a depreciation of the core “currency”. In other words,
a higher real exchange rate means an improved competitiveness.
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3.2.4 Banking sector
We specify the banking sector as a bank a` la Enders et al. (2011), i.e. a
perfectly competitive bank playing at the EA wide level. At this stage, we
assume a full banking integration, meaning that the bank bears no cost for
geographical diversification (we explain how we introduce fragmentation in
section 3.4.3). The bank is physically located in country c but trades with all
countries j ∈ {c, p}. More precisely, it receives deposits Djt from households,
lends Ljt to firms and buys s
j
t one-period bonds from the government. The
bank may also buy Bcbt one-period bonds from the central bank. The bank
consumes profits in the two countries, that is it buys Cb,jt goods in each
country. Since the central bank is common to the currency union and the
bank is located in country c, we first need to express relative price indexes.
The global production in the currency union is Yt =
∑
j Y
j
t and we define
ηt = Y
c
t /Yt as the share of the c country. Then:
Pt = (P
c
t )
ηt (P pt )
1−ηt ,
Πt =
Pt
Pt−1
= (Πct)
ηt (Πpt )
1−ηt ,
Pt
P ct
=
(
Qpc,t
)1−ηt ,
Pt−1
P ct
=
(
Qpc,t
)1−ηt
Πt
.
The bank faces a capital requirement a` la Enders et al. (2011) implying
that it must keep a constant fraction 0 < γ < 1 of loans as own capital.
xt represents excess capital, that is the amount of capital above the legal
requirements. A negative xt therefore means that bank capital is below
requirements. The bank’s balance sheet constraint is:
(1− γ)
∑
j
Qjc,tL
j
t +
∑
j
Qjc,ts
j
t +
(
Qpc,t
)1−ηt Bcbt = ∑
j
Qjc,tD
j
t + xt . (3.2.26)
Government bonds do not enter the requirement constraint because they were
considered as risk-free, in line with standard features of capital regulation
(see Guerrieri et al., 2012, for a similar representation). We nevertheless
consider the possible inclusion of bonds in the constraint in section 3.4. The
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bank’s budget constraint is:∑
j
Qjc,tC
b,j
t +
∑
j
Qjc,t
Rd,jt−1
Πjt
Djt−1 +
∑
j
Qjc,tL
j
t +
∑
j
Qjc,ts
j
t +
(
Qpc,t
)1−ηt Bcbt
+ Ψ
(∑
j Q
j
c,t(1− jt )νsjt∑
j Q
j
c,tL
j
t
−
∑
j Q¯
j
c s¯j∑
j Q¯
j
c L¯j
)
+
Γl
2
∑
j
(
Ljt − L¯j
)2
+ Ω(xt)
+ Γd
∑
j
(
Djt − D¯j
)
=
∑
j
Qjc,tD
j
t +
∑
j
Qjc,t
Rl,jt−1
Πjt
Ljt−1
+
∑
j
Qjc,t
Rb,jt−1 − jt
Πjt
sjt−1 +
(
Qpc,t
)1−ηt Rt−1
Πt
Bcbt−1 +
∑
j
Qjc,tH
b,j
t . (3.2.27)
The bank pays a gross nominal interest rate Rd,jt−1 on deposits and receives
gross nominal interest rates Rl,jt−1, R
b,j
t−1 and Rt−1 on respectively loans to
firms, government bonds and central bank bonds. It is worth noting that
the return on government bonds is risky, that is government in country j
may default with a probability jt . Moreover, the bank faces four different
costs. First, there is an operating cost, proportional to the size of the bank
balance sheet (we approximate the size of the balance sheet through deposits),
represented by the parameter Γd > 0. We find similar costs in Enders et al.
(2011). Second, as in Guerrieri et al. (2012), we have quadratic adjustment
costs on loans, represented by the parameter Γl > 0. Third, as explained
above, there is a cost when capital is below requirements. The cost function
must satisfy Ω(0) = 0, Ω
′
(0) ≤ 0 and Ω′′(.) > 0 as in Enders et al. (2011).
The bank therefore bears a positive cost when xt < 0 and the cost is 0
when the bank exactly meets the requirements. We call the transmission of
shocks through this cost the bank capital channel. Fourth, banks typically
use government bonds as collateral in the secured interbank market. A
reduction in their volume or quality decreases the ability of banks to collect
funds from other banks and hence to sustain private credit supply. In our
model, there is no interbank market and therefore no such collateral role
for sovereign bonds. In order to nevertheless reproduce this channel, we
introduce a collateral cost whenever the ratio between sovereign bonds and
private loans is lower than the steady state. It is worth noting that the
numerator of the ratio not only includes the volume of bonds but also a
measure of riskiness, through the parameter ν ≥ 0, which represents the
haircut applied to them. This cost function must therefore satisfy the same
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requirements as the capital cost, i.e. Ψ(0) = 0, Ψ
′
(0) ≤ 0 and Ψ′′(.) > 0. We
call the transmission of shocks through this cost the bank collateral channel.
We discuss in more details the role of the capital cost Ω(.) and the collateral
cost Ψ(.) further in this section. The bank’s expected lifetime utility at date
s is:
maxEs
∞∑
t=s
βt−s
(
Cb,ct
)ϑ (
Cb,pt
)1−ϑ
. (3.2.28)
The bank derives instantaneous utility from a Cobb-Douglas combination
of consumption goods from countries c and p, where ϑ (resp. 1− ϑ) is the
elasticity of the utility with respect to Cb,ct (resp. C
b,p
t ). By simplicity, we
take a discount factor similar to the one of the household. The bank maxi-
mizes (3.2.28) with respect to (3.2.26) and (3.2.27). It gives one definition
(equation 3.2.29) and five first order conditions:
λbt =
ϑ
(
Cb,ct
)ϑ (
Cb,pt
)1−ϑ
Cb,ct
, (3.2.29)
Qpc,t =
1− ϑ
ϑ
Cb,ct
Cb,pt
, (3.2.30)
λbt(Q
j
c,t − Γd +Qjc,t Ω
′
(xt)) = βEtλ
b
t+1Q
j
c,t+1
Rd,jt
Πjt+1
, (3.2.31)
λbt
(
Qpc,t
)1−ηt (1 + Ω′(xt)) = βEtλbt+1 (Qpc,t+1)1−ηt+1 RtΠt+1 , (3.2.32)
λbt
(
Qjc,t −Qjc,tΨ
′
(∑
j Q
j
c,t(1− jt )νsjt∑
j Q
j
c,tL
j
t
−
∑
j Q¯
j
c s¯j∑
j Q¯
j
c L¯j
)∑
j Q
j
c,t(1− jt )νsjt(∑
j Q
j
c,tL
j
t
)2
+ Γl(L
j
t − L¯j) + (1− γ)Qjc,t Ω
′
(xt)
)
= βEtλ
b
t+1Q
j
c,t+1
Rl,jt
Πjt+1
, (3.2.33)
λbt
(
Qjc,t +Q
j
c,tΨ
′
(∑
j Q
j
c,t(1− jt )νsjt∑
j Q
j
c,tL
j
t
−
∑
j Q¯
j
c s¯j∑
j Q¯
j
c L¯j
)
(1− jt )ν∑
j Q
j
c,tL
j
t
)
+ λbt Q
j
c,t Ω
′
(xt) = βEtλ
b
t+1Q
j
c,t+1
Rb,jt − jt+1
Πjt+1
. (3.2.34)
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Equation (3.2.30) says that the ratio core consumption-periphery consump-
tion depends on the relative prices, i.e. the higher is the price of p goods, the
higher is the consumption of c goods. Equations (3.2.31), (3.2.32), (3.2.33)
and (3.2.34) are Euler equations for – respectively – deposits, central bank
bonds, private loans and sovereign bonds.
Discussion
We first focus on the bank capital cost Ω(.). By simplicity, let us assume
only one region, no inflation and Ψ(.) = 0. Subtracting equation (3.2.31)
from equation (3.2.33) and taking a first order Taylor expansion around the
steady state gives:
(Γd − γΩ′(0))︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
λˆt + ΓlL¯Lˆt − γΩ′′(0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
xˆt = β(R¯
l − R¯d)λˆt+1 + β(Rˆlt − Rˆdt ) ,
where a variable with a hat denotes the absolute (Rˆlt, Rˆ
d
t and xˆt) or relative
(λˆt and Lˆt) deviations from the steady state and a variable with a bar
denotes the steady state. On the one hand, we see that the convexity of
the cost is the crucial assumption. It makes increasing (resp. decreasing)
the spread – between the lending rate and the deposit rate – when xt is
below (resp. above) the requirements. We also observe that the higher is
the convexity, the higher is the transmission of the capital position to the
spread. On the other hand, the assumption Ω
′
(0) ≤ 0 is less important since
the parameter in front of λˆt will always be positive. In the calibration and
hence the subsequent analysis, we assume Ω
′
(0) = 0 and Ω
′′
(0) = Γx > 0.
By looking at equation (3.2.34), we could also point out that a fall in bank
excess capital increases the spread Rˆlt − Rˆbt exactly in the same way as the
spread Rˆlt − Rˆdt . In section 3.4.2, we conduct a sensitivity analysis on Γx.
We then consider the bank collateral cost Ψ(.). Once again, we simplify
with one single region, no inflation and Ω(.) = 0. To simplify the notation,
we also define (1 − t)νst/Lt ≡ crt. Subtracting equation (3.2.31) from
equation (3.2.33) and taking a first order Taylor expansion around the steady
state gives:
Γdλˆt + ΓlL¯Lˆt − c¯rΨ
′
(0)
L¯
(λˆt − Lˆt)−
(
c¯rΨ
′′
(0)
L¯
+
Ψ
′
(0)
L¯
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡η
cˆrt
= β(R¯l − R¯d)λˆt+1 + β(Rˆlt − Rˆdt ) ,
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where a variable with a hat denotes the absolute (Rˆlt, Rˆ
d
t , ˆt and cˆrt) or
relative (λˆt and Lˆt) deviations from the steady state and a variable with a
bar denotes the steady state. We observe that the elasticity of Rˆlt − Rˆdt to
cˆrt is −η/β, which has an ambiguous sign. Because we want an increase
(resp. decrease) in the collateral ratio to reduce (resp. raise) the spread –
between the lending rate and the deposit rate –, we therefore need η > 0
that is c¯rΨ
′′
(0) > −Ψ′(0). In the subsequent analysis, we assume Ψ′(0) = 0
and Ω
′′
(0) = Γp > 0, which meets this requirement. The higher is Γp, the
higher is the transmission of the collateral position to the spread. Again
by looking at equation (3.2.34), we could easily see that the collateral ratio
cˆrt affects the spread Rˆ
l
t − Rˆbt with an elasticity −η(1 + 1/c¯r)/β < 0. In
section 3.4.2, we conduct a sensitivity analysis on Γp and also on the haircut
ν.9
3.2.5 Government
In each country j ∈ {c, p}, the government consumes Gjt and transfers lump-
sum amounts Hh,jt to the household and H
b,j
t to the bank. The government
finances it through lump-sum taxes T jt from the household or public debt
Bjt according to:
Hh,jt +H
b,j
t +G
j
t +
Rb,jt−1 − jt
Πjt
Bjt−1 = T
j
t +B
j
t . (3.2.35)
This equation also shows that sovereign default may happen through the
term 0 ≤ jt ≤ 1. Everything else equal, a strictly positive jt reduces the
stock of sovereign debt in the next period. We moreover assume:
T jt = T¯ + τ
(
Bjt−1 − B¯j
)
, (3.2.36)
Bjt = b
j
t + s
j
t , (3.2.37)
Gjt =
(
G¯j
)1−γg (
Gjt−1
)γg
exp(ugt ) . (3.2.38)
9The calibration therefore implies quadratic cost functions Ω(.) and Ψ(.), under which
the bank also incurs costs when the capital or the collateral ratio is above the steady state.
The key point is that quadratic functions satisfy the assumptions stated above and, up
to a linear approximation, yield the same predictions than more general cost functions.
These quadratic cost functions are often used in the literature as for instance Gerali et al.
(2010), Andre`s et al. (2004) or Harrison (2011).
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Equation (3.2.36) with τ > 0 implies that lump-sum taxes react positively
to an increase in debt. In other words, the government does not only rely on
debt to finance any budget deficit but also raises taxes, as estimated in Bohn
(1998), rather than decreasing public consumption. This tax rule is similar to
the one used in Corsetti et al. (2013).10 It is worth noting that a sufficiently
high τ parameter is crucial to stabilize the economy.11 Equation (3.2.37)
states that both households and the bank own the sovereign debt. Finally,
we define public consumption as a stochastic autoregressive process with
0 < γg < 1 and u
g
t i.i.d. (equation 3.2.38).
Default
To determine the default rate jt we tightly refer to the methodology used
by van der Kwaak and van Wijnbergen (2013) by introducing an exogenous
fiscal limit for the economy. The intuition is that there is a maximum level
of taxes that can be raised before the economy becomes politically unstable.
This translates through equation (3.2.36) into a maximum level of sovereign
debt-to-output ratio BY maxt that the government is able to service. We
moreover assume that this maximum sustainable level is stochastic and
follows:
BY maxt = B¯Y
max
+ γb(BY
max
t−1 − B¯Y max) + ubt , (3.2.39)
where 0 < γb < 1 is the autoregressive component and u
b
t is a i.i.d. shock.
This stochasticity aims capturing the uncertainty around political instability
in the context of sovereign debt and taxation.12
Let us define B˜jt as the level of debt in the economy when no default
occurs. This is obviously defined as:
Gjt +
Rb,jt−1
Πjt
Bjt−1 = T
j
t + B˜
j
t .
10The focus of this chapter is not on taxation and we therefore use a lump-sum and
non distortionary tax instead of a more sophisticated and distortionary tax scheme.
11A linearization of equations (3.2.35) and (3.2.36) gives Bˆt = (R¯
b−τ)Bˆt−1+R¯b(Rˆbt−1−
Πˆt) + G¯/B¯ Gˆt + H¯/B¯ Hˆt − ˆt. We see that after a shock, we need a sufficiently high τ to
avoid an explosive path for Bt.
12In reality, the maximum sustainable government debt level is not exogenous but
depends on expected growth rates, on expected growth volatility or on the expected
government ability to raise taxes (see for instance Collard et al., 2014). But this is beyond
the scope of this chapter.
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If this level of debt-to-output B˜jt /(4Y
j
t ) is lower (resp. higher) than the
maximum sustainable level BY maxt , the government does not (resp. does)
default. In other words, we define the default decision ∆t as:
∆t =
0 if
B˜jt
4Y jt
< BY maxt
1 otherwise
This default process ∆t is a step function and we approximate it with the
continuous normal cdf:
jt = F
(
B˜jt
4Y jt
−BY maxt ; 0 , σ2
)
= Φ
 B˜
j
t
4Y jt
−BY maxt
σ
 . (3.2.40)
where σ > 0 represents the variance and Φ(.) is the standard normal cdf.
We see that when σ → 0, then jt → ∆t. A reduction (resp. increase) in the
maximum sustainable level of debt-to-output, through the stochastic shock
ubt in equation (4.3.35), increases (reduces) the default rate in the economy.
Similarly, a higher (resp. lower) debt-to-output ratio B˜jt /(4Y
j
t ) increases
(resp. reduces) the default rate in the economy. Agents observe the current
economic conditions and, as a consequence, they form expectations on default
according to equation (4.3.38). If we assume that only the periphery country
can default, the spread between the periphery and the core sovereign interest
rate – abstracting from other general equilibrium dynamics – is therefore
given by a wedge reflecting the default expectations:
Rb,pt = R
b,c
t + Et[
p
t+1] . (3.2.41)
Realization versus risk
We investigate the effects of both default realization and default risk. With
default realization, we simply assume Hh,jt = 0 and H
b,j
t = 0. In this case, a
– negative – stochastic shock in equation (4.3.35) reduces the maximum sus-
tainable debt, which in turn increases default according to equation (4.3.38).
This immediately decreases the government debt (equation 3.2.35) and there-
fore the assets of the bank (equations 3.2.26 and 3.2.27) and of the households
(equation 3.2.1). Since the shock is persistent, expectations of default also
increase and hence the sovereign interest rates through equation (3.2.41).
As a result, debt starts rising progressively in the subsequent periods. The
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default realization is therefore transmitted both through prices (higher risk
premium) and quantities (partial loss for the holders of sovereign debt).
To deal with only the risk dimension of the shock, we want to isolate
the price effect from the quantity effect. To do so, we assume that the
government does really default as explained above but transfers at the
same time a lump-sum amount equivalent to the defaulted amount to the
concerned agents (households and the bank):
Hh,jt =
jt
Πjt
bjt−1 ,
Hb,jt =
jt
Πjt
sjt−1 .
In other words, Hh,jt and H
b,j
t are lump-sum transfers that (i) exactly
compensates bond holders (households and the bank) for losses associated
with the default realization and at the same time (ii) leaves the current level
of debt unchanged. In this way, we capture the effects of higher interest
rates on sovereign due to the default risk dimension, but abstract from the
consequences of direct wealth loss due to the realization dimension. The
same specification has been used by Corsetti et al. (2013). This procedure
is helpful to reproduce the sovereign debt crisis’ dynamics in the euro area
where only Greece effectively, partially, defaulted.
3.2.6 Monetary authority
The central bank sets the policy interest rate Rt according to a standard
Taylor rule:
Rt = (Rt−1)γm
(
R¯
(
Yt
Y¯
)0.5(Πt−1
Π¯
)1.5)1−γm
, (3.2.42)
where 0 < γm < 1 is the autoregressive parameter. The coefficients on
output gap and inflation gap are standard as found for instance in Smets
and Wouters (2003).
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3.2.7 Closing the model
We close the model with the definitions of domestic demand in country
j ∈ {c, p}:
Ajt = C
j
t + C
e,j
t + C
b,j
t + I
j
t +G
j
t + costs
j
t ,
where costsjt collects all adjustment and operative costs related to house-
holds, entrepreneurs and firms in country j. Moreover, costsct also includes
the costs related to the bank. These two definitions imply that we have a
zero net-supply of central bank bonds, i.e. Bcbt = 0.
3.3 Calibration
As already explained, we assume that the core economy and the periphery
economy have the same structure, meaning that the parameters are similar
in each country. The only difference between the two countries is the
steady state level of debt and hence the steady state level of government
consumption. The calibration refers to euro area stylized facts in 2010,
that is at the onset of the sovereign crisis. Time is discrete and one period
represents one quarter. Table 3.3.1 presents an overview of the parameters
while the calibration methodology is explained below.
3.3.1 Steady state restrictions
The similar structure of the two economies implies that the steady state
inflation is also identical and we assume it to be zero, that is Π¯ = Π¯j = 1
(see later). The similar structure also implies the same marginal costs
for the production of intermediate goods and therefore φ¯c = φ¯d through
equation (3.2.20). In turn, equations (3.2.22) and (3.2.23) imply φ¯j = 1 and
Q¯−jj = 1. Regarding the bank, we follow Enders et al. (2011) and consider
no excess capital at the steady state (x¯ = 0). Moreover, we also assume no
default (¯j = 0). Regarding the steady-state portion of sovereign bond held
by households and the bank, we follow Guerrieri et al. (2012) and assume
that only one third of debt is held by households both in the core and the
periphery.
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Table 3.3.1: Parameter values
Parameter Value Description
Households
β 0.99 Discount factor
φd 0.5 Deposit adjustment cost
φb 0.1 Bond adjustment cost
ψn 18.44 Weight of labour in (dis-)utility
ψd 0.01 Weight of deposits in utility
Global bank
ϑ 0.5 Elasticity of substitution between c and p consumption goods
γ 0.05 Bank capital ratio requirement
Γd 0.005 Deposit operating cost
Γl 0.01 Loan adjustment cost
Γp 0.25 Collateral requirement cost
Γx 1.50 Capital requirement cost
ν 8 Elasticity of haircut to default applied to government bonds
Production
δ 0.025 Capital depreciation rate
σe 0.01 Inverse of IES in consumption (entrepreneur)
φi 0.2 Investment adjustment cost
α 0.3 Index of openess
θ 0.37 Markup in price setting
µ 0.3 Elasticity of production w.r.t. capital
κ 263 Price rigidities
Authorities
τ 0.13 Elasticity of taxes w.r.t. debt
T¯ /Y¯ j 0.12 Tax-output ratio objective
B¯c/(4Y¯ c) 0.60 Debt-output ratio objective in the core country
B¯p/(4Y¯ p) 0.85 Debt-output ratio objective in the periphery country
B¯Y
max
0.92 Maximum sustainable debt-output ratio
σ 0.015 Standard deviation of default pdf
Π¯ 1.00 Gross inflation objective
Shocks
γm 0.85 Autoregressive parameter for Taylor rule
γg 0.85 Autoregressive parameter for government spending shock
γb 0.8 Autoregressive parameter for sustainable debt-output shock
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3.3.2 Parameters governing the steady state
Taking the different Euler equations (3.2.3), (3.2.4), (3.2.9), (3.2.10), (3.2.31),
(3.2.32), (3.2.33) and (3.2.34) at the steady state gives:
R¯d,j =
1− a ψd
β
=
1− Γd
β
,
R¯ = R¯l,j = R¯b,j =
1
β
,
r¯j =
1
β
− 1 + δ .
We observe that the deposit rate R¯d,j is negatively related to the deposit
operating cost Γd, that is the bank compensates the cost of operating deposits
through lower interest rates payments. We set the psychological discount
factor β = 0.99 to have annualized interest rates on loans and bonds, as
well as the monetary policy rate, equal to 4% at the steady state. We fix
the deposit operating cost Γd = 0.005 to have annualized interest rates
on deposits equal to 2%. We compute the weight of deposits in utility
ψd = Γd/a, where a is a parameter aggregating other parameters and steady
states. Following the RBC literature we assume that hours h¯j = 0.2 meaning
that agents work 20% of their time. This allows to determine the labour
disutility parameter ψn. The production function is a Cobb-Douglas with
the capital share µ = 0.3 and setting the depreciation rate at δ = 0.025
implies K¯j/Y¯ j = 6.24 and I¯j/Y¯ j = 0.156, in line with the RBC literature
and empirical observations. We calibrate the price markup θ = 0.37 as
in Smets and Wouters (2003). Finally, we assume a bias for domestic goods
and we calibrate α = 0.3 < 0.5. This kind of bias is standard in the NOEM
literature, as for instance in Gali and Monacelli (2008). The value we select is
in the range used in recent quantitative macro-finance models. For a detailed
description, we may for instance refer to Coeurdacier et al. (2007). This
bias also determines the gross trade (the lower the bias, the higher the gross
trade) but not the net trade. Since the two countries are symmetric, the net
trade is zero at the steady state, whatever the value of α. Moreover, to keep
again symmetry between regions, we impose that the bank has an identical
preference between consuming core or periphery goods, i.e. ϑ = 1− ϑ = 0.5.
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3.3.3 Parameters related to policies
Following Enders et al. (2011), we set the required bank capital ratio at
γ = 0.05. Empirically, the capital ratio for the major banks in the euro area
has been found to be between 3% and 5%. Regarding monetary policy and
as already explained above, we set the inflation objective of the central bank
at 0%, implying Π¯ = 1. Increasing the inflation objective to a more realistic
value of 2% would not modify our results. On the fiscal side, we specify our
two-country model for the euro area distinguishing between the core and
periphery in terms of debt-to-GDP ratio. The periphery refers to the GIIPS
(Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) for which we assume a debt to
GDP ratio B¯p/(4Y¯ p) = 85% at steady state while for the core, the rest of the
euro zone, we assume a ratio B¯c/(4Y¯ c) = 60%. These values are the same
as Guerrieri et al. (2012) and they aggregate them from the IMF economic
outlook for 2010. Taxes-to-output T¯ /Y¯ j are set at steady state to 12% of
GDP in both regions, which is the level of indirect taxes in the euro area
(source: OECD), implying a government consumption of 9.5% of GDP in the
core and of 8.5% in the periphery. This asymmetry is due to the different
steady state values of debt to GDP in the two regions. The periphery bears
a higher interest rate burden on debt and must therefore reduce its steady
state public consumption. We set the two parameters governing the default
process – i.e. the maximum sustainable debt-to-output ratio B¯Y
max
and the
standard deviation σ of default pdf – in order to have an elasticity of default
risk (or of sovereign risk premium) to debt of 0.1 around the steady state,
in the periphery country, as shown in Figure 3.3.1.13 The same calibration
methodology is used by Corsetti et al. (2013) where we refer the reader
for an exhaustive list of empirical works on the relationship between fiscal
variables and yields on government bonds. As explained in section 3.2, we
consider that only the periphery may default.
13We choose the year 2011 because it corresponds to the period of troubles on the
sovereign debt market. We see an increasing and strictly convex relationship between debt
and spread. Removing Greek data would imply a more linear relationship.
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Figure 3.3.1: Sovereign risk premia vs. debt-to-GDP in EA countries
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Notes. The figure plots the 5-year CDS spread for the year
2011 (quarterly observations) against the debt-to-GDP level
at quarterly frequency (black dots). The countries shown are:
Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, Finland, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Portugal and Spain. The blue line is a quadratic interpo-
lation whereas the red line is the tangent at the debt-to-GDP
steady state. Data sources: Datastream.
3.3.4 Other steady state implications
First, our calibration implies that the size of the bank balance sheet (total as-
sets or total liabilities) represents 140% of yearly total output (4×(Y¯ c+ Y¯ c)).
This number seems realistic. EA data compiled by the ECB show that total
assets of euro area credit institutions over euro area GDP was 339% in 2010.
However, focusing on loans to EA residents (save for monetary and financial
institutions) and holdings of securities issued by EA residents (save for mone-
tary and financial institutions), this ratio reduces to 166% which is therefore
close to what we have.14 Second, we have three private consumptions in
14Source: ECB, Statistical Data Warehouse, Monetary statistics, Credit institutions
and money market funds balance sheets, Aggregated balance sheet of euro area credit
institutions.
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each region, from the household, the bank and the entrepreneurs. With
respectively 69% of GDP, 2% of GDP and 3% of GDP, we observe that most
of the private consumption is at the household’s level. Third, all the costs
in the model are dynamics, that is they exist only outside the steady state.
3.3.5 Parameters governing the dynamics
This set of parameters does not affect the steady state of the model variables.
They instead are set to obtain plausible dynamics. Regarding consumption
and as often in the literature, we use a log-utility for households and a
linear utility for banks. We assume that the entrepreneurs have a high
intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption, that is they have a
only slightly concave utility function. We set σe = 0.01. Adjustment costs
on deposits, bonds, loans and investment (respectively represented by the
parameters φd, φb, Γl and φi) are standard in DSGE models and their role
is to smooth quantity reactions after a stochastic shock. We directly borrow
the capital adjustment cost from Enders et al. (2011) and we set Γx = 1.5
to obtain a sufficiently persistent reaction of excess capital xt, and therefore
a strong enough bank capital channel. The collateral adjustment cost is
crucial in our model. It gives an additional collateral role to sovereign bonds,
both with respect to its volume (important in case of default realization)
and quality (important in case of default risk). We set Γp = 0.25 and ν = 8.
We discuss further the role of these parameters in section 3.4.2. In the
model we assume price rigidities through a menu cost κ a` la Rotemberg.
We calibrate this parameters of the new-Keynesian Phillips curve such as
to reproduce the one estimated by Smets and Wouters (2003) with euro
area data. There is not much empirical observations regarding the elasticity
τ of taxes to debt. For instance, Corsetti et al. (2013) assume that taxes
react to debt ”sufficiently strongly” to ensure that debt remains bounded
throughout their simulations. To objectify this calibration, we first calibrate
the autocorrelation of the public expenditure shock (3.2.38) as γg = 0.85 to
match the one we observe in EA aggregated data. Then we use this public
expenditure shock – in the absence of default risk – to generate fluctuations
in public consumption and debt. We set τ = 0.13 to match the relative
volatility of public consumption and debt with what we observe in EA data.
We fix the remaining autoregressive parameters – γm and γb – to standard
values between 0.8 and 0.85.
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3.4 Dynamic simulations
To produce dynamic simulations, we take a first order approximation of the
model equations. We study the consequences of a shock to the maximum
sustainable debt-output ratio, represented by equation (4.3.35). We calibrate
the size of the shock in order to have an initial increase in default of 1%. The
default in turn affects the whole economy, including the realized debt-output
ratio and again default, through general equilibrium effects. As already
mentioned, our calibration implies an elasticity of sovereign interest rates
w.r.t. debt-output ratio around 0.1 in the periphery country. In other words,
an increase in debt-to-GDP by 1 ppt raises the interest rate on sovereign
debt by 0.1 ppt. In the subsequent simulations, we first investigate how
default risk vs. default realization spreads to the whole economy, with
banking integration as presented in section 3.2.4, i.e. without cost in case
of geographical diversification. Second, we conduct sensitivity analysis on
the parameters related to the bank capital channel and the bank collateral
channel, to better understand the role of these two frictions. Third, we
move from a fully integrated banking system to a more fragmented one
and check how it changes the transmission mechanisms. We also compare
simulation results with alternative banking to what we know from empirical
observations. Fourth and finally, we conduct a couple of policy analysis.
3.4.1 Defaults: from risk to realization
Figure 3.4.1 shows the impulse response functions under the risk assumption
and the realization assumption regarding default, as explained in section 3.2.
We assume integration in the banking sector as presented in section 3.2.4.
Default risk
Figure 3.4.1 (blue line with dots) shows the model transmission of default
risk to the banking sector and the real economy in the two regions. As
explained in section 3.2.5, we remind that default risk is in fact a default
realization immediately followed by a lump-sum compensation a` la Corsetti
et al. (2013). We obviously observe an increase in the sovereign rate in the
defaulted country and a “flight-to-quality” to the core country. The increase
in the periphery sovereign rate raises periphery public debt – through higher
interest rate burden – whereas the decrease in the core sovereign rate reduces
core public debt. Then the transmission from the banking sector to the
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Figure 3.4.1: IRFs after a negative maximum sustainable debt-output ratio
shock, with banking integration (deviations from the steady state)
0 5 10 15
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
Default periphery
 
 
Default
Def risk
0 5 10 15
−0.5
0
0.5
Bonds periphery
0 5 10 15
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
Bond spread (p−c)
0 5 10 15
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
Periphery bonds rate
0 5 10 15
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
Loans rate
0 5 10 15
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
Deposits rate
0 5 10 15
−0.2
0
0.2
Loans core
0 5 10 15
−0.2
0
0.2
Loans periphery
0 5 10 15
−0.01
0
0.01
Bank excess capital
0 5 10 15
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
Output core
0 5 10 15
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
Output periphery
0 5 10 15
−0.1
0
0.1
Net export core
0 5 10 15
−0.04
−0.02
0
0.02
Inflation core
0 5 10 15
−0.04
−0.02
0
0.02
Inflation periphery
0 5 10 15
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
Policy rate
Notes. ‘Bank excess capital’ is normalized with respect to the steady state
size of the bank balance sheet. Deviations are expressed respectively in
percentage points for ratios and rates and in percentage for volumes. The
green line ‘Default’ represents the scenario with default realization. The
evolutions of loan and deposit rates are similar in the two regions.
92 CHAPTER 3. SOVEREIGN DEBT DEFAULT AND BANKING
real economy mainly goes through the bank capital channel and the bank
collateral channel. As explained in section 3.2.4, the fall in excess capital
raises the spread between the lending and the deposit rates. Moreover, the
sovereign bond risk increases the haircut applied to the collateral. The
eligible collateral ratio falls and this raises further the spread.15 As a result,
the volume of loans to the real economy shrinks, especially towards the
periphery region. Inflation follows a similar pattern. Since inflation is
smaller in the periphery country, the real exchange rate appreciates and net
exports from the core region fall. In the end, although the sovereign crisis is
located in the periphery region, we observe that the – initial – fall in output
is quite similar in the two regions. The integrated bank therefore allows for
an almost perfect transmission of the crisis.16
Default realization
Figure 3.4.1 (green line) shows the model transmission of default realization
to the banking sector and the real economy in the two regions. We see
that the transmission is different from risk in many respects. First, default
realization reduces the debt level in the periphery which limits the surge in
the periphery bond rate. Second, the transmission from the banking sector
to the real economy is stronger than with the risk scenario. The deeper falls
in excess capital and in the eligible collateral ratio increase the bank capital
cost and the bank collateral cost. This raises further the spread between the
loan rate and the deposit rate, and in fine intensifies the fall in loans and in
output. As with the risk scenario, we observe that the output follows a quite
similar pattern in the two regions, due to integration in the banking sector
and its ‘crisis sharing’. Third, although output is lower with realization than
with risk, inflation is higher. The lower deposit rate with realization makes
the household more willing to consume. The implied lower marginal utility
of consumption increases wage claims which in turn raises the marginal cost
and hence inflation.17
15The spread increase is similar in the two regions and therefore, figure 3.4.1 does not
make the distinction between the core and periphery loan and deposit rate variables.
16We observe that after the initial fall, output immediately jumps above the steady
state. This jump is due to a similar jump of labour and wages. One solution to smooth
the labour and output reactions would be for instance to introduce a monopolistic labour
supply with rigid wages, instead of the perfectly competitive labour market we currently
have.
17This is also due to the perfectly competitive labour market assumption. A monopolistic
labour market with wage rigidities, as already mentioned in footnote 16, would change
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In conclusion, we see that realization has a deeper impact on output
than risk, mainly through the bank capital and the bank collateral channels
(lower excess capital and lower eligible collateral with realization). Moreover,
both with risk and realization, the integrated bank assumption allows to
share almost perfectly between regions the periphery sovereign troubles.
3.4.2 Sensitivity analysis
We see above that default may transmit from the bank to the real economy
through the bank capital and the bank collateral channels. Indeed, a
sovereign shock weakens the bank capital position and the bank collateral
position. The bank faces higher costs and as a consequence increases the
lending-deposit interest rate spread. This reduces private loans. We show
theoretically in section 3.2.4 that the higher the convexity of the capital and
collateral costs, the higher is the transmission. In this section, we conduct a
sensitivity analysis on the parameters governing the convexity, namely Γx
for the capital cost and Γp for the collateral cost. Moreover, the collateral
cost depends on the eligible collateral, that is the potential collateral less
a haircut. The size of the haircut reflects the riskiness associated to the
collateral. We conduct a sensitivity analysis on the parameter ν representing
the elasticity of the haircut to the riskiness.
The role of convexity in the bank capital channel
The parameter Γx represents the convexity of the bank capital cost Ω(.).
Section 3.2.4 shows theoretically that when Γx = 0, a fall in excess capital
xt has no direct effect on the loan-deposit interest rate spread.
18 The higher
Γx, the more a fall in excess capital increases the spread. Figure 3.4.2
provides a numerical illustration of the effects of a negative sovereign shock,
for different values for the convexity. We give the average effect over the
first 15 periods.19 First, we observe that a change in Γx does not really
change the transmission with a default risk (blue line with dots). Indeed,
risk does not directly affect bank assets and therefore the capital position.
The picture is different with a default realization which reduces assets and
hence the capital position (green line). When Γx = 0, bank may let excess
inflation behaviour.
18Although it may obviously have indirect effects through general equilibrium linkages.
19Reactions may become highly volatile with extreme values for the convexity. The
average over 15 periods allows to give a more stable and accurate picture of what happens.
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Figure 3.4.2: Effects of a negative maximum sustainable debt-output ratio
shock with banking integration, for different values of Γx (deviations from
the steady state)
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Notes. Average effects over 15 periods. Deviations are expressed respectively
in percentage for volumes and in percentage points for rates. The green line
‘Default’ represents the scenario with default realization. The evolutions of the
spread loan-deposit interest rate are similar in the two regions.
capital fall without cost consequences. When Γx is higher, the bank must
restore its capital position to avoid costs. To do so, the bank increases its
spread which slowdowns the economy as revealed by the policy rate. We
see that a sufficiently high convexity may increase the transmission to the
economy and hence to the policy rate by about 50% (the policy rate falls –
on average over the first 15 periods – from 0.04 ppt when Γx = 0 to 0.06
ppt when Γx is above 1).
The role of convexity in the bank collateral channel
The parameter Γp represents the convexity of the bank collateral cost Ψ(.).
Section 3.2.4 shows theoretically that when Γp = 0, a fall in the collateral
ratio crt has no direct effect on the loan-deposit interest rate spread. The
higher Γp, the more a fall in collateral increases the spread. Figure 3.4.3
provides a numerical illustration of the effects of a negative sovereign shock,
for different values for the convexity. To isolate the convexity effect from
the haircut effect, we assume ν = 0, i.e. there is no haircut whatever the
riskiness of sovereign bonds. Focusing on default realization (green line), we
observe that with a small Γp, there is almost no transmission of the shock to
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Figure 3.4.3: Effects of a negative maximum sustainable debt-output ratio
shock with banking integration, for different values of Γp (deviations from
the steady state)
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Notes. Average effects over 15 periods. Deviations are expressed respectively
in percentage for volumes and in percentage points for rates. The green line
‘Default’ represents the scenario with default realization. The evolutions of
the spread loan-deposit interest rate are similar in the two regions.
the economy. However, the transmission strongly increases along with the
convexity. Indeed, default realization reduces the collateral and banks must
reduce private loans to avoid high costs. The picture is more ambiguous with
a default risk because risk does not reduce available collateral (remember
we do not apply any haircut).
The role of haircut in the bank collateral channel
We see from equation (3.2.27) that the bank values sovereign bonds as
collateral taking into account their riskiness, because the riskiness determines
the size of the haircut applied. The parameter ν controls the elasticity
between the riskiness and the haircut applied to the collateral. Figure 3.4.4
shows that the higher is the elasticity, the higher is the shock transmission
to the economy, both with the risk scenario and the realization scenario.
Indeed, higher values of the haircut reduce eligible collateral which makes
bank borrowing more costly. As a consequence, the bank shrinks its balance
sheet with lower credit to the private sector. We also observe that the
quantitative effect of haircut is sizeable. For instance, without any haircut, a
1% default realization shock reduces private loans to the periphery by 0.05%
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Figure 3.4.4: Effects of a negative maximum sustainable debt-output ratio
shock with banking integration, for different values of ν (deviations from the
steady state)
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Notes. Average effects over 15 periods. ‘Bank excess capital’ is normalized
with respect to the steady state size of the bank balance sheet. Deviations are
expressed in percentage points. The green line ‘Default’ represents the scenario
with default realization. The evolutions of the spread loan-deposit interest rate
are similar in the two regions.
on average over 15 periods whereas the same shock with ν = 10, that is with
an haircut of 10%, reduces loans by 0.25% on average.
In conclusion, convexity of the capital and collateral costs increase the
transmission of the default realization shock. However, this convexity does
not generate enough transmission with default risk. In this latter case, the
role of the elasticity of haircut is crucial.
3.4.3 From integration to fragmentation in the banking
sector
So far we assume a fully integrated banking system. However, although we
have several banks playing at a global level inside the euro area, there are
also some banks more exposed to their domestic market. Moreover, banking
fragmentation probably increased during the financial crisis of 2007-2008
and the sovereign crisis of 2010-2011 (see section 3.1 for a discussion). In
theory, assuming a full integration might induce a too strong transmission
from periphery to core and as a result a too weak impact of default in the
periphery. There are different ways to introduce fragmentation in the banking
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sector. For instance, we could assume one bank in each region with only
local liabilities and assets, apart from sovereign bond holdings as in Guerrieri
et al. (2012). Alternatively, we could keep one single bank but with two
different bank capital constraints, one related to the core assets/liabilities
and one related to the periphery ones. This would therefore imply two
different bank capital costs. The only link between regions would be the
maximization of a ‘global profit’. Another possibility would be to have two
different bank collateral costs, meaning that the bank having more sovereign
bonds/collateral from one region has an incentive to increase private lending
to the same region, and vice versa. A reason could be that it is indeed
easier to attest the reliability of both domestic creditors and sovereigns.
Another that with an insufficient harmonization of bankruptcy procedure
within the EA, banks are more exposed to foreign defaults creating a bias
towards domestic-banking. In other words, assets from the same region
are complement meaning there is a cost from geographical diversification.
In the subsequent analysis, we focus on the third approach because its
implementation requires almost no modification of the initial model.20
Fragmentation
As shown in equation (3.2.27), the fully integrated bank does not make any
distinction between the geographical origin of assets and the bank collateral
cost is:
Ψ
(∑
j Q
j
c,t(1− jt )νsjt∑
j Q
j
c,tL
j
t
−
∑
j Q¯
j
c s¯j∑
j Q¯
j
c L¯j
)
, (3.4.1)
with Ψ(0) = 0, Ψ
′
(0) ≤ 0, Ψ′′(.) > 0 and ν ≥ 0. With fragmentation, we
assume that bonds from region j only help lending – through its collateral
role on the secured interbank market – to the same region. In other words,
we introduce a double cost making the distinction between core and foreign
assets:
d
∑
j
Ψ
(
(1− jt )νsjt
Ljt
− s¯
j
L¯j
)
. (3.4.2)
In this case, the j collateral is only useful for the j private lending. This
modifies first order conditions (3.2.33) and (3.2.34) accordingly. We calibrate
equation (3.4.2) as equation (3.4.1), with Ψ
′
(0) = 0 and Ψ
′′
(.) = Γp > 0 (see
20In appendix 3.B, we also present the second alternative (two different capital con-
straints) and show that we obtain the same kind of results.
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table 3.3.1 for the numerical values). d = 1/2 is a new parameter calibrated
such that the size of the cost after the shock is similar with the two types of
formulation.
Comparison to existing empirical evidence
Before comparing simulation results with an integrated bank and with
fragmentation, we first look at the FAVAR estimates from Neri and Ropele
(2013) on the macroeconomic effects of the sovereign debt crisis for a subset
of core and periphery countries of the euro area. Table 3.4.1 (row ‘Data
estimates’) shows that, according to Neri and Ropele (2013), a 1 ppt increase
in default risk in the periphery raises sovereign periphery bond interest rates
by 1 ppt (full pass-through) and has no effect on sovereign core bond interest
rates (no pass-through). However, the interest rates on private loans increase
both in the periphery and the core region, although the increase is more
pronounced in the periphery (respectively +0.3 ppt in p and +0.1 ppt in c).
These results are in line with what we already observed from figure 3.1.1
in section 3.1. The fall in loans is important, with -1% in the core and
-2% in the periphery. As a result the central bank reduces the policy rate
by 0.3 ppt. Our simulation results with integration in the banking sector
(row ‘Model integ.’) are qualitatively in line with the FAVAR estimates.
Quantitatively, we however observe that banking integration shares too much
the periphery troubles with the core region. The increase in the periphery
bond rate is limited to 0.4 ppt and the core bond rate falls by 0.4 ppt
because of a flight-to-quality. The spread surge – between the periphery and
the core bond rates – is therefore close to the data estimates but not its
distribution among regions. Similarly, the model with banking integration
provides equivalent rises in private lending rates although data show a more
pronounced rise in the periphery. Finally, the model cannot reproduce the
deep fall in loans – and output – and therefore the strong central bank
reaction. Moving from bank integration to fragmentation (row ‘Model frag.’)
prevents the full sharing of the periphery turmoil. As a result, the situation
in the periphery deteriorates and is now more in line to what we observe from
data estimates. However, the situation in the core becomes too good. We
observe that the lending rate to core firms decreases (-0.1 ppt) and therefore
the volume of loans increases (+0.1%). We see from the simulations that
these two polar banking representations (integration vs. fragmentation) also
produce polar results with contagion on the one hand and no contagion
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on the other hand. With fragmentation, the monetary policy is therefore
too loose for the core region and too restrictive for the periphery region.
Looking at EA aggregated variables, we see that the – negative – effect of
the shock is about twice stronger with banking fragmentation than with
banking integration (columns R, Lc + Lp and Y c + Y p in table 3.4.1). In
a currency union, banking integration is therefore desirable in case of an –
asymmetric – sovereign shock. Bignon et al. (2013) find a similar conclusion
although they use a different modelling approach.
The last line of table 3.4.1 (row ‘Model interm.’) proposes a model with a
banking sector between integration and fragmentation. To do so, we assume
a collateral cost as:
d Ψ
(
λsct + (1− λ)Qpc,t(1− pt )νspt
λLct + (1− λ)Qpc,tLpt
− λs¯
c + (1− λ)Q¯pc s¯p
λL¯c + (1− λ)Q¯pcL¯p
)
+ d Ψ
(
(1− λ)sct + λQpc,t(1− pt )νspt
(1− λ)Lct + λQpc,tLpt
− (1− λ)s¯
c + λQ¯pc s¯p
(1− λ)L¯c + λQ¯pcL¯p
)
(3.4.3)
with 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1/2. When λ = 1/2 and d = 1/2, equation (3.4.3) is equivalent
to equation (3.4.1) and we are back to the integration case. When λ = 0,
equation (3.4.3) is equivalent to equation (3.4.2) and we are back to the
fragmentation case. Any other 0 < λ < 1/2 gives an intermediate degree of
fragmentation, the closer to 0 (resp. the closer to 1/2) is λ, the stronger is
the fragmentation (resp. integration). In the simulation, we assume λ = 1/3
and set d = 2 such that the size of the cost after the shock is similar with
the two other simulations. We see that this intermediate representation
reproduces quite well the empirical evidence, at the exception of the deep
fall in loans and output estimated in Neri and Ropele (2013). However, none
of the three different models/banks is able to reproduce the fall.21
3.4.4 Policies
We see above that default has negative consequences for the currency area
as a whole. In this section, we want to check how macro-prudential and
monetary policies could – or could not – attenuate the effects of default. We
21On the one hand, the fall in loans and output in Neri and Ropele (2013) seems
extremely strong, compared to the relatively limited increase in periphery bond rates. On
the other hand, we might miss some links – and therefore underestimate the output effects
–as for instance the possibility of default also for firms or the non-linear effects.
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Table 3.4.1: Maximum pass-through of a 1 ppt increase in default risk in the
periphery country to selected market interest rates, spreads and volumes
Rates Rb,c Rb,p Rb,p −Rb,c Rl,c Rl,p Rl,c −Rb,c Rl,p −Rb,p
Data +0.0 +1.0 +1.0 +0.1 +0.3 +0.1 -0.7
Integ. -0.4 +0.4 +0.8 +0.2 +0.2 +0.5 -0.3
Frag. -0.1 +0.3 +0.3 -0.1 +0.7 -0.1 +0.5
Interm. -0.2 +0.4 +0.6 +0.1 +0.3 +0.3 -0.1
Volumes R Lc Lp Y c Y p Lc + Lp Y c + Y p
Data -0.3 -1.0 -2.0 -2.0 -2.0 – –
Integ. -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.1 -0.2
Frag. -0.2 +0.1 -0.4 -0.2 -0.7 -0.2 -0.5
Interm. -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.4 – –
Notes. Pass-through are expressed in percentage points for rates and in percentage for
volumes. ‘Data’ are estimates from the FAVAR study of Neri and Ropele (2013). We
aggregate individual countries belonging to their sample to produce aggregated core
and periphery data. They do not show results for output but we proxy them with
their data on industrial production. We normalize their results to a 1 ppt increase in
risk by assuming a constant reaction elasticity. Model ‘Integ.’ provides simulation
results using the banking integration approach from section 3.2.4 and equation (3.4.1).
Model ‘Frag.’ provides simulation results using the fragmentation approach explained
in equation (3.4.2). Model ‘Interm.’ provides simulation results using the intermediate
– between integration and fragmentation – approach explained in equation (3.4.3).
assume that macro-prudential and monetary policies are ex ante policies,
that is policies to prevent the realization of default. Therefore, we focus
on default risk shocks – rather than default realization shocks – through
a shock to the maximum sustainable debt-output ratio, represented by
equation (4.3.35). For each policy, we consider an integrated banking sector
vs. a fragmented one.
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Counter-cyclical capital requirements
In the benchmark model, the capital requirement γ is constant. Basel III
instead advocates for a counter-cyclical regulation, that is promoting financial
soundness during good times in order to attenuate business cycle fluctuations.
More precisely, Basel III foresees a regulatory framework under which a
counter-cyclical capital surcharge - within a range of 0 to 2.5% of common
equity - in addition to a capital buffer should help insuring a sufficient degree
of protection against losses during the downturn of the economic cycle. In
our simulation, we assume that γ may react respectively to output growth
as in Angelini et al. (2012), private credit growth as in Quint and Rabanal
(2013) or default expectations as in DeWalque et al. (2010). We assume
a counter-cyclical regulation in the sense that γ is positively correlated to
output and credit and negatively correlated to default. The general rule is
as follows:
γt = 0.1 γ + 0.9 γt−1 + ρ (Xt − X¯) .
When the requirements react to output growth, Xt =
∑
j Y
j
t /
∑
j Y
j
t−1 and
we calibrate ρ = 0.2 > 0 according to Angelini et al. (2012). We also
use their autoregressive parameter of 0.9. When the requirements react
to private credit growth, Xt =
∑
j L
j
t/
∑
j L
j
t−1 and we calibrate ρ > 0 to
obtain a similar volatility in γt as with the first policy and the banking
integration case (ρ = 0.15). Finally, when the requirements react to default,
Xt = Et
p
t+1 and we calibrate ρ < 0 again to obtain a similar volatility in γt
as with the first policy and the integration case (ρ = −0.021).22 So far in the
model, regulated assets are only private loans (
∑
j L
j) as we may see from
equation (3.2.26). We here also allow for the inclusion of sovereign bonds in
the regulated assets (
∑
j(L
j + sj)). This slightly modifies equation (3.2.26)
as well as the first order condition (3.2.34).23 Table 3.4.2 displays how the
volatility of the economy changes depending on the regulation rule, for both
integration and fragmentation in the banking system, and with or without
the inclusion of sovereign bonds in the regulation. We do not only look at
the change in volatility but we also look at the difference in welfare, both
22Since we consider a single bank – with or without fragmentation – we assume a EA
wide macro-prudential policy.
23So far we consider that regulated assets are only private loans (lines ‘L’ in table 3.4.2)
or that all assets (private and public loans) are regulated without any distinction between
assets (lines ‘L + s’ in table 3.4.2). We could consider any intermediate situation with
a weight 1 on private loans and a weight strictly between 0 and 1 on public loans. This
would obviously also give intermediate results.
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for the core and the periphery households, between the counter-cyclical
policy equilibrium and the constant capital requirement equilibrium. To
do so we compute a second order approximation of the expected utility
equation (3.2.2) and compute the welfare cost – of moving from the acyclical
to the counter-cyclical policy rule – as the fraction of consumption an agent
would agree to give up each period in return for staying under the acyclical
rule.24
We see from table 3.4.2 that with the benchmark/acyclical policy, the
standard deviation of core and periphery outputs are around 0.25% with an
integrated bank. With fragmentation, the volatility of the p region increases
dramatically. We assume that the policy aims at reducing the volatility in
outputs and that only private loans are considered as regulated assets (lines
‘L’ in table 3.4.2). We see that the most powerful counter-cyclical policy
is the one reacting to output growth, both under integrated banking and
under fragmented banking representation. This policy implies a volatility of
the capital ratio requirement parameter γ between 0.78 (integrated bank)
and 1.21 (fragmentation), meaning that the parameter fluctuates roughly
between 4% and 6%. However, this policy increases inflation volatility,
but only marginally, and implies a welfare cost for the c region and also
the p region in case of fragmentation. We observe that the total welfare
cost (sum for the 2 regions) is negligible with an integrated bank but is
more important with fragmentation. In the former case, the total cost is
0.026% − 0.023% = 0.003%, which represents approximately e 0.12 per
person per quarter. In the later case, the total cost represents approximately
e 19 per person per quarter. In other words, the welfare cost of stabilizing
output is much lower under a well integrated banking sector.
We also see that including sovereign bonds as regulated assets improves
results, whatever the rule (lines ‘L+ s’ in table 3.4.2). It reduces further the
volatility of output while also decreasing the volatility of inflation. Moreover,
changes in the policy parameter γ are lower. However, we have a strong
dichotomy regarding welfare, with huge costs for the core and high gains for
the periphery. These huge costs for the core – although there is a gain at
the EA level – makes the policy more difficult to implement from a political
point of view.
24This consumption equivalent welfare measure was originally introduced in Lucas
(1987). It also obviously depends on the size of the shock.
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Extended Taylor rule
Equation (3.2.42) gives the Taylor rule we use in all the above simulations,
with output gap and inflation gap as inputs. However, a sovereign crisis
may harm the banking system and therefore hamper the transmission of
monetary policy. As a result, a central bank might want to also include an
index of sovereign distress as extra input for the conduct of its monetary
policy. To analyze this, we follow Trabandt and Smets (2012) and augment
the Taylor rule with the spread between the periphery and core sovereign
interest rates:
Rt = (Rt−1)γm
(
R¯
(
Yt
Y¯
)ρy (Πt−1
Π¯
)ρpi (Rb,pt
Rb,ct
)ρr)1−γm
.
For any combination [ρy ρpi ρr], we compute the standard deviation of
aggregate (EA wide) output, aggregate inflation and the policy rate. The
only restrictions on these parameters we impose a priori are 0.2 ≤ ρy ≤ 0.8,
1.1 ≤ ρpi ≤ 1.9 and −0.2 ≤ ρr ≤ 0.0. We center these restrictions on the
benchmark calibration regarding ρy and ρpi and we impose a counter-cyclical
reaction of the policy rate to the spread, that is a negative ρr. Figure 3.4.5
shows the results, with each dot representing a specific combination of
parameters.25
In the benchmark simulations, we impose ρy = 0.5, ρpi = 1.5 and ρr = 0
and we look for combinations of parameters that could reduce the volatility
of inflation and output with respect to this benchmark, without increasing
the volatility of the policy rate. In figure 3.4.5, any better combination must
be located in the gray area. On the one hand, we see from the first column
of figure 3.4.5 that it difficult to reduce substantially the volatility of output
without increasing the volatility of the policy instrument. On the other hand,
we see from the second column that we can decrease seriously the volatility
of inflation by only playing with ρy and ρpi, and keeping ρr = 0. Finally, the
last column shows how we may reduce the volatility of output and inflation,
keeping the volatility of the policy rate lower than in the benchmark. We
see that the best combination is ρy = 0.5, ρpi = 1.1 and ρr = −0.2, both
with banking integration and with banking fragmentation. A reaction to the
sovereign rate spread therefore always improves the situation, even though
25We also look at the standard deviation of the disaggregated variables (distinction
between c and p). Results with disaggregated variables are close to the aggregated ones.
We therefore do not show them in figure 3.4.5.
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the main improvement concerns inflation and is mainly due to the change
in the coefficient ρpi (rather that to the strict negativity of ρr). Computing
a welfare analysis as above shows that with banking integration, moving
from the benchmark rule with coefficients [0.5 1.5 0] to the extended optimal
rule with coefficients [0.5 1.1 -0.2] produces a welfare gain in the EA as a
whole representing approximately e 20 per person per quarter. However,
the aggregate gain hides regional disparities since there is a loss in the core
region. In case of banking fragmentation, there is a global cost of e 0.24.
Policy conclusions
From the above policy analysis, we see that counter-cyclical capital require-
ments targeting output growth reduces seriously the volatility of output
without implying a too high welfare cost. Extending the Taylor rule does
not really allow to reduce output volatility. In general, whatever the policy,
the welfare costs of stabilizing the economy are much lower under a well
integrated banking sector. This conclusion is in line with the main findings
of Bignon et al. (2013) that the optimality of a currency union is restored
only when credit limitations are reduced and banking union is achieved.
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Figure 3.4.5: Standard deviations depending on the Taylor rule specification,
assuming a default risk shock
Notes. In each subplot, each blue dot represents a parameter combination for
the Taylor rule. The red dot represents the parameter combination shown in
the min=[p1 p2 p3]. p1 represents the weight on output gap, p2 represents the
weight on inflation and p3 represents the weight on the spread. The gray area
is delimited by the standard deviations in the benchmark case [0.5 1.5 0]. In
the right-hand-side subplots, we only represent combinations when the standard
deviation of the policy rate is lower than the one from the benchmark. All
variables are EA aggregated.
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3.5 Conclusion
This chapter studies the international transmission of sovereign debt default.
More precisely, we build a 2-country model of the EA and look at the spillover
from the periphery to the core. We show that a well integrated banking
sector reduces the negative consequences at the EA wide level and limits
the welfare cost of stabilizing policies.
From a modelling point of view, we here impose ex ante the type of
banking representation (integration vs. fragmentation vs. intermediate).
Obviously, this banking representation is not exogenous but endogenous and
evolves according to the economic and/or financial situation. Moving from
an exogenous to an endogenous banking structure would be an interesting
extension. From a policy point of view, we focus on macro-prudential and
monetary policies to attenuate the risk of default. An interesting avenue for
future research would be to look at more structural policies, that is to look
at policies to keep public debt at fair level in order to avoid the risk – and
therefore the realization – of default. For instance, the new Fiscal Compact
Treaty, the introduction of common area-wide eurobonds or a deeper level
of fiscal union.
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3.A Integration vs. fragmentation of the
financial sector in the euro area
Table 3.A.1: Sovereign debt holding
Holders (% of total stock)
Sovereign Domestic Other Non Public
debt from Year banks residents residents institutions
2007 13 32 55 0
France
2011 14 29 57 0
2007 30 21 49 0
Germany
2011 23 14 63 0
2007 11 3 74 13
Greece
2011 19 6 38 36
2007 3 4 93 0
Ireland
2011 17 2 64 17
2007 12 34 49 5
Italy
2011 17 29 43 11
2007 9 21 69 0
Netherlands
2011 11 21 67 1
2007 9 15 76 0
Portugal
2011 22 14 52 12
2007 21 21 48 10
Spain
2011 27 20 34 19
2007 23 24 53 0
Core
2011 19 19 61 0
2007 13 27 54 6
Periphery
2011 20 24 42 15
Notes. ‘Domestic banks’ excludes the domestic central bank. ‘Other residents’
represents the domestic private sector less domestic banks. ‘Non-residents’ is the
non-domestic private sector (bank and non-bank). ‘Public institutions’ is both
domestic and non-domestic public institutions (including the ESCB). Source:
Table 1 from Merler and Pisany-Ferry (2012), based on various national sources.
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Table 3.A.1 gives a breakdown of sovereign debt by holding sectors. We
directly borrow this table from Merler and Pisany-Ferry (2012). Data relate
to the year 2007, that is before the start of the financial crisis, and the year
2011, that is at the height of the sovereign debt troubles. We see that in
2007, about 55% of the sovereign debt, both from the core countries and the
periphery countries, were held by non-residents. Data cannot distinguish
between banks and non-banks in the non-resident sector, as well as between
other euro area residents and non-euro area residents. We also notice that
domestic banks in the periphery hold relatively few domestic debt (13%).
We observe significant changes between 2007 and 2011. First, non-residents
reduce their – relative – holdings of periphery debt and increase theirs of
core debt. Second, domestic banks in the periphery increase their – relative
– holdings of domestic debt. In conclusion, we have a rather globalized
sovereign debt market in 2007 whereas we see a flight-to-quality as well as a
specialization of periphery banks between 2007 and 2011.
The first columns of Table 3.A.2 use BIS data and focus on the foreign
claims of banks located in selected countries vis-a`-vis the core region, the
periphery region and the non-euro area countries. The foreign claims include
claims on public debt but also all other – private – foreign claims. A limitation
of the consolidated BIS data is that they do not include information on
domestic claims. Data refer to 2009 and 2013, that is before and after the
period of sovereign debt troubles. We see that in 2009, banks located in the
core region have the same amount of foreign claims vis-a`-vis the other core
countries as vis-a`-vis the periphery countries. Banks located in the periphery
countries are more exposed to the core countries than to the other periphery
countries. We also notice that all banks have a large exposure outside the
euro area. Between 2009 and 2013, we observe a flight-to-quality. Core
banks reduce their exposure to periphery and increase their exposure to the
other core countries, whereas periphery banks reduce their exposure to other
periphery countries to increase – relative – claims outside the euro area.
Once again, we conclude that banks’ direct foreign exposures are diversified
in 2009 whereas we see a flight-to-quality between 2009 and 2013.
To better understand the integration of the euro area banking sector,
we also look at the wholesale banking market using Monetary Financial
Institutions (MFI) statistics compiled by the ECB. The last columns of
Table 3.A.2 show that, on average, between 25% and 30% of MFI to MFI
lending is cross-border. We however observe huge dispersions between
countries depending on their size, with smaller countries having much higher
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cross-border positions than large countries. From 2009 and 2013, we see a
geographical specialization but of limited size. This underlines that banks
do not only have direct foreign exposures but also indirect foreign exposures
through an integrated interbank market.
3.B Fragmentation of the financial sector: an
alternative approach
In the main text, we introduce fragmentation through the bank collateral
channel. We here look at an alternative fragmentation through the bank
capital channel. To do so, we keep one single bank but with two different
capital constraints, one related to the core balance sheet items and another
related to the periphery ones. More precisely, we split equation (3.2.26) into
one equation for each region j ∈ {c, p}:
(1− γ)Qjc,tLjt +Qjc,tsjt + Y jt /Yt Qjc,tBcbt = Qjc,tDjt + xjt . (3.B.1)
We therefore obtain two different excess capital variables xjt and therefore
two different bank capital costs d Ω(xjt ). We calibrate the parameter d such
that the size of the costs after the shock is the same between simulations.
This modifies the first order conditions (3.2.31) to (3.2.34). Table 3.B.1
compares the maximum pass-trough of a 1 ppt increase in the periphery
default risk under alternative banking specifications. We see that compared
with integration, fragmentation worsens the situation in the periphery and
improves the situation in the core. It also worsens the situation in the
aggregated EA. These results hold whatever we introduce fragmentation
through the bank collateral cost Ψ(.) as in the main text or through the
bank capital cost Ω(.) as in equation (3.B.1). Quantitatively, we however
observe that the collateral fragmentation produces stronger effects than the
capital fragmentation. We could obviously combine the two fragmentation
and this would increase further the asymmetry between the core and the
periphery regions.
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Table 3.A.2: Selected banking statistics
Direct Exposure Indirect exposure
Foreign claims vis-a`-vis Loans to MFIs
vis-a`-vis (%) (%)
Banks from Year Core Periphery Other Domestic Euro Area
2009 19 9 72 74 26
Austria
2013 16 5 79 81 19
2009 32 21 46 20 80
Belgium
2013 30 17 53 30 70
2009 19 24 58 82 18
France
2013 25 18 57 85 15
2009 20 21 59 74 26
Germany
2013 23 14 64 79 21
2009 6 1 92 21 79
Greece
2013 22 1 78 55 45
2009 15 14 71 76 24
Ireland
2013 9 3 88 57 43
2009 52 7 41 86 14
Italy
2013 50 4 46 84 16
2009 27 16 57 42 58
Netherlands
2013 35 8 57 59 41
2009 19 38 43 49 51
Portugal
2013 21 30 49 67 33
2009 12 12 77 68 32
Spain
2013 9 7 84 78 22
2009 22 21 58 71 29
Core
2013 25 14 61 76 24
2009 25 12 63 75 25
Periphery
2013 23 6 71 77 23
Notes. The Direct Exposure column shows the percentage of outstanding amount of
consolidated foreign claims of reporting banks per country with respect to the core
and periphery countries of the Euro area, as well as with respect to all other countries.
Source: BIS Quarterly Review 2010 and 2014, table 9B and author’s calculations. The
Indirect Exposure column presents the percentage of outstanding amounts of loans of
reporting banks to other financial institutions belonging to the same country and to the
rest of the EA (excl. the ESCB). Source: ECB, Statistical Data Warehouse and author’s
calculations.
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Table 3.B.1: Maximum pass-through of a 1 ppt increase in default risk in
the periphery country to selected market interest rates and volumes
Rates Rb,c Rb,p Rl,c Rl,p R
Model integ. -0.4 +0.4 +0.2 +0.2 -0.1
Model frag. Ψ(.) -0.1 +0.3 -0.1 +0.7 -0.2
Model frag. Ω(.) -0.0 +0.4 +0.2 +0.2 -0.1
Volumes Lc Lp Y c Y p Lc + Lp Y c + Y p
Model integ. -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.1 -0.2
Model frag. Ψ(.) +0.1 -0.4 -0.2 -0.7 -0.2 -0.5
Model frag. Ω(.) -0.0 -0.4 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -0.3
Notes. Pass-through are expressed in percentage points for rates and in
percentage for volumes. ‘Model integ.’ provides simulation results with
banking integration, explained in section 3.2.4 and equation (3.4.1). ‘Model
frag. Ψ(.)’ provides simulation results with fragmentation through the bank
collateral channel, explained in equation (3.4.2). ‘Model frag. Ω(.)’ provides
simulation results with fragmentation through the bank capital channel,
explained in equation (3.B.1).

Chapter 4
Stock and sovereign bond
dynamics in the Euro Area1
4.1 Introduction
The understanding of the relation between stock and sovereign bond corre-
lations is of primary importance for investors as well as for policy makers.
From a finance point of view this correlation suggests a measurement of risk
and diversification of investors’ portfolio. From an economic point of view
asset prices are the mechanism by which consumption and investment are
allocated across time and states of nature. These decisions change according
to the business cycle and the different sources of shocks that impact the
economy. In this chapter we study the causes of asset market’s comovements
from a macroeconomic perspective. In particular we show that looking at
stock-bond correlations helps to identify the nature of shocks that hit the
euro area (EA hereafter) economy.
Figure 4.1.1 presents the evolution of the euro period equity and bond
returns. Since the introduction of the common currency both bond and
stock markets in the euro zone registered a high level of correlation giving
support to the idea that the introduction of the common currency fostered
integration among countries. However with the beginning of the sovereign
debt crisis the behaviour of core and periphery bond yields started to move in
opposite directions. This evidence is known as flight-to-quality in sovereign
bond markets due to the increasing fiscal troubles of the periphery countries
1This chapter is based on Perego (2014).
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and the relative increased fears of default. This evidence is plotted in the
left-hand side of Figure 4.1.1. On the right-hand side we show the behaviour
of the stock market. Notwithstanding the difference in the value of the two
stock market indexes we observe that they moved in line during the whole
period after the introduction of the euro even during both the financial
crisis and the sovereign debt crisis. While the impact of the sovereign debt
crisis it is easily detectable in the behaviour of sovereign bond markets, the
identification of the causes of asset markets’ co-movements before 2010 it is
less obvious.
The first contribution of this chapter is to build an international general
equilibrium model able to identify and explain how different shocks and
macroeconomic dynamics impact on the euro area stock-bond correlation.
Many empirical works have explained the determinants of the stock-bond
comovements for the euro zone in terms of macroeconomic variables. Among
the others Kim et al. (2006) and Andersson et al. (2008) explain the role of
variables such as inflation, GDP growth, market uncertainty as main drivers
of the correlations. Perego and Vermeulen (2013), in the light of the recent
sovereign debt crisis, highlight the role of relative imbalances between the
core and the periphery of the euro zone and of variables such as balance
of payments among the euro area asset markets movements’ determinants.
Recently, the work of Adrian et al. (2010) showed the crucial role of financial
intermediaries’ balance sheet in the pricing of both the cross-section as well
as the time series of asset prices. In the euro area the balance sheets of
banks were highly exposed to sovereign bonds that were used as a source of
collateral. Moreover, the ECB yearly financial report (ECB, 2012) shows
how the decrease in the integration on the sovereign bond market brought to
a decrease in the integration also in the banking sector. Ultimately troubles
on the banking sector translate into lower credit for the private sector and,
in this way, they might impact the equity market performance.
General equilibrium models in the macro-finance literature have focused
on the one hand on the term structure of bond interest rates and on the
asset pricing of stock and bonds in a closed economy. Latest works on
bond pricing are those of van Binsbergen et al. (2012) and Rudebusch and
Swanson (2012)2. A good review of the stock-bond asset pricing literature is
provided by Campbell et al. (2014). The first set of papers studies the bond
premium and the relation with macroeconomic variables, the second explains
the change in the stock-bond correlation in relation to monetary policy and
2For an exhaustive review of the literature see Rudebusch (2010).
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other macroeconomic variables. In both cases the international dimension of
the correlations is neglected. On the other hand, the new literature on open
economy financial macroeconomics focuses on the international dimension of
asset markets. Coeurdacier and Rey (2011) provide an exhaustive review of
the literature on the home bias in international capital markets. Closer to our
approach is the branch of this literature dealing with the hedging properties
of bond and equities. They find that bonds are better suited to hedge real
exchange rate risk whereas equities non-tradable income risk. However, this
set of models does not consider the role of financial intermediaries and the
risk of default on sovereign bonds. Both dimensions proved to be crucial in
the euro zone history.
The second contribution of this chapter is to introduce financial interme-
diaries into the open economy financial macroeconomics literature and to
theoretically study their relation with asset markets.
We build a two-country real DSGE model with a banking sector and asset
markets as this framework is the best equipped to study the transmission of
shocks and the multiple linkages between the core and the periphery of the
euro zone. On the modelling side we refer closely to Perego and Pierrard
(2014). They develop a two-country model for a currency union including
an international banking sector and allowing for endogenous default on
government bonds. They look at the transmission of a sovereign default
shock through the banking sector onto the real economy and study policy
recommendations. We extend their model by including international equity
markets as in Coeurdacier et al. (2007). This new framework allows for a
comprehensive study of asset markets’ dynamics and, additionally, to look
at the impact of shocks originating in the equity market.
We find that the interaction between credit constraints in the banking
sector and macroeconomic variables is a key driver of the time-varying stock-
bond correlation. Constraints on bank’s capital and collaterals determines a
strong tightening of credit to firms and a pro-cyclical amplification of shocks.
Moreover, the existence of credit constraints at the international bank level
prompts more synchronization in asset markets’ responses as there is a more
homogeneous sharing of the effects of shocks between countries. We show
that in the presence of credit constraints a sovereign risk shock reproduces
the 2010-2012 facts on the euro area correlations. For the previous sample
a productivity shock matches the negative stock-bond correlation during
the years 2004-2006 while a financial expectation shock reproduces the
positive correlation registered both during the dot-com and the subprime
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Figure 4.1.1: Returns in the euro zone stock-bond markets
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Notes. Stock market series are total return indexes on non-financial firms;
bond series are DS benchmark 10 years index of yields to redemption. Coun-
tries belonging to the core are: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France and
Germany. Whereas countries belonging to the periphery are: Greece, Ire-
land, Italy, Portugal and Spain. The series are aggregated at the core and
periphery level by weighted average based on market capitalization for stock
and government liabilities for bonds at the baseline values of 2002.
Data source: Datastream.
crisis period.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2
presents the stylized facts on the EA stock-bond market; Section 4.3 details
the model, Section 4.4 explains the calibration and Section 4.5 shows the
dynamic simulations. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Stylized facts on the EA stock-bond markets
The behaviour of the stock market integration and the correlation of stock
and bond returns have been studied in depth in the empirical financial
literature. Regarding the euro area, the focus was in attesting the degree of
integration between the different member countries and in understanding
the portfolio diversification possibilities in the euro area asset markets. Kim
et al. (2005) showes how the introduction of the common currency brought
to the integration of euro area stock markets while Kim et al. (2006) points
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out how, since the introduction of the common currency, the correlation on
the stock-bond market was time-varying and negative. Recently, the work
of Perego and Vermeulen (2013) illustrates how the sovereign debt crisis
impacted on the correlation in the sovereign bond market and, consequently,
on the stock-bond markets’ one. They find that the stock-bond correlation
behaved differently in the core and in the periphery of the EA after the
beginning of the sovereign debt crisis.
Figure 4.2.1 shows some stylized facts on the behaviour of sovereign
bond and stock returns in the euro zone. We consider the 10 years yields
to redemption index for sovereign bonds and the total return index for
non-financial corporations for stocks. Since the beginning of the common
currency union and up to 2009, we observe that the dynamics of sovereign
bond yields in the core and in the periphery of the euro zone moved hand-
in-hand. Both region’s yields seem to be decreasing and converging towards
the same value. This behaviour was interpreted as an indicator that the
two area’s sovereign bonds were perceived to be more and more safe and
alike. After 2009, and more pronouncedly in 2010, the two region’s yields
started to diverge. In the core returns continued to decrease whereas in the
periphery they rocketed. This evidence is what we refer to as flight-to-quality
in the sovereign bond market. It shows that, since the beginning of the
sovereign debt crisis, periphery sovereign bonds were perceived to be more
risky and, for this reason, they were sold against the core, safer, ones. For
what concerns the stock market, we observe that, during the whole euro
area period, returns have been moving pretty much in line in the core and
in the periphery. Notwithstanding the different crisis (financial first and
sovereign then) the stock markets of the two regions were highly correlated:
decreasing in the early 2000 after the dot-com crisis, increasing afterwards
until the recent financial crisis with the consequent fall in the late 2007.
From these index series we compute the realized correlations between the
stock-bond assets and the aggregated core-periphery markets. The behaviour
of such correlations is presented in Figure 4.2.1. With the grey areas we
highlight the change in the sign of the stock-bond correlations. We identify
four sub-periods. The first and the third (in white) present a high correlations
on the bond and stock markets and, further, a positive correlation on the core
and periphery stock-bond markets. In the second sub-period the correlation
on core and periphery stock-bond markets becomes negative notwithstanding
the still high correlation on the bond and stock markets. For what concerns
the last period we can clearly detect the decreasing correlation in the bond
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market, the high correlation in the stock market and a different regional
pattern for the stock-bond correlations.3 Before 2010 we can observe instead
a time varying behaviour of the stock-bond correlations common to the two
regions.
Figure 4.2.1: Realized correlations in the euro zone stock-bond markets
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Notes. The realized correlations are computed on quarterly windows
of the same data presented in Figure 4.1.1. They show the dynamic
relations between the returns on stock and the yields on sovereign bond
within the euro zone over the period 2000 to October 2013. The shaded
areas highlight the change in the sign of the stock-bond correlations.
Previous studies conducted at the euro area level showed the same pat-
tern.4 However the way previous mentioned papers dealt with the correlation
is somehow different. They focused on the correlation between price changes.
We instead calculate the correlation between index of returns. The reason
of the different approach is to use a correlation measure that is compatible
3 These facts have been studied in detail by Perego and Vermeulen (2013).
4See for instance Kim et al. (2006).
4.2. STYLIZED FACTS ON THE EA STOCK-BOND MARKETS 123
with the one computed from the model’s variables.5 The two measures are
however related. Stock market returns are made of a price component and
of a dividend payout component. So we should expect the stock return
index and the relative price index to move in line. Instead, on the bond
market the relation between returns and prices is not linear. The bond’s
yield is the inverse to its price: as bond prices increase, bond yields fall. As
a consequence, in terms of correlations, the only difference with respect to
previous studies, as the ones of Kim et al. (2006) and Perego and Vermeulen
(2013), comes from the stock-bond correlations that by construction present
the opposite sign.
In Table 4.2.1 we present the average correlation per sub-period. Until
2010 there is an homogeneous market for stock and bonds within the two
regions of the euro zone. The correlation in the bond market is almost unity
while in the stock market it is very high. As the stock and bond markets
within regions are integrated, the stock-bond correlations behave similarly
in the two regions. In the period between 2000-2004 and 2007-2010 it is
positive while in the period 2004-2007 it is negative. After 2010, following
the disruption in the bond market, the stock-bond correlations do not behave
similarly in the two regions any more. In the core the stock-bond correlation
is positive whereas in the periphery it becomes negative.
The understanding of which mechanisms have contributed to determine
the behaviour of these asset markets is the focus of the rest of the chapter.
Table 4.2.1: Correlation data
2000-2004 2004-2007 2007-2010 2010-2012 2000-2012
corr(Rb,p,Rb,c) 0.94 0.98 0.88 0.17 0.71
corr(RS,p,RS,c) 0.74 0.82 0.82 0.73 0.77
corr(Rb,c,RS,c) 0.34 -0.08 0.44 0.28 0.22
corr(Rb,p,RS,p) 0.18 -0.24 0.28 -0.19 -0.02
Rb,j is the gross return on sovereign bonds in country j ∈ {c, p} and RS,j the gross
return on equity.
5In the model the agents make decisions on the basis of changes in the returns from
their assets rather than relative to changes in prices. This is because they hold one-period
assets until maturity ruling out possible gains from buying and selling according to changes
in prices.
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4.3 Model
We develop an international business cycle model for the euro area. It
consists of two regions, we call the first country/region as core and we denote
it by c hereafter. We call the second country/region as periphery and we
denote it by p hereafter. The model features an international banking sector,
an equity market and an endogenous probability of default on sovereign
debt. Households, in each region j ∈ {c, p}, work for the firms, consume and
invest in deposits at the bank, in sovereign government bonds and in equity.
Both the sovereign debt market and the labour market are segmented at the
household’s level, i.e. the household in country j may only hold debt from
government j and work in country j. The segmentation of the bond market,
though being stylized, is helpful to represent the high home bias in this
market. The role of international holder of sovereign debt is left to financial
intermediaries, in this way we reproduce the international exposure of bank’s
balance sheets to sovereign debt. The production side of the economy is
composed of final and intermediate firms as well as by capital producers.
Capital producers borrow from the international bank in the form of one-
period loans, decide how to redistribute dividends to households and invest
in the intermediate firm’s capital. Final firm’s combine the intermediate
goods produced in the domestic and in the foreign country into a final good
that is traded between regions. There exists one international bank located
in country c. The bank plays an important financial intermediary role as it
can provide credit to the private sector in a more efficient way than financial
markets, given the presence of costs on the equity side. More specifically, the
bank collects deposits from the j households, lends loans to capital producers’
firms and buys one-period bonds from the government. The government
expenditures are financed via lump-sum taxes from households or by public
debt. Moreover, the government may default on its debt if the economy
reaches a stochastic maximum level of sustainable debt to output. Finally,
we assume that the two regions are perfectly symmetric except for a higher
level of debt to output in the periphery country.
4.3.1 Households
In each country j ∈ {c, p}, the representative household may consume Cjt ,
invest Djt in one-period bank deposits or b
j
t in one-period sovereign debt.
Moreover households can invest in financial markets both in domestic and
foreign equity Sji,t issued by the respective firms-capital producers i ∈ {c, p}.
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By investing in deposits the households obtain Rd,jt−1, the predetermined
gross return on deposits. The expected gross return on sovereign bond is
Rb,jt−1 while the actual net return is R
b,j
t−1 − jt , where jt ≥ 0 captures the
share of outstanding sovereign debt lost by households because of – partial –
sovereign default.
The expected return on equity holdings is given by the price at which
households can sell the share ρjs,t bought in the previous period and the
dividend payout divjt coming from the capital producers. Q
i
j,t is the real
exchange rate of country i when country j is taken as the numeraire. The
household also supplies hjt hours to the firms and receives wages w
j
t . Moreover,
it owns the firms located in j and receives their profits Υjt . Finally, the
household receives a lump-sum transfer Hh,jt from the government and
must pay taxes T jt as well as a quadratic portfolio adjustment cost on
sovereign debt represented by the parameter φb > 0 in equation (4.3.1).
This cost makes the households’ portfolio choices less sensitive to interest
rate differentials. Additionally, the households pay a cost related to their
equity holdings represented by the parameter φs > 0. The households, in
order to minimize the sum of the squared costs associated to equity holdings,
optimally choose to hold the same amount of c and p shares. For this reason
we can interpret this cost as a way to mimic preferences for a diversified
portfolio. If the shares’ holdings deviate from the optimal reference value,
the households bear an additional cost. The household’s budget constraint
is:
Cjt +D
j
t + b
j
t +
∑
i
Qij,tρ
s
i,tS
j
i,t+
φs
2
∑
i
Qij,tρ
s
i,t
(
Sji,t
)2
+
φb
2
(bjt − b¯j)2
= wjth
j
t +R
d,j
t−1D
j
t−1 + (R
b,j
t−1−jt )bjt−1 +
∑
i
Qij,t(ρ
s
i,t + divi,t)S
j
i,t−1
+Υjt+H
h,j
t − T jt . (4.3.1)
Throughout the chapter, z¯ represents the steady state of any variable zt.
The household’s expected lifetime utility at date s is:
max Es
∞∑
t=s
βt−s
(
ln
(
Cjt − ψn
(hjt )
η+1
η + 1
)
+ ψdln D
j
t
)
(4.3.2)
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0 < β < 1 is the subjective discount factor, η is the inverse of the
intertemporal elasticity of labour supply and ψn, ψd > 0 are parameters.
6
The household maximizes (4.3.2) subject to (4.3.1). It gives the following
first order conditions (FOCs):
ψn(h
j
t )
η = wjt , (4.3.3)
λjt =
ψd
Djt
+ Etβλ
j
t+1R
d,j
t , (4.3.4)
λjt
(
1 + φb(b
j
t − b¯j)
)
= Etβλ
j
t+1(R
b,j
t − jt+1) , (4.3.5)
Qij,tλ
j
t (1 + φsS
j
i,t) = Etβλ
j
t+1(R
S
i,t+1)Q
i
j,t+1 , (4.3.6)
λjt =
(
Cjt − ψn
(hjt )
η+1
η + 1
)−1
. (4.3.7)
Equation (4.3.3) shows that the wage is equal to the marginal disutil-
ity of hours worked. Equations (4.3.4), (4.3.5) and (4.3.6) state that, at
equilibrium, marginal costs are equal to expected marginal income from,
respectively, deposits, sovereign bonds and equity. Equation (4.3.6) repre-
sents the FOCs for equity holding for country j households with respect to
country i ∈ {c, p}, i 6= j issuer. The expected real return on equity is:
Et[R
S
i,t+1] =
Et[ρ
s
i,t+1] + Et[divi,t+1] + u
s
t
ρsi,t
. (4.3.8)
These returns are defined as the change in price plus the dividend payout.
ust is an i.i.d. shock to the expected returns. An increase (decrease) of u
s
t
mimics overly optimistic (pessimistic) expectations on equity returns. It
6The choice of a GHH utility function is motivated by the international framework.
The absence of wealth effect on the labour supply helps to match a series of empirical
regularities as explained by Garcia-Cicco et al. (2010), Raffo (2008) and Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe (2012). Moreover, the results of the chapter are not changed by using a different
utility formulation (KPR for instance).
We introduce deposits in the utility function as in Enders et al. (2011) for steady state
reasons. Nevertheless with this formulation deposits play the role of real value for cash.
An increase in deposits increases the means of payments of the households and (ceteris
paribus) increases their consumption.
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can be interpreted as a noise component, a subjective belief, that makes
expectations on future returns detach from their fundamental values.7
Comparing equations (4.3.5) and (4.3.6) we can analyse the relation
between the sovereign bond and equity rates in the households’ portfolio.
Let us define Rnb,jt as the net return on sovereign bonds. As we assume that
only the periphery country can default, net returns are respectively given by
Rnb,pt = R
b,p
t − Et[pt+1] , (4.3.9)
Rnb,ct = R
b,c
t . (4.3.10)
Abstaining from adjustment costs and price dynamics, the relation between
the sovereign bond and equity rates is the following:
Et[R
S
i,t+1] = R
nb,j
t + λ
j
tφsS
j
i,t. (4.3.11)
Equation (4.3.11) shows that the two assets are not perfect substitute.
There are two sources of differentiation: sovereign debt default and the cost
associated to equity holdings. Changes in the amount of shares bought
reduces the correlation between equity and sovereign returns. The more
the shares held, the higher the return demanded by the households in order
to hold such an asset. Analogously, periphery default on sovereign debt
determines a wedge between the return on equity and periphery sovereign
bonds.
4.3.2 Capital producers
The capital producers in country j ∈ {c, p} have the choice of financing
either via one-period loans from the bank or through asset markets in the
form of equity. They may payout dividends, divjt , to the households or invest
Ijt in domestic firms. In turn, investment increases firms’ capital stock K
j
t
according to the following law of motion:
Kjt = (1− δ)Kjt−1 + Ijt , (4.3.12)
where 0 < δ < 1 is the capital depreciation rate. Capital provides a net
real return rjt and capital producers pay a gross nominal interest rate R
l,j
t−1
on loans, as well as an adjustment cost on investment represented by the
7For a detailed description of the financial expectation shock see Section 4.5.
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parameter φi > 0.
8 If the capital producers decide to pay out dividends they
face an adjustment cost represented by the parameter κd. As in Jermann
and Quadrini (2012) the equity payout cost can be interpreted as a pecuniary
cost as well as a way to model the speed of fund’s adjustment when financial
conditions change. In this model’s specification of the cost, when κd is
infinitely large capital producers have access to only one source of funds:
bank loans. For smaller values, the capital producers can be financed both
via (negative) dividend payouts and bank’s loans. High values of κd oblige
the capital producers to pay a high cost when they want to adjust the
dividend payouts from their steady state value. Lower values allow more
flexibility in the payout policy. The capital producers’ budget constraint is:
divjt+I
j
t +
φi
2
(Ijt−I¯j)2+
κd
2
(divjt− ¯divj)2+Rl,jt−1Ljt−1 = Ljt+rjtKjt−1. (4.3.13)
As equity shares are held internationally, the capital producers are
owned by the households of both the core and the periphery country. They
maximize:
max Es
∞∑
t=s
(βe,j)t−s divjt
subject to (4.3.12) and (4.3.13). With βe being the time varying weighted
average of the discount factors of the core and periphery households, ex-
pressed in terms of the capital producers’ domestic price index:
βe,c = β
(
Scc,t
(
λct+1
λct
)
+ Spc,t
(
Qpc,t+1
Qpc,t
λpt+1
λpt
))
,
βe,p = β
(
Spp,t
(
λpt+1
λpt
)
+ Scp,t
(
Qpc,t
Qpc,t+1
λct+1
λct
))
.
As equity shares are held internationally the discount factor of capital
producers accounts for the relative importance of each owner’s marginal
utility. The weights are set according to the time-varying amount of shares
8A convex adjustment cost on investment is common in the literature as it helps to
match empirical behaviour of aggregate investment and prevents the investment demand
curve to be perfectly elastic. For the early literature that assumes this cost see Gould
(1968) and Lucas (1967) among others.
4.3. MODEL 129
each household holds of one country’s capital producers. The first order
conditions for this problem read:
λe,jt = Etβ
e,jλe,jt+1R
l,j
t , (4.3.14)
λe,jt q
j
t = Etβ
e,jλe,jt+1
(
rjt+1 + (1− δ)qjt+1
)
, (4.3.15)
Ijt = I¯
j +
1
φI
(qjt − 1) , (4.3.16)
λe,jt =
1
1 + κd(div
j
t − ¯divj)
, (4.3.17)
where λe,jt is the Lagrangian multiplier associated to the capital producers’
budget constraint.
Equation (4.3.14) says that, at equilibrium, the marginal income from
loans is equal to the expected marginal cost weighted by the households
discount factor. Equation (4.3.15) defines the shadow value of capital, qjt , as
the expected discounted value of the marginal profits of having one additional
unit of capital. If qjt < 1, meaning that the shadow value of capital is smaller
than the price of capital, equation (4.3.16) states that investments should
decline, if qjt > 1 that investments should increase.
9 Furthermore, from
equation (4.3.15), we see that the shadow value of capital increases when
the expected future dividend payouts are lower than the actual ones.
4.3.3 Nonfinancial firms
In each country j ∈ {c, p} firms are perfectly competitive. The intermediate
j firm produces a good that is sold in the domestic country as well as in the
foreign one. A final firm in each country combines the intermediate goods
from the j and −j countries into a final one.
Final firms
In each region the demand for goods is a composite of the home and foreign
intermediate goods. The aggregate demand for country j is:
9This formulation of the investment equation follows Tobin’s Q theory of investment
(Tobin, 1969).
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Aj =
(
Ajj
1− α
)(1−α)(
Aj−j
α
)α
, (4.3.18)
where Ajj and A
j
−j are respectively the demands of the final firm j for
goods j and −j. 0 < 1−α < 1 is the degree of home bias or, alternatively, it
can be interpreted as the index of country openness. We set this parameter
to be 0 < α < 0.5 implying a certain degree of home bias. The composite
final good can be used for consumption and investment by all the agents in
the economy.10 The optimal demand for each variety of the final good is
given by the following first order conditions:11
Acc,t = (1− α)
1
φct
Act , A
p
p,t = (1− α)
1
φpt
Apt ,
Acp,t = α
1
Qpc,tφ
p
t
Act , A
p
c,t = α
Qpc,t
φct
Apt .
The welfare based price index (for both regions) corresponding to these
preferences is:
P jt = (p
j
j,t)
(1−α)(pj−j,t)
α. (4.3.19)
Dividing by P j , and by the law of one price, the price index can be
simplified as:
1 = φjtφ
−j
t ,
Q−jj,t = (φ
j
t )
2α−1
α ,
with φjt =
pjj,t
P jt
being the share of domestic produced goods’ prices in the
domestic price index and Qpc,t =
etP
p
t
P ct
being the real exchange rate for the
core country. The nominal exchange rate et is set to 1 as the two economies
belong to the same currency union.
10We assume that the same Cobb-Douglas CES aggregator applies to the consumption
bundles of all the agents as well as for investment. As a consequence the price index for
consumption and investment is the same. For the choice of the CES function we follow
Gali and Monacelli (2008).
11Optimal demands are the solution of the final firm maximization problem:
{Ajj,t, Aj−j,t}∞t=0 to maximize P jt Ajt − pjj,tAjj,t − pj−j,tAj−j,t.
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Intermediate firms
There is a competitive non financial sector in the economy which produces a
tradable good under a Cobb-Douglass production function. The inputs are
capital and labour rented respectively from capital producers and households.
The maximization problem of the firms reads:
max Υjt
s.t. Υjt = φ
j
tY
j
t − wjthjt − rjtKjt−1 , (4.3.20)
Y jt = Z
j
t
(
Kjt
)µ (
h
j
t
)1−µ
, (4.3.21)
where Zjt represents total factor productivity and 0 < µ < 1 is the
elasticity of output to capital. The first order conditions for this maximization
problem equate the marginal productivity of factors with their marginal
cost:
rjt = µ
φjtY
j
t
Kjt−1
, (4.3.22)
wjt = (1− µ)
φjtY
j
t
hjt
. (4.3.23)
One source of aggregate risk in this model comes from the total factor
productivity Zjt :
Zjt =
(
Zjt−1
)γz
exp(uzt ) , (4.3.24)
that is represented as a stochastic autoregressive process with 0 < γz < 1,
and uzt i.i.d.
4.3.4 Banking sector
The banking sector is represented by an international and perfectly competi-
tive bank a` la Enders et al. (2011) augmented by credit frictions a` la Perego
and Pierrard (2014). The bank is located in the core but trades with all
countries j ∈ {c, p}. It collects deposits Djt from households and can invest
in sovereign bonds sjt as well as provide loans L
j
t to the firms in both regions.
The bank maximizes its consumption, its profits, over the two regions.
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The bank faces a capital requirement a` la Enders et al. (2011) having to
set aside a fraction 0 < γ < 1 of loans as own capital. The bank can deviate
from legal requirements (xt = 0) but this is costly. The bank’s balance sheet
constraint is:
(1− γ)
∑
j
Qjc,tL
j
t +
∑
j
Qjc,ts
j
t =
∑
j
Qjc,tD
j
t + xt . (4.3.25)
The bank budget constraint is:
∑
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b,j
t +
∑
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d,j
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j
t−1 +
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j
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j
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+
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2
∑
j
(Ljt − L¯j)2 +
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2
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j Q
j
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j
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−
∑
j Q¯
j
cs¯j∑
j Q¯
j
cL¯j
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=
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j
Qjc,tD
j
t +
∑
j
Qjc,tR
l,j
t−1L
j
t−1 +
∑
j
Qjc,t(R
b,j
t−1 − jt )sjt−1 +
∑
j
Qjc,tH
b,j
t .
(4.3.26)
The bank pays a real return Rd,jt−1 on deposits, it receives R
l,j
t−1 on loans
and Rb,jt−1 on sovereign bonds. Sovereign bonds are risky assets as government
can default on it with a probability jt . The bank might receive a lump-sum
transfer Hb,jt from the government. Moreover, the bank faces different types
of costs as in Perego and Pierrard (2014): operational costs on deposits,
captured by Γd; adjustments costs on loans, Γl, as in Guerrieri et al. (2012);
and the cost of deviating from the legal requirement that, following Enders
et al. (2011), we capture by Γx > 0. Finally the bank is subject to a collateral
requirement cost Γp(.)
2 that, following Perego and Pierrard (2014), we call
the collateral constraint. Banks normally use sovereign bonds as collaterals
on the interbank market in order to collect funds to sustain the private credit
supply. In this model we force the overall supply of loans to depend directly
on the quantity, as well as on the quality, of the collateral sovereign bonds as
we do not frame explicitly the interbank market. The parameter ν measures
the riskiness of bonds and represents the haircut applied to them. In the case
of a sovereign risk shock this cost introduces a demand for riskless bonds
and determines the well known flight-to-quality in sovereign bond markets
(more than obviously reducing the supply of credit to capital producers).
The bank utility is:
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max Es
∞∑
t=s
βt−s(Cb,ct )
ϑ(Cb,pt )
1−ϑ (4.3.27)
where ϑ is the share of consumption goods from country c in the utility
that we set to 0.5 such that the bank consumes its profits equally in the two
regions. The bank maximizes (4.3.27) with respect to (4.3.25) and (4.3.26).
The first order conditions are:
λbt = ϑ
(Cb,ct )
ϑ(Cb,pt )
1−ϑ
Cb,ct
, (4.3.28)
Qpc,t =
1− ϑ
ϑ
Cb,ct
Cb,pt
, (4.3.29)
λbt(Q
j
c,t − Γd +Qjc,tΓxxt) = βEtλbt+1Qjc,t+1Rd,jt , (4.3.30)
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(∑
j Q
j
c,t(1− jt )νsjt∑
j Q
j
c,tL
j
t
−
∑
j Q¯
j
cs¯j∑
j Q¯
j
cL¯j
)∑
j Q
j
c,t(1− jt )νsjt
(
∑
j Q
j
c,tL
j
t )
2
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)
= βEtλ
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t+1Q
j
c,t+1R
l,j
t , (4.3.31)
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j
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j
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+ Γxxt
)
= βEtλ
b
t+1Q
j
c,t+1(R
b,j
t − jt+1) . (4.3.32)
Equation (4.3.29) shows that the ratio of consumption of the bank for the
two regions depends on the ratio of relative price indexes. Equations (4.3.30),
(4.3.31), (4.3.32) represent respectively the Euler equation for deposits, loans
and sovereign bonds.
4.3.5 Government
The government consumption in each region j ∈ {c, p}, Gj , is financed via
lump-sum taxes, T jt , from the households, as well as via public debt, B
j
t ,
134 CHAPTER 4. STOCK AND BOND DYNAMICS IN THE EURO AREA
according to:
Gj +Hh,jt +H
b,j
t + (R
b,j
t−1 − jt )Bjt−1 = Bjt + T jt , (4.3.33)
T jt = T¯ + τ(B
j
t − B¯) . (4.3.34)
Moreover, the government may transfer Hh,jt to the households and H
b,j
t
to the bank. Both for the tax rule and the transfer specification we follow
Corsetti et al. (2013). As estimated by Bohn (1998), taxes react positively to
the increase in debt such as to stabilize it. This implies that the government
cannot finance public expenditure only via debt.12 Equation (4.3.33) also
shows that sovereign default may happen through the term 0 ≤ jt ≤ 1.
Everything else equal, a strictly positive jt reduces the stock of sovereign
debt in the next period. Finally we define public expenditures as a fixed
fraction, Gj , of debt at any period.
Default
To determine the default rate jt we tightly refer to the methodology used
by van der Kwaak and van Wijnbergen (2013) by introducing an exogenous
fiscal limit for the economy. The intuition is that there is a maximum level
of taxes that can be raised before the economy becomes politically unstable.
This translates through equation (4.3.34) into a maximum level of sovereign
debt-to-output ratio BY maxt that the government is able to service. We
moreover assume that this maximum sustainable level is stochastic and
follows:
BY maxt = B¯Y
max
+ γb(BY
max
t−1 − B¯Y max) + ubt , (4.3.35)
where 0 < γb < 1 is the autoregressive component, and u
b
t is a i.i.d. shock.
This stochastic behaviour aims at capturing the uncertainty around political
instability in the context of sovereign debt and taxation.13
Let us define B˜jt as the level of debt in the economy when no default
occurs:
12As the focus of the chapter is not on the fiscal dimension we use debt-smoothing
lump-sum taxes rather than more complicated distortionary tax schemes.
13In reality, the maximum sustainable government debt level is not exogenous but
depends on expected growth rates, on expected growth volatility or on the expected
government ability to raise taxes (see for instance Collard et al. (2014)). But this is beyond
the scope of this chapter.
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Gjt +R
b,j
t−1 B
j
t−1 = T
j
t + B˜
j
t . (4.3.36)
If this level of debt-to-output B˜jt /(4Y
j
t ) is lower (resp. higher) than the
maximum sustainable level BY maxt , the government does not (resp. does)
default. In other words, we define the default decision ∆t as:
∆t =
0 if
B˜jt
4Y jt
< BY maxt
1 otherwise
(4.3.37)
This default process ∆t is a step function that we approximate with the
continuous normal cdf:
jt = F
(
B˜jt
4Y jt
−BY maxt ; 0 , σ2
)
= Φ
 B˜
j
t
4Y jt
−BY maxt
σ
 , (4.3.38)
where σ > 0 represents the variance and Φ(.) is the standard normal
cdf. We see that when σ → 0, then jt → ∆t. A reduction (resp. increase)
in the maximum sustainable level of debt-to-output, through the stochastic
shock ubt in equation (4.3.35), increases (reduces) the default rate in the
economy. Similarly, a higher (resp. lower) debt-to-output ratio B˜jt /(4Y
j
t )
increases (resp. reduces) the default rate in the economy. Agents in the
economy observe the current economic conditions and, as a consequence,
they form expectations on default according to equation (4.3.38). If we
assume that only the periphery country can default, the difference between
the core and the periphery sovereign interest rate -abstracting from other
general equilibrium dynamics- is given by a wedge that reflects the default
expectations:
Rb,pt = R
b,c
t + Et[
p
t+1] . (4.3.39)
The spread between the core and the periphery interest rate on sovereign
bonds is driven by default expectations reflecting low economic growth and
high levels of debt (with respect to the fiscal limit) in the periphery country.
Default risk A stochastic shock (negative for instance) to the maximum
sustainable level of debt increases default implying a change in the interest
rate on bonds as well as a direct loss on the households and bank’s portfolio.
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This shock impacts for instance both on prices (interest rates changes) as on
quantities (partial default on the amount of sovereign debt held by agents).
To deal with the risk dimension of the shock we want to isolate the price effect
from the quantity effect. In order to do so we assume that the government
makes transfers to the households and the bank in order to compensate the
loss:
Hh,jt = 
j
tb
j
t−1 ,
Hb,jt = 
j
ts
j
t−1 ,
In this way we capture the effect of a change in the interest rate on
bonds and abstract from the consequences of the direct wealth loss. The
same specification has been used by Corsetti et al. (2013) and Perego and
Pierrard (2014). This procedure is helpful to reproduce the sovereign debt
crisis’ dynamics in the euro area where only Greece effectively, partially,
defaulted.
4.3.6 Closing the model
Asset market clearing conditions
The sovereign bond market clearing condition for country j ∈ {c, p} is:
Bjt = b
j
t + s
j
t (4.3.40)
where bjt and s
j
t is the amount of bonds held respectively by the house-
holds and the bank.
The equity market clearing condition for country i ∈ {c, p} issuing and
country j ∈ {c, p} holding is:
1 = Sji,t + S
−j
i,t (4.3.41)
implying that there is a fixed amount of shares traded in the economy
normalized to 1.
Good market clearing condition
Let’s define the domestic demand for country j as:
Ajt = C
j
t + C
b,j
t + I
j
t +G
j
t + costs
j
t (4.3.42)
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where costsjt collects all adjustment and operative costs beared by
households, capital producers and firms in country j. Moreover, costsct also
includes the costs related to the bank.
The good market clearing condition for each region j reads:
Y jt = A
j
j,t +A
−j
j,t (4.3.43)
By summing them up we obtain the resource constraint for the two-
country economy:
∑
j
φjtQ
j
c,tY
j
t =
∑
j
Qjc,tA
j
t (4.3.44)
stating that the total production has to be equal to the demand in the
whole currency area.
4.4 Calibration
Table 4.4.1 presents an overview of the parameters of the model. Most of
the values are widely used in the DSGE and sovereign default literature.
The calibration refers to euro area stylized facts. Time is discrete and one
period represents one quarter. We specify the two country model for the
euro area distinguishing between the core and the periphery in terms of
debt-to-output ratios. The periphery refers to the GIIPS (Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Portugal and Spain) for which we assume a higher debt to GDP ratio
with respect to that of the core. This is the only assumed asymmetry in the
model although, in reality, there are additionally asymmetries between the
core and the periphery of the EA. Most notably the size of the two regional
economies.14 However, we assume the same size for the core and periphery
area in order to focus on the main asymmetry brought by differentials in
debt levels. Unless otherwise specified we opt for the same parameter choice
in the two country blocs.
14 Data on the euro area period suggest that the core output accounts for about
63-67% of EA output and the periphery for the remaining 33-37%. Calibrating the model
accounting for different sizes for the core and the periphery would change the steady state
of the model but not the dynamics.
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Table 4.4.1: Parameter values
Parameter Value Description
Households
β 0.99 Discount factor
φb 0.001 Bond adjustment cost
φs 0.01 Stock adjustment cost
ψn 110 Weight of labour in (dis-)utility
ψd 0.05 Weight of deposits in utility
η 5 Inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of labour supply
Global bank
ϑ 0.5 Elasticity of substitution between c and p consumption goods
γ 0.05 Bank capital ratio requirement
Γd 0.005 Deposit operating cost
Γl 0.05 Loan adjustment cost
Γp 0.5 Collateral requirement cost
Γx 1.50 Capital requirement cost
ν 8 Elasticity of haircut to default applied to government bonds
Production
δ 0.025 Capital depreciation rate
φi 0.05 Investment adjustment cost
κd 11 Dividend adjustment cost
α 0.3 Index of openess
µ 0.3 Elasticity of production w.r.t. capital
Authorities
τ 0.13 Elasticity of taxes w.r.t. debt
G¯j/Y¯ j 0.20 Public consumption-output ratio objective
B¯c/(4Y¯ c) 0.60 Debt-output ratio objective in the core country
B¯p/(4Y¯ p) 0.85 Debt-output ratio objective in the periphery country
B¯Y
max
0.92 Maximum sustainable debt-output ratio
σ 0.015 Standard deviation of default pdf
Shocks
γz 0.89 Autoregressive parameter for technological shock
γb 0.79 Autoregressive parameter for sustainable debt-output shock
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4.4.1 Parameters governing the steady state
Taking the different Euler equations (4.3.4), (4.3.5), (4.3.6), (4.3.14), (4.3.15),
(4.3.30), (4.3.31) and (4.3.32) at the steady state gives:
R¯d,j =
1− a ψd
β
=
1− Γd
β
,
R¯l,j = R¯b,j =
1
β
,
R¯S,ji =
1
β
(1 + φsS¯
j
i ) ,
r¯j =
1
β
− 1 + δ .
At steady state all the agents in the economy discount the future via the
same discount factor β as β¯e = β. We assume no default at steady state,
¯j = 0, both for the periphery and the core and that x¯ = 0 implying no
excess bank capital at steady state. We set ΓD = 0.005 and β = 0.99 in order
to have the annualized returns on loans and bonds of 4% and on deposits of
2%.15 Additionally we set φs equal to 0.01 in order to obtain an annualized
return on equity of 6%16 given a steady state holdings of domestic as well
as foreign shares of S¯ji = 1− S¯−ji = 0.5. This value is consistent with the
studies of ECB (2012) and Jochem and Volz (2011) on the intra-EA home
bias in equity holdings assessing a degree of cross-border holdings around
40-60%. For what concerns the sovereign bond holdings in the euro zone, we
follow Guerrieri et al. (2012) and we assume that 33% of sovereign debt is
held by domestic household and the rest by the bank.17
Following Enders et al. (2011) we set the required bank capital ratio at
γ = 0.05. Empirically the capital ratio for the major banks in the euro area
is between 3% and 5%. Finally the size of the bank balance sheet is of 111%
of yearly total output (Y¯ c + Y¯ p). This number is in line with the euro area
15These steady state values are set to match the empirical evidence for the 10 years
bond’s returns and the 5 years maturity loans’ rate. This choice is made in order to have
comparable maturities on the two assets, given the data availability.
16This value is in line with the annualized returns from the non-financial corporation
equity index for EA countries.
17 We do not have data on non-resident holdings of sovereign debt so we assume that it
is mainly held by banks rather than foreign households. A different assumption would not
change the implications of the model as long as the majority of the debt held by household
is domestic.
140 CHAPTER 4. STOCK AND BOND DYNAMICS IN THE EURO AREA
data on bank balance sheet for loans to and holdings of securities issued by
euro area residents.
The loans to physical capital ratio is set at around 1/3 and it pins down
the households weight on deposits Ψd. Ψn, the disutility of labour parameter,
is pined down by setting h¯j = 0.2 following the RBC literature implying that
households work 20% of their time. We calibrate η, the parameter governing
the shape of the labour disutility, in order to have a Frisch elasticity of 0.2
as it is in line with micro-based measures.18 The production function is
Cobb-Douglass with the capital share at 0.3; setting the depreciation rate at
δ = 0.025 implies K¯j/Y¯ j = 8.54 and I¯/Y¯ = 0.21 which is in line with the
RBC literature and empirical observations. The consumption of households
in total output is of 55% while the one of the bank of 2.3%. The consumption
of the bank falls equally in the two regions as we impose ϑ = 0.5. Finally,
following the NOEM literature as in Gali and Monacelli (2008), we assume a
bias for domestic goods and we calibrate α = 0.3 < 0.5. The value selected
is in the range of those used in recent macro-finance model. For a detailed
description see for instance Coeurdacier et al. (2007).
On the fiscal side we distinguish between the core and the periphery in
terms of debt-to-output ratios: we set the one of the periphery at 85%, at
steady state, while the one of the core at 60%.19 Public expenditures are set
to 20% of GDP as in line with EA data. This implies that taxes-to-output
are 22% of GDP for the core and 23% for the periphery where the difference
is due to the different debt burden in the two regions that forces a higher
taxation in the periphery. We set the maximum level of debt B¯Y
max
and the
standard deviation of default, σ, in order to obtain an elasticity of default
risk to debt of 0.1 around the steady state. This elasticity 20 is consistent
with empirical stylized facts for the EA as shown in Perego and Pierrard
(2014). The methodology used to calibrate the default process follows the
one used by Corsetti et al. (2013). Finally we assume that only the periphery
can default on its debt.
18MaCurdy (1981) and Altonji (1986) estimate the Frisch elasticity - determined from
hours and wage fluctuations on an individual basis - to be in the range of 0 to 0.54.
19These values are in line with the IMF economic outlook for 2010.
20The elasticity of – yearly – default wrt. debt to output implied by the model is:
elasticity
j =
4∆jt
∆Xbj,t
=
4
σ
φ
(
X¯bj
σ
)
,
where φ(.) is the standard normal pdf and Xbj,t =
B˜
j
t
4Y
j
t
−BY maxt with X¯bj its steady state.
4.4. CALIBRATION 141
4.4.2 Parameters governing the dynamics
This set of parameters does not affect the steady state but rather the
dynamics of the model. Regarding consumption, we assume a logarithmic
utility function for households and a linear one for the bank in order to
account for the different degrees of risk aversion (higher for the households
and null for the bank). As a sensitivity analysis we substitute the utility
function used in the baseline model with a KPR formulation as of King et al.
(1988). Correlation results are unchanged to the new utility specification.
Moreover the results are also qualitatively consistent to changes in the value
of the intertemporal substitution of consumption. However, the baseline
formulation helps to better match empirical regularities, given the absence of
wealth effect on the labour supply, and to have correlation results closer to
the data estimates. As capital producers are owned by the households they
do not have an explicit utility function. Adjustment costs on bonds, loans,
and investments (φb, φd and φi) are standard in the literature of DSGE and
their values are reported in Table 4.4.1.
In the bank specification we borrow the capital constraint from Enders
et al. (2011) and set Γx = 1.5. For what concerns the collateral cost we set
Γp = 0.5 and ν = 8. For an exhaustive discussion on the role of those three
parameters we address the interested reader to the discussion in Perego and
Pierrard (2014).
On the capital producers’ side, the adjustment cost on dividend payout is
associated to the parameter κd. When κd is infinitely large capital producers
have access to only one source of funds: bank’s loans. For smaller values
the capital producers can be financed both via dividend payouts and bank’s
loans. A similar cost is used by Jermann and Quadrini (2012). In the
benchmark calibration we set κd such as to match the volatility of dividend
payout for the EA over the period 1991-2013. In Section 4.5 we show how
more flexibility on the dividend payout policy (lower values of κd) might
have an impact on the correlations’ dynamics.
Regarding the elasticity of the fiscal rule we follow Corsetti et al. (2013)
and set the value of τ = 0.13 that is a sufficiently high value to ensure that
the debt remains bounded during the simulations.
In each country the sum of all the dynamic costs accounts for 1% of
domestic output.
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Shocks calibration
We calibrate the technology shock on EA data in order to match the volatility
of output in the core and in the periphery for the period 1995Q1-2013Q4.
The autocorrelation of the technology process is estimated to be 0.88 in the
core and 0.89 in the periphery so that we calibrate the autocorrelation in
the shock process, γz, to be 0.89 in both countries. We set the volatility of
the technology shock, σz, to 0.004 in order to match the volatility of output,
respectively of 0.013 and 0.011, in the core and in the periphery. Finally, the
correlation between the shocks in the two regions is set to 0.5 as estimated
by the author.
In order to calibrate the maximum sustainable level of debt shock we
identify the part of the riskiness indicator for the periphery debt that is
not explained by debt-to-output. As a riskiness measure we compute the
sovereign bond yield spread between periphery countries and Germany.
An alternative measure is the CDS on the underlying sovereign bonds.
Unfortunately the data availability for this variable is limited to the period
2007-2012 that is when the sovereign debt shock is expected to be observed.
For this reason we use yields in deviation from the benchmark risk-free asset
(Germany’s bonds) on the sample period 2000Q2-2013Q4 as a proxy for the
CDS informations. We estimate a panel using as dependent variable the
first difference of yield spread, ∆Y ield and as independent variable the level
of yield spread, Y ield, the level of debt-to-output, Debt as well as its first
difference ∆Debt. We additionally control for country fixed effects αi. The
shock we identify is the residual of the following panel regression21:
∆Y ieldi,t = βb ∆Debti,t − γ (Y ieldi,t−1 − βbDebti,t−1) + αi + ubt ,
for i = Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain;
t = 2000q2, . . . , 2013q3. (4.4.1)
Appendix 4.B explains that γ is related to γb, the persistence of the shock, by:
1− γ = γb. For instance for an estimate of γˆ = 0.211 then γˆb = 0.789. We
calibrate consequently γb in equation (4.3.35) to 0.79 that is a close value to
the one used by van der Kwaak and van Wijnbergen (2013), 0.8, for the same
shock. Finally in order to calibrate σb we construct the variable maximum
sustainable level of debt as explained in Appendix 4.B and compute its
standard deviation. We set σb = 0.1 in the model such as to match the
21For details on the estimations and the choice of the panel model see Appendix 4.B.
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relative standard deviation of the maximum sustainable level of debt with
respect to output.
Finally the financial expectation shock is calibrated such as to match the
EA volatility of the price-to-dividend ratio. We set σs = 0.001 accordingly.
4.5 Dynamic simulation
To simulate the model we take a first order approximation of the model’s
equations. Model correlations are computed from 50 simulations of the
economy, each of 60 periods. The number 60 corresponds to the length, in
terms of quarters, of the euro zone period data which we compare the model to.
We look at the implications of a financial expectation shock, a technological
shock and a sovereign risk shock for the international asset (equity and
sovereign bond) markets. We will show that banking credit constraint (we
will refer to them generally as credit constraint) play an important role for
the behaviour of asset markets. In order to do so we simulate the benchmark
model, as explained in Section 4.3, with a version without credit constraint.
We do so by shutting down the collateral constraint and the cost on excess
capital (Γx = Γp = 0). Moreover, we study the importance of capital
producers’ financing decisions for the correlations on asset markets. We
compare for instance the previous models with a version characterized by low
adjustment costs on dividend payouts (κd = 1 vs. the benchmark κd = 11).
Finally, we bring the model to the data. We show that it is able to
quantitatively reproduce the asset markets’ correlations during the euro
period and in particular during the sovereign debt crisis. Additionally, in
Appendix 4.C, we compare the model to standard business cycle stylized facts
to attest its consistent performance with respect to reference macroeconomic
variables’ behaviours.
4.5.1 Financial expectation shock
We now investigate the case of a shock to the expected returns from equity.
Under the efficient market hypothesis (EMH), any fluctuation in stock
prices is fully efficient as it reflects investors’ expectations about future
firm’s profits. Recently however, part of the academic world started to
doubt about the prevailing view that stock prices fluctuations are fully
efficient. Behavioural economists started to attribute the imperfections in
financial markets to a combination of cognitive biases such as overconfidence,
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overreaction, information bias, and various other predictable human errors
in reasoning and information processing. Among the others, Shiller (2005)
challenged the EMH theory by putting forward the idea that financial market
are characterized by ’irrational exuberance’ in the form of successive cycles
of excesses of optimism and pessimism. He defines ’irrational exuberance’ as
a psychological contagion that spreads from person to person after news of a
price increase occurs, bringing more investors to buy and effectively start the
bubble. As a consequence, according to him, a large part of price movements
during a bubble is caused by speculative purchases. Analogously, Adam
et al. (2014) suggest that are self-reinforcing belief dynamics, triggered by
fundamentals, that explain the most of US stock prices fluctuations. In their
model if agents become optimistic, this causes an increase in actual stock
prices, confirming agents’ expectations and feeding a stock price bubble. In
our model we do not aim at reproducing the dynamics leading to higher
returns’ expectations and the consequent increase in prices. We rather take
this process as given and we introduce a positive shock on the returns’
expectations such as to mimic these subjective irrational believes.22 We
assume this shock to be common to the core and the periphery of the EA
as suggested by the similar behaviour of stock returns, Figure 4.1.1, and of
price dividend ratios, Figure 4.5.1.
Figure 4.D.1 in Appendix 4.D presents the impulse response functions
(IRFs hereafter) for the model with and without credit constraints. As for
the previous shocks we will further investigate the role of more or less flexible
dividend payout policy of the capital producers. By bringing the model
to the data we compare the model’s results with the correlations over the
period 2000-2004 and 2007-2010.
Financial expectation shock in the data
The period between 2007-2010 is what we refer to as the financial crisis that
started with a real estate bubble; the period 2000-2004 instead, on the one
hand was characterized by the end of the dot-com bubble and, on the other
hand, it was the converging period after the introduction of the common
22Although assuming an irrational shock in a framework characterized by rational
agents might look contradictory, it is consistent with a theoretical framework a´ la Adam
and Marcet (2011). In their model agents are ’internally rational’ as they make fully
optimal decisions by maximizing discounted expected utility under uncertainty, but at the
same time they may not be ’externally rational’ as they may not know the true stochastic
process for the payoff of relevant variables that are beyond their control as prices.
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currency.23 In order to attest the presence in the data of such a period of
high expected returns we look at the price-dividend ratio (PD henceforth)
for an aggregate of EA core and periphery countries. PD ratios are usually
used as measures of expected returns in the stock market.24
As we can notice, this ratio was high around the years 2000 and again
in 2006-2008. However, the shock we identify as the financial expectation
shock not only includes the rising part of the bubble but also its decline.
For this reason we can compare the model’s dynamics with the whole cycle
of a bubble. In this perspective we observe that, for the dot-com period,
PD ratio increased at the end of the ’90 to burst until 2003; for the second
period, the increasing time of PD ratios started in 2005 and the burst lasted
until 2009. This behaviour of the stock markets, in both periods, have been
regarded by scholars and media to be due to speculative bubbles.
Model without credit constraints
Without credit constraints, a financial expectation shock has a very limited
impact on rates and variables. On the equity side the shock drives up the
stock price and, temporarily, the equity returns. This entails an increase in
the capital producers’ demand for loans driving up the interest rate. The
bank, by arbitrage, demands a higher return on sovereign bonds in order to
hold them and it accumulates excess capital. The increase in the interest rate
on sovereign bonds determines an increase in the stock of debt and hence of
taxation. As households foresee future taxation, they decrease consumption
and savings both in sovereign bonds and in deposits. Output falls in both
regions after a couple of periods as also investments slightly, but persistently,
decrease. Table 4.5.1 shows the correlations. As the shock is assumed to hit
the two regions in the same way it entails a one-to-one correlation between
equity markets and a very high correlation in the sovereign bond one. In
the absence of credit constraints, column (1) and (2), we notice that the
cross asset correlation is almost null. This is due to the negligible change of
sovereign bonds’ interest rates as opposed to the change in equity returns.
As we can notice, more flexible dividend payout do not change the results.
23For the concurrence of the two effects in this period we should be cautious in explaining
it via a financial expectation shock. However, looking at the performance of the stock
market in Figure 4.1.1, and at the realized correlations, we notice a strong similarity with
the behaviour of the asset markets in the period 2007-2010.
24In the US stock market, for which this data is available, PD ratios comove almost
perfectly with expected returns based on investors’ surveys.
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Figure 4.5.1: Price-Dividend ratio for core and periphery stocks
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Notes. The figure plots the price-dividend ratio for the stock index in the
core and the periphery against their HP-trends. Prices and dividends
are expressed in real terms after being deflated by the domestic price
consumption index. Core and Periphery series are geometric averages for
the set of countries belonging to each region. Countries belonging to the
core are: Belgium, Finland, France and Germany. Whereas countries
belonging to the periphery are: Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain.
Data sources: Datastream and author’s calculations.
This is not surprising as the shock affects directly the equity market ruling
out the effectiveness of a different dividend payout policy.
Model with credit constraints
When we introduce credit constraints the impact of the shock amplifies. The
capital constraint impedes the bank to be too leveraged (positive excess
capital) and forces the bank to cut on part of the asset side. As a consequence
of the capital constraint, the bank decreases loans and sovereign bonds in
order to reduce the excess capital and the related cost. This drives up
both loan and sovereign bond rates even more. On the production side it
determines a stronger decrease in investments, capital and output. The fall in
investment is driven by the fact that while households are overly optimistic,
capital producers are not. As returns on equity increase, households are
willing to buy more of this asset and reduce the other sources of investment
(deposits and sovereign bonds). On the capital producers’ side the higher
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lending rates and the expectations of future lower growth reduce loans’
demand and investments (despite the fact that capital producers resort to
internal financing via lower dividends).
At the same time, via collateral channel, a decreased loans’ demand
brings to a reduction in the demand of collaterals for the bank. As a
consequence sovereign bond returns increase. On impact both the returns on
equity and the interest rate on sovereign bonds raise determining a positive
correlation. As soon as the effect of the shock ends, both rates decrease
as households suddenly revise downwards their return expectations. This
dynamics matches the correlation in the data both in the case of high and
low adjustment costs on dividend payout as shown in Table 4.5.1 column (3)
and (4).
Table 4.5.1: Correlation data vs financial expectation shock
Data Model
2000 2007 No credit constr. Credit constr.
2004 2010 Bench. Flex. div Bench. Flex. div
(1) (2) (3) (4)
corr(Rb,p,Rb,c) 0.94 0.88 0.94 0.95 0.99 0.99
corr(RS,p,RS,c) 0.74 0.82 1 1 1 1
corr(Rb,c,RS,c) 0.34 0.44 0.002 0.004 0.54 0.52
corr(Rb,p,RS,p) 0.18 0.28 -0.002 -0.002 0.51 0.50
Rb,j is the gross return on sovereign bonds in country j ∈ {c, p} and RS,j the gross
return on equity. ’Bench.’ is the benchmark model calibrated as explained in section
4.4; ’Flex. div’ is the model with a lower adjustment cost on dividend payout. The
different model specifications are simulated after a positive shock to core and periphery
equity returns’ expectations.
4.5.2 Technology shock
Figure 4.D.2 in Appendix 4.D shows the effect of a positive technology shock
to the core country. In the following we compare the model with and without
credit constraints in the case of more or less flexible dividend payout policy
of the capital producers. By bringing the model to the data we compare the
model’s results with the correlations over the period 2004-2007.
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Technology shock in the data
The 2004-2007 period came between the burst of the dot-com bubble and
the beginning of the real estate bubble whose burst turned into the recent
financial crisis. The 2004-2007 period was characterized by a growing path
for the euro zone GDP reflected in a good performance of the stock market as
we can see from Figure 4.1.1. By looking at the correlation on the stock-bond
market in this period, Figure 4.2.1, we observe a change in its time-varying
behaviour with respect to the preceding and the following period. We read
this change as an indication that something happened in this interval of time
that drove, or became the main determinant of, the negative comovement.
By introducing a positive technology shock in the model we manage to
reproduce the correlation of this period. So, although we cannot precisely
identify the nature of the shock that hit the economy in these years, we
can have the suspicion that it was a technology shock. This suspicion is
sustained in the data by looking at the growing path of GDP and at other,
related, economic indicators.
In Figure 4.5.2 we show the behaviour of GDP per person employed,
GDP per hour and multi-factor productivity for Italy and Germany.25 GDP
per hour worked is a more reliable measure than GDP per employee and in
particular captures labour productivity. Multi-factor productivity (MFP)
additionally relates a change in output to several types of inputs. It is
measured residually as that change in output that cannot be accounted for
by changes in the combined inputs.
As we can see, in the period 2006-2007, all the GDP indicators show
a higher than average productivity in both countries. As GDP measures
do not adjust instantaneously to shocks we could infer that in the years
preceding 2006, and up to 2007, there could have been a positive shock to
productivity.26 By looking at the MFP data we can see that between 2004
and 2007 productivity was above the trend providing additional evidence of
a positive TFP shock in the period under consideration. However, we need
additional rigorous empirical evidence to be able to properly identify this
25We consider Germany as the representative for the core countries whereas Italy for
the periphery. Given the scarce availability of data for consistent samples over the different
EA countries, we decided to show the behaviour of two representatives.
26The abrupt fall in all the indicators in 2009 should not be considered as a negative
technology shock but rather as the consequence of the burst of the real estate bubble and
the beginning of the financial crisis with its consequent reduction in credit and fall in
production activities.
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Figure 4.5.2: Indicators of a technology shock
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Notes. The figure plots a selection of macroeconomic indicators for
Germany and Italy. ’GDP per employee’ refers to the GDP per person
employed in the total economy; ’GDP per hour’ refers to the manu-
facturing sector only and ’Multi-Factor Product.’ shows the growth
rate of multi-factor productivity for the whole economy. The series are
plotted against their trends computed via Hodrick-Prescott filtering.
Data on GDP per person is at quarterly frequency whereas the other
two measures are at the annual one. Data sources: OECD statistics.
shock in the data.
Model without credit constraints
In the absence of credit constraints, that is when the bank’s capital and
collateral channels are not working, our model delivers the same dynamics
as the international real business cycle model as of Backus et al. (1992). A
positive productivity shock brings the marginal productivity of the factors of
production to increase in the core country. Households work more, consume
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more and save more in the form of deposits. The bank provides more loans
to the core capital producers driving down the loan interest rate. The
shadow value of capital increases determining an increase in investments.
Output increases and the real exchange rate, for the core, depreciates.
In the periphery the relative change in prices determines an increase in
output, labour and consumption as now core goods are cheaper. Moreover,
households substitute consumption for savings decreasing the supply of
deposits and driving up the interest rate. Investment in the periphery
slightly increases as a consequence of the wealth effect brought about by the
relative change in prices. The bank supplies less loans increasing the interest
rate on periphery loans.
As of the equity market, in the core region capital producers payout, pro-
cyclically, more dividends and households buy more of domestic and foreign
issued equity. The price of core shares increases and this drives the increase
in the equity return. In the periphery, instead, capital producers payout
negative dividends in an attempt to use internal resources to finance the
higher investments as external resources (loans) are now more expensive. A
negative dividend payout coupled with a fall in stock prices, as the periphery
is not affected by the technology shock, determines a fall in equity returns.
Finally, regarding sovereign bonds, as households in the core country enjoy
more the effects of the productivity shock, they also increase the demand
of domestic sovereigns driving down the interest rate. In the periphery,
instead, the demand decreases determining a higher interest rate. Table
4.5.2, column (1), shows these dynamics in terms of correlations. If we allow
capital producers to be more flexible in their dividend payout policy, column
(2), we see that only the correlation on the equity market changes.27 In the
core, capital producers increase dividend payouts such as to further sustain
the rise in the stock price and in the return on equity. In the periphery,
capital producers payout even less dividends than in the previous case. This
behaviour allows the capital producers to further self-finance their operations,
increase investment and push up the stock price. In turn, this entails a lower
decrease (and eventually a slight increase) in the periphery equity returns.
27In the model, a more flexible dividend payout policy is achieved by reducing the
adjustment cost on dividends’ parameter, κd, from 11 to 1.
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Model with credit constraints
In the scenario without constraints the bank accumulates negative excess
capital. After the positive technology shock the bank collects resources
from the households (deposits) but does not provide enough loans to the
firms. The unused resources translate into bank’s consumption. The capital
constraint forces the bank to avoid to be too indebted with no counterpart
on the asset side of the balance sheet. It obliges the bank to match the asset
side and the liability side of the balance sheet not allowing for a negative
net position. Once we introduce the capital constraint, the bank keeps
less unused resources for lending activities and provides more loans to the
economy. In doing so the interest rate on loans decreases for the two regions
providing an incentive for the capital’s producers to be financed through
the bank. As a consequence, in the periphery, dividend payout fall less and
the demand of loans increases determining a more pronounced increase in
investments. The stock price increases following the behaviour of investment
and driving up the return on equity. Moreover, the augmented investments
further sustain the output increase in both countries. Consumption, in both
countries, increases as well. Via the collateral constraint, the bank demands
also more sovereign bonds in order to support the private credit supply.
Both core and periphery sovereign interest rates fall. On the equity market,
the increase in investment drives a stronger increase in equity prices that is
reflected in higher equity returns in both regions. Table 4.5.2, column (3),
shows these dynamics in terms of correlations.
With credit constraint, on the one hand a positive technological shock
in the core triggers a positive increase in equity returns both in the core
and in the periphery; on the other hand, it determines an equal increase
in the demand of sovereign bonds, as collaterals, that drives the interest
rate on these assets down. As a consequence the correlation bond-stock is
negative both in the core and in the periphery implying a certain degree
of diversification for investor’s portfolio. These results are not affected by
increasing the flexibility of dividend payouts as shown in column (4). Capital
producers in the periphery payout less dividends whereas those in the core
payout more. These decisions determine a further (slight) increase in stock
prices and equity returns. However, in the presence of credit constraint,
allowing capital producers to decide their payout policy does not affect asset
market’s correlations. As a result, we conclude that the model with credit
constraints is better able to reproduce the correlations as in the data with
respect to the model without.
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Table 4.5.2: Correlation data vs Technology shock
Data Model
2004-2007 No credit constr. Credit constr.
Bench. Flex. div Bench. Flex. div
(1) (2) (3) (4)
corr(Rb,p,Rb,c) 0.98 -0.75 -0.75 0.79 0.82
corr(RS,p,RS,c) 0.82 -0.07 0.35 0.87 0.88
corr(Rb,c,RS,c) -0.08 -0.19 -0.18 -0.11 -0.13
corr(Rb,p,RS,p) -0.24 -0.29 -0.32 -0.06 -0.09
Rb,j is the gross return on sovereign bonds in country j ∈ {c, p} and RS,j the gross return
on equity. ’Bench.’ is the benchmark model calibrated as explained in section 4.4; ’Flex.
div’ is the model with a lower adjustment cost on dividend payout. The different model
specifications are simulated after a correlated (positive) technology shock between the
core and the periphery.
4.5.3 Sovereign risk shock
A shock to the maximum level of sustainable debt determines an increase
in the default rate. The direct consequence is that agents demand a higher
(gross) interest rate in order to compensate for the lower net return given by
the expected higher default. On the government side, the debt level in the
periphery increases as a consequence of the higher interest rate, given that,
with default risk, the government does not enjoy a reduction in the stock of
debt. As sovereign debt increases so do taxes given the debt-stabilizing tax
rule. Figure 4.D.3 in Appendix 4.D shows the IRFs after a sovereign risk
shock for the model with and without credit constraints. We will further
investigate the role of more or less flexible dividend payout policy of the
capital producers. By bringing the model to the data we compare the model’s
results with the correlations over the period 2010-2012.
Sovereign risk shock in the data
The period 2010-2012 was characterised by the sovereign debt crisis of the
euro zone. Periphery countries experienced increasing troubles on their
sovereign debt reflected in high interest rates as shown in Figure 4.1.1. The
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Figure 4.5.3: Sovereign risk shock for EA periphery countries
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Notes. The figure plots the residuals from the panel estimation
on sovereign yields spreads that identifies the sovereign risk
shock. The countries shown are: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal
and Spain. Data sources: Author’s calculations.
main issues shaping the crisis were weak actual and potential growth, low
competitiveness and large (and growing) debt-to-output ratios.28 Prior
to this crisis, the level of debt-to-output has been the main determinant
of the interest rate demanded on sovereign bonds. However, during the
sovereign debt crisis a big part of the riskiness was not explained by the
level of debt-to-output. In order to identify this shock we regress the level
of debt-to-output onto the sovereign bond yields’ spreads vis-a`-vis Germany
as explained in Section 4.4 and in Appendix 4.B. The residuals are plotted
in Figure 4.5.3.
As we can see, until 2010 the yields (or riskiness vis-a`-vis Germany) were
well explained by the previous level of risk as well as debt (residuals centred
around zero). From 2010 the model does not fit the data as well as before
meaning that something else was the driver of the risk. This is the shock we
identify and that has its major impact between 2010 and 2012.29
28See for instance Petrakis et al. (2013).
29If we run the panel regression by splitting the sample before and after 2010 and
compare the R2, we see that it is much lower in the second sample. This provides additional
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Model without credit constraints
Without credit constraints an increase in the maximum sustainable level
of debt brings to a wealth loss for the periphery households via taxation.
They decrease consumption of both domestic as well as foreign goods. Given
the home biased composition of their consumption basket, the decrease in
consumption in the periphery leads to a reallocation of relative prices with
the appreciation of the core currency. The marginal productivity of factors of
production falls, determining a decrease in labour and output. Furthermore,
as the shadow value of capital falls, investments decrease which reduces
capital. In the core, the change in relative prices brings employment, capital
and output to increase. Also core consumption increases as foreign goods
are relatively cheaper.
For what concerns the bank’s related dynamics, loans’ demand falls
in both regions decreasing the interest rate. In the periphery, households
decrease the supply of deposits and increase the holdings of sovereign bonds.
In the core, households increase both deposits and the sovereign bond
holdings. As the net return on sovereign bonds decreases, the bank decides
to hold less of these assets on impact. However, as after impact the net
return on sovereign bond increases, the bank decides to invest more in the
periphery bonds driving an increase in its excess capital.
On the equity side, households in the periphery buy more of both domestic
as well as foreign issued equity. At the same time capital producers payout
more dividends both in the core and in the periphery. Such a behaviour in
the periphery determines a faster disinvestment; in the core an attempt to
keep a high price and return on equity. However, the price of equity falls in
both regions as the expected discounted value of future dividends decreases.
This, in turn, leads to a decrease in the return on equity in both regions,
though more pronounced in the periphery country. Table 4.5.3, column (1),
shows these dynamics in terms of correlations. In column (2) we see that
allowing the capital producers to be more flexible on their payout policy
changes the correlation on the equity market. Both in the core and in the
periphery they payout more dividends for the reasons explained above. As a
consequence the periphery stock price further falls whereas the core stock
price increases. In turn, the positive increase in the core stock price drives a
different dynamics of equity returns in the two regions: an increase in the
core and a decrease in the periphery. All the reported effects are, however,
evidence of a change in the explanatory power of debt-to-output.
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quite small without credit constraints.
Model with credit constraints
When credit constraints are introduced, the impact of the shock magnifies.
The capital constraint impedes the bank to be too leveraged (positive excess
capital) and forces the financial intermediary to cut on part of the asset
side. As a consequence, the bank decreases the supply of loans. This in
turn hampers the fall in investment in the periphery and leads core capital
producers also to decrease investments. The consequent fall in capital in
the two regions brings a fall in output, wages and labour supply in the
periphery, and a short lasting increase in core output and employment. Real
exchange rate dynamics drive the different behaviour. Nevertheless, as also
core investments fall, output in the core is forced to decrease after the initial
boost. Consumption falls more than before and this time also in the core
country.
At the same time, the collateral constraint forces the bank to hold
sovereign bonds as a collateral for the provision of credit to the private
sector. The collateral requested not only accounts for the quantity of
sovereign bonds held by the bank but also for their quality. For instance,
a sovereign shock that decreases the quality of periphery collaterals, by
increasing the default rate on sovereign bonds, forces the bank to hold more
of these assets in order to make up for the loss in quality. This determines
a flight to quality between the risky sovereigns (periphery bonds) and the
riskless ones (core bonds).30 Additionally, this behaviour drives a wedge in
the return from deposits and sovereign bonds that induces the households
to invest more in deposits than in sovereign bonds. Noteworthy, all the
previous dynamics are consistent with the findings of Perego and Pierrard
(2014).
For what concerns equity, the owners of the firms demand more equity
payouts in order to sustain their consumption. Regardless of the increase in
dividend payouts, equity prices fall reflecting the decrease in investments.
As a consequence, the equity returns in the two regions decrease of almost
the same amount.
30 We refer to flight-to-quality in bond markets by comparing the level of the correlation
before 2010, that was very high, to the one during the sovereign debt crisis that fell to
approximately 0.2. The flight-to-quality in the sovereign bond market has been widely
documented by media and scholars in the recent years. Among the others see for instance
Barrios et al. (2009) for an analysis of core-periphery sovereign bond spreads.
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Table 4.5.3: Correlation data vs Sovereign risk
Data Model
2010-2012 No credit constr. Credit constr.
Bench. Flex. div Bench. Flex. div
(1) (2) (3) (4)
corr(Rb,p,Rb,c) 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.28 0.25
corr(RS,p,RS,c) 0.73 0.99 -0.85 0.99 0.99
corr(Rb,c,RS,c) 0.28 0.22 0.22 0.67 0.49
corr(Rb,p,RS,p) -0.19 -0.60 -0.60 -0.14 -0.16
Rb,j is the gross return on sovereign bonds in country j ∈ {c, p} and RS,j the gross return
on equity. ’Bench.’ is the benchmark model calibrated as explained in section 4.4; ’Flex.
div’ is the model with a lower adjustment cost on dividend payout. The different model
specifications are simulated after a negative shock to the maximum sustainable level of
debt in the periphery.
The disruption of the sovereign bond market and the high correlation on
the stock one ultimately impact in a different way on the core and periphery
stock-bond correlations. In the core the correlation is positive. After a
sovereign risk shock, on the one hand the interest rate on bonds is lowered by
the flight-to-quality towards this asset; on the other hand, the equity returns
decrease as firms are affected by a credit crunch that impacts negatively on
investment and output. In the periphery the correlation turns instead to be
negative as the sovereign returns spike whereas the stock returns decrease.
As for the previous shocks, in the case of credit constraints, the capital
producers’ payout policy does not affect the correlations as we can see from
column (3) and (4).
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4.6 Conclusion
This chapter proposes a framework where to detect the sources of shocks
that hit the euro area economy by looking at the correlation on the equity
and sovereign bond markets. We explore the role of financial intermediaries,
credit constraints and capital producers’ dividend payout policy for the
correlations on these markets. We show that credit constraints (i) amplify
shocks and (ii) change the response of variables to the shocks being key
for the behaviour of asset markets. Without credit constraints, asymmetric
shocks in the union imply asymmetric impacts on the core and periphery
asset markets. The existence of credit constraints at the international bank
level prompts more synchronization in asset markets’ responses and a more
homogeneous sharing of the effects of shocks between countries. Capital
producers’ dividend payout policy can effect the behaviour of the stock
market only in the case of unconstrained credit. This is not surprising as
constraints on bank’s capital and collaterals determine a strong tightening
of credit to firms and a pro-cyclical amplification of shocks that leaves a
small margin of manoeuvre to firms.
Finally, we show that the model with credit constraints is able to explain
the stylized facts on correlations’ behaviours in the EA stock and sovereign
bond markets during the period 2000-2012. We find that a productivity
shock can explain the negative relation between stock and bonds before the
sovereign debt crisis whereas that a financial expectation shock can account
for the positive one. After 2010, the heterogeneous behaviour of the core
and periphery stock-bond markets can be reproduced by a sovereign risk
shock to the periphery.
This chapter is a first attempt to introduce financial intermediaries in
an otherwise standard open economy macroeconomic framework. Future
research should focus more on the bank representation of leverage as well as
on its regulation. Moreover, a closer look at the central bank’s dimension
and monetary policy would be worthy. Finally, it could be of interest to add
to the dimension of asset markets by including bank and corporate debt in
the model. On the firm side, introducing corporate debt and allowing for
new issuing of equity would refine the capital choice of firms and add new
insights to the corporate finance literature.
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4.A Individual return series
In this appendix we present the disaggregated behaviour of sovereign bond
and stock markets in the euro zone. The figure presents data from the year
2000 to October 2013. Legends for the individual countries refer to the rows.
Figure 4.A.1: Behaviour of core and periphery bond and stock returns
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Notes. Stock market series are total return indexes on non-financial firms;
bond series are DS benchmark 10 years index of yields to redemption.
Data Source: Datastream.
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4.B Sovereign risk shock
In this appendix we present a detailed explanation of the methodology used
to estimate the sovereign risk shock and we compare it with different panel
specifications. Data for the yield series are taken from Datastream for the
10 years central government bonds. The Y ield series used in the estimations
are computed as the difference of periphery country yields from the one of
Germany. Debt data are expressed as percentage of output and are taken
from the quarterly national account statistics from Eurostat. The periphery
countries we consider are the GIIPS: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and
Spain over the period 2000Q2-2013Q4.
4.B.1 Derivation of the panel formulation
From equation (4.3.39) we can see that the difference between the periphery
and core returns on sovereign bonds depends on expectations of default.
These expectations are themselves dependent on the changes in the level
of debt-to-output and the stochastic maximum sustainable level of debt,
equation (4.3.38). In the data we capture this relation by regressing the
debt-to-output ratio of periphery countries to the yield spread between
those countries and Germany, taken as the benchmark for the core. The
residuals of this regression are the maximum sustainable level of debt (MSD).
In other words, the stochastic MSD is the part of risk of sovereign bonds’
yields unexplained by changes in levels of debt-to-output as expressed by
the following relation:
Y ieldi,t = βbDebti,t + ui,t ,
where
ui,t = BY
max
t − B¯Y max
from equation (4.3.35). We additionally assume that the MSD series follow
the autoregressive process:
ui,t = γb ui,t−1 + ubi,t
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where 0 < γb < 1 is the autoregressive component, and u
b
t is a i.i.d. shock.
By substituting the ui,t definition into the Yield expression we obtain:
Y ieldi,t = βbDebti,t + ui,t
= βbDebti,t + γb ui,t−1 + ubi,t
= βbDebti,t + γb (Y ieldi,t−1 − βbDebti,t−1) + ubi,t .
By re-expressing variables in differences we obtain the final formulation as
in equation (4.4.1):
∆Y ieldi,t = βb ∆Debti,t − (1− γb) (Y ieldi,t−1 − βbDebti,t−1) + αi + ubt
where αi are country fixed effects. Notice that (1−γb) = γ in equation (4.4.1).
So by estimating γˆ we know γˆb that we interpret as the persistence parameter
of the MSD shock. Finally, in order to calibrate the volatility of ubi,t, σ
b
t , we
could reconstruct the series of the MSD as ui,t = Y ieldi,t − βbDebti,t.
4.B.2 Alternative panel estimations
Table 4.B.1 presents the estimation results for equation (4.4.1) when con-
trolling for different set of fixed effects.31
The specification in column (1) does not include fixed effects in order
to get a preliminary idea of the sign of the coefficients, which indeed have
the expected sign. In column (2) and (3) we include respectively, first only
year and then also quarter fixed effects to control for time specific shocks
common to all countries. The sign of the coefficients of interest remains
unchanged. Then, in column (4) we include year and country fixed effects to
control for any country specific factor affecting the change in the riskiness.
Although this might appear the best specification in terms of explained
variance, our final purpose is to use the error component as a proxy for
exogenous riskiness shock. By including year (or even quarter) fixed effects,
any time specific exogenous shock is absorbed by fixed effects, and thus
removed from the error component. In contrast, we want the error term
to capture also exogenous shock common to all countries, thus we remove
year fixed effects from specification (4). Finally, in column (5) we show our
31The data sample has been cleaned from outliers by removing the top and bottom 1
percentile.
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preferred estimation including only country fixed effects. The sign and the
magnitude of coefficient do not change a lot, but the error component now
(potentially) contains exogenous shock common to all countries.
Table 4.B.1: Alternative panel estimations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables ∆ Yield ∆ Yield ∆ Yield ∆ Yield ∆ Yield
∆ Debt 0.0587∗∗ 0.0346∗∗ 0.0243∗∗ 0.0192∗ 0.0531∗∗
(0.0177) (0.00986) (0.00724) (0.00864) (0.0140)
Lag Yields -0.145∗ -0.173∗ -0.168∗ -0.227∗∗ -0.211∗
(0.0581) (0.0644) (0.0651) (0.0590) (0.0792)
Lag Debt 0.00273 0.00177 0.00174 0.00954 0.0109
(0.00291) (0.00280) (0.00279) (0.00940) (0.00946)
Country FE no no no yes yes
Year FE no yes yes yes no
Quarter FE no no yes no no
Observations 260 260 260 260 260
R-squared 0.110 0.275 0.295 0.331 0.147
Number of i 5 5 5 5 5
Errors are cluster at country level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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4.C Business cycle statistics
In this appendix we compare the model’s second moments with the cyclical
properties of EA data. We simulate the model with a correlated technology
shock between the core and the periphery and calibrated as explained in
section 4.4. Table 4.C reports the standard deviations of sample moments
that, as in section 4.5, are computed from 50 simulations of the economy,
each of 60 periods. As with the data, the statistics in our simulations refer
to Hodrick-Prescott filtered variables.
We compare the model with EA data on business cycle second moments.32
In the specific, we refer to the ECB study of Agresti and Mojon (2001) where
they present data for individual euro area countries for the period ’70-’80
until 2000 for investment, output and consumption. In Data (1) of table 4.C
we present their statistics by taking the average between countries belonging
to the core and the periphery of the EA (except Ireland). Data on hours
worked, ’N’, are taken from Ohanian and Raffo (2011) on the period 1960-
2010. As they only present an aggregate for euro area countries33 we cannot
disentangle the core and periphery statistics and we use one estimate for
the two regions. In Data (2) we additionally provide statistics based on the
author’s calculations. Variables are logged and HP-filtered, except for Q
that is only HP-filtered, with a 1600 smoothing weight. Data comes from
the OECD economic outlook and covers the period 1995Q1-2013Q4. ’N’ is
hours worked and ’W’ is compensation per employee divided by number
of hours worked. ’Q’ is the real exchange rate of the core with respect
to the periphery. This variable has been created as the ratio between the
consumption price index in the core and in the periphery.34 35
As of model’s simulations, we present moments for the benchmark model
(with credit constraints) ’Bench.’; for a model without constraints, ’No credit
32Both for the model and for the data, standard deviations are always presented relative
to the one of output in the domestic country.
33In detail they consider an average for France, Germany and Italy.
34The countries considered for the core region are France and Germany whereas those
belonging to the periphery are Italy, Spain and Portugal.
35In Data (2) we find that the volatility of wages is higher than the one of hours worked.
This is contradictory with the empirical estimates of the US business cycle as well as
with national studies for EA countries (see for instance Bec et al. (2000), chapter 20, for
a study on France). However, on the one hand these studies have been conducted on a
different time period and on single countries rather than for an aggregate of the EA, on
the other, the time period we consider could have strongly influenced the data given the
recent financial crisis first and the sovereign debt crisis then.
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Table 4.C.1: Individual country statistics
France Germany Italy Spain Portugal
Absolute standard deviations
Y 0.0107 0.0155 0.0128 0.0108 0.0116
C 0.0075 0.0063 0.0099 0.0132 0.0141
I 0.0310 0.0382 0.0255 0.0392 0.0385
N 0.0069 0.0075 0.0054 0.0059 0.0068
W 0.0110 0.0120 0.0139 0.0187 0.0148
Standard deviations relative to output
C 0.7033 0.4034 0.7691 1.2225 1.2184
I 2.9038 2.4572 1.9848 3.6278 3.3314
N 0.6481 0.4805 0.4178 0.5457 0.5859
W 1.0283 0.7753 1.0843 1.7324 1.2830
This table presents the disaggregated behaviour of selected
business cycle statistics for France, Germany, Italy, Spain and
Portugal. Variables are log and HP-filtered. Data comes from
the OECD economic outlook and covers the period 1995Q1-
2013Q4. ’N’ is hours worked and ’W’ is compensation per
employee divided by number of hours worked.
constr.’ and for the benchmark model with low adjustment cost on dividends
’Flex. div’. Among the different model’s specifications, ’Bench.’ is the one
that reproduces the closer the business cycle stylized facts in the two regions.
As we can notice, the model delivers statistics consistent with the data
although ’C’ and ’I’ are too volatile. This can be explained by the fact that
we have a reduced representation of all the linkages and shocks that exist
and hit the EA economy as the model was not constructed with this purpose.
However it shows to behave qualitatively in line with the performance of
models in the RBC literature although, for some variables, not quantitatively.
These results are consistent through out the different model’s specifications.
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Table 4.C.2: Business cycle statistics
Data Model
(1) (2) Bench. No credit constr. Flex. div
Standard deviations relative to output
Core
Y c 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Cc 1.00 0.45 1.51 2.12 1.61
Ic 2.83 2.58 8.5 4.47 7.6
Nc 0.78 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.45
W c - 0.77 0.21 0.21 0.21
Qc - 0.36 0.19 0.19 0.20
Periphery
Y p 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Cp 1.05 0.87 1.57 2.13 1.64
Ip 3.05 2.49 8.6 4.46 7.5
Np 0.78 0.31 0.46 0.45 0.45
W p - 1.13 0.21 0.21 0.20
Correlation with output
Core
Cc 0.68 0.64 0.94 0.88 0.95
Ic 0.72 0.92 0.95 0.97 0.89
Nc - 0.36 0.96 0.95 0.96
W c - 0.27 0.96 0.95 0.96
Qc - 0.23 0.45 0.42 0.41
Periphery
Cp 0.69 0.77 0.95 0.87 0.94
Ip 0.62 0.91 0.95 0.97 0.90
Np - 0.08 0.96 0.96 0.96
W p - 0.47 0.96 0.96 0.96
We present the results for a correlated productivity shock in the core and in the periphery
of the EA. We present moments for the benchmark model with banking frictions ’Bench.’,
without ’No credit constr.’ and with low adjustment cost on dividends ’Flex. div’.
Standard deviations and correlations are always presented relative to output of the
domestic country. Data (1) is taken from Agresti and Mojon (2001) on the sample period
’70-’80-2000. N j , hours worked in Data (1), are taken from Ohanian and Raffo (2011) on
the period 1960-2010 while W j is not available for an aggregate of EA countries. Data
(2) on the EA business cycle is taken from the OECD economic outlook at quarterly
frequency for the period 1995Q1:2013Q4 and are based on author’s calculations.
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4.D Dynamic simulations
Figure 4.D.1: IRFs after a positive financial expectation shock.
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Notes. The shock is to the (union) equity market returns. IRFs show the benchmark
model (dotted line) vs model without credit constraints (solid line). Results, in
deviation from the steady state, are expressed respectively in percentage points for
rates and in percent for the remaining variables.
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Figure 4.D.2: IRFs after a positive technology shock in the core.
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Notes. IRFs show the benchmark model (dotted line) vs model without credit
constraints (solid line). Results, in deviation from the steady state, are expressed
respectively in percentage points for rates and in percent for the remaining variables.
’Core domestic equity’ stands for the equity of the core country held by core households.
Analogously, ’Periphery domestic equity’ stands for the equity of the periphery country
held by periphery households.
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Figure 4.D.3: IRFs after a negative maximum sustainable debt-output ratio
shock in the periphery.
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Notes. IRFs show the benchmark model (dotted line) vs model without credit
constraints (solid line). Results, in deviation from the steady state, are expressed
respectively in percentage points for rates and in percent for the remaining variables.
’Core domestic equity’ stands for the equity of the core country held by core households.
Analogously, ’Periphery domestic equity’ stands for the equity of the periphery country
held by periphery households.
